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— The fact that we can predict eclipses does not mean that we can predict
revolutions.
— Five overlapping sub-systems –science, technology, economy, politics and
general culture– influence the process of economic growth. Although each of
the five has its own distinctive features and relative autonomy, it is their
interdependence and interaction which provides major insights into the
processes of “forging ahead”, “catching up” and “falling behind” in economic
growth.
Christopher Freeman, History, Co-evolution and Economic Growth, University
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At the start of the new decade, the debate on economic policy centres on
the consequence of the reforms implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean
in the last two decades. Trade and financial liberalization and the privatization
of production activities have radically altered the rules of the game governing
labour and business. The macroeconomic policy changes that accompanied or
preceded the reforms sometimes strengthened the latter’s specific objectives,
especially the growth of exports, but on other occasions they had the opposite
effect. That combination of factors prompted the emergence of new market
structures and transformations in microeconomic behaviour.
Assessing the effects of the reforms on economic growth, employment
and income distribution is of more than academic interest. Governments,
political parties and social actors require a thorough evaluation of the results,
so as to devise or propose policies that complement the reforms or counter
their unwanted consequences. The Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) actively participates in this process.
This book is part of a project carried out by ECLAC, in conjunction
with researchers from nine countries, to study the impact of the reforms.
Directed by Dr. Barbara Stallings, the project has produced 14 books and 70
working papers. The summary appears in the first volume, entitled Growth,
Employment and Equity: The Impact of the Economic Reforms in Latin America
and the Caribbean. It is complemented by four issue-specific volumes
analysing investment, technological change, employment and equity.
Additionally, another nine country volumes examine the particular
characteristics of the reforms in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico and Peru. The working papers are available at
ECLAC’s web site (www.cepal.cl).
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One feature of the project that distinguishes it from other comparative
studies of economic reform is that it specifically addresses the interaction
between macroeconomic and microeconomic processes. To understand the
impact of the reforms more fully, it is necessary to disaggregate the regional
level and to study the differences between countries and in the microeconomic
behaviour of firms according to sector, size and ownership. The globalization
of the economy and government policies such as structural reform affect
different countries and groups of firms in different ways. Some have been
able to exploit the new opportunities, while the situation of others has
deteriorated. The outcome of such developments gives rise to aggregate trends
that others have observed and measured, but to design economic policy
measures and improve future performance, it is essential to know what
underlies those aggregates.
In this book, Jorge Katz, Director of ECLAC’s Division of Production,
Productivity and Management, seeks to examine the impact of the structural
reforms on labour productivity growth; the relative technological gap with
the international productivity frontier; differences in technological behaviour
among different groups of firms, such as subsidiaries of transnational firms,
large national conglomerates and family-owned small and medium-sized
enterprises; the creation and destruction of jobs; and the trade balance in
manufacturing goods of the different countries of the region.
The study examines changes over time in Latin American countries’
pattern of production specialization and participation in world trade of
manufactured goods. It also seeks to determine which productive sectors have
been the winners and losers following the structural transformation mentioned
above, and what has happened to various types of firms during the adjustment
to the new rules of the game. Finally, the book assesses the impact of structural
transformation on employment and the foreign trade balance in
manufacturing.
The findings show that two main models of production specialization
have been consolidating in Latin America. On the one hand is the model
unfolding in several South American countries –Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Uruguay– where relative share has been gained by natural resource–based
industries producing industrial commodities such as iron and steel, pulp and
paper, vegetable oil, fishmeal and aluminium. On the other hand, Mexico
and several of the smaller countries of Central America have specialized in
the production of assembly industries (maquilas) producing computer
equipment, televisions, video recorders and clothing, largely for the United
States market. In both cases there has also been an increase in the relative
weight of non-tradable industries producing goods and services –such as,
telecommunications, energy and transport– as well as in the automotive
industry, which has received preferential treatment in all countries.
By contrast, engineering and labour-intensive industries have lost relative
participation in gross domestic product (GDP). These include sectors which
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use unskilled labour rather intensively, for the production of consumer goods
such as footwear and leather goods, furniture and textiles, and engineering-
intensive industries producing capital goods, agricultural equipment or
pharmaceutical raw materials. Among the “winning” sectors we find those
in which local subsidiaries of transnational firms and large domestic
conglomerates figure more prominently. In contrast, industries in which
family-owned businesses tend to be the major actors have clearly lost ground
throughout the region.
In sum, this study describes an episode of major transformations in the
region’s production structure, the most prominent consequence of which has
been a sharp increase in each economy’s degree of structural heterogeneity.
ECLAC could not have carried out a project of this scale without the
cooperation of many individuals and institutions. We wish to thank the
researchers that participated in each of the nine countries, as well as the
coordinators of the thematic and national volumes. We are also indebted to
the members of the project’s External Advisory Committee: Nancy Birdsall,
Director of Economic Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; René Cortázar, Executive Director of Chilean National Television;
Norman Hicks, senior economist at the World Bank; Juan Antonio Morales,
President of the Central Bank of Bolivia; Pitou van Dijck, Professor of
Economics at the University of Amsterdam; and Dorothea Werneck, Executive
Director of the Brazilian Agency for Export Promotion.
External financing came from a number of international donors. First,
we wish to recognize the central role of the Netherlands Ministry for
Development Cooperation, which provided the project’s basic donation. The
International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) also made a
substantial contribution that allowed us to expand the scope of the project
significantly. These two sources were supplemented with funds from the Ford
Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency. We offer
our deepest thanks to all the donors, without whose support this project would
not have been possible.
JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

PREFACE
More than two decades have passed since the region’s first attempts to
move towards a development strategy that was more open to foreign
competition and more deregulated, in which the State had a smaller role in
production activities. Those earliest efforts were made at the start of the 1970s
by Chile and were later followed by similar initiatives in Mexico, Argentina,
Colombia, Costa Rica and Brazil in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The change
in development paradigm, which entailed the abandonment of the inward-
oriented, state-led model of the postwar period, brought about great macro-,
meso- and microeconomic changes. The production structure and the
institutional and regulatory regime of the countries of the region underwent
significant change as part of a profound, long-term structural transformation
that is far from finished.
The combination of pro-competitive structural reforms, the historical
features of each national economy and the impact of the world economy’s
increasing financial turbulence and volatility triggered a Schumpeterian
episode of “creative destruction” through which a new economic, institutional
and technological regime is gradually emerging. The micro- and
mesoeconomic features of this regime have scarcely been researched so far.
This book presents the research findings of one of the five modules of a
project entitled “Growth, employment and equity: Latin America and the
Caribbean in the 1990s”, which was conducted jointly by the Economic
Development Division and the Division of Production, Productivity and
Management at ECLAC’s headquarters in Santiago, Chile. The study was
carried out in close collaboration with various research centres and
independent professionals from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica
and Mexico.
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Many people provided intellectual and analytical support during the three
years covered by the research and writing of this book. At ECLAC’s headquarters
in Santiago, Chile, special mention should be made of the colleagues who were
responsible for the other modules of the programme: Ricardo Bielschowsky,
Graciela Moguillansky, Samuel Morley, Wilson Peres, Barbara Stallings and
Jürgen Weller. Thanks are also due to Oscar Altimir, Martine Dirven, Ricardo
Ffrench-Davis, José Antonio Ocampo, Juan Carlos Ramírez, Joseph Ramos and
Giovani Stumpo for their contributions at various stages.
The research was conducted in direct collaboration with Roberto Bisang
and Beny Kosacoff in Argentina; João Ferraz and Paulo Tigre in Brazil; José
Miguel Benavente and Gustavo Crespi in Chile; Ricardo Chica in Colombia;
Gustavo Barbosa and Rudolfo Buitelaar in Costa Rica; and Mario Capdeville,
Mónica Casalett and Mario Címoli in Mexico. They all deserve my deepest
thanks, though I obviously retain total responsibility for what is said
throughout the book. Thanks also go to Paula Warnken and Isabel Massad for
their efficient secretarial support, and to Ximena Sánchez and María Eugenia
Johnson for their help in getting the manuscript into shape.
The book was originally published in Spanish under the title “Reformas
Estructurales, Productividad y Conducta Tecnológica en América Latina”, and
it was translated into English by Andrew Crawley. I made considerable
revisions in the translation, but the general arguments and conclusions
nonetheless remain the same. Jennifer Hoover and Barbara Stallings are to be
thanked for their editorial help in making these changes.
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INTRODUCTION
More than two decades have already elapsed since the first attempts were
made in Latin America to move towards a development strategy that was
more open to external competition and more deregulated, with less
participation of the State as a producer of goods and services. Efforts in this
direction began in Chile in the early 1970s and Argentina later in the same
decade; Mexico and Costa Rica followed suit in the 1980s. Brazil appears as a
late reformer, initiating market-oriented reforms only in the early 1990s. Such
a paradigmatic change prompted enormous macro-, meso- and microeconomic
changes. The production structure and the institutional and regulatory
environment of the Latin American countries is currently in the middle of a
deep, long-term structural transformation.
The transition to a new model of production organization and a new
regulatory regime is far from being concluded. Even Chile, which is often
cited in the international press as a country that has been able to return to a
stable, long-term equilibrium growth path after the crisis of the 1970s, is far
from having developed a well-behaved microeconomic scenario. Large inter-
industry and inter-regional differences in productivity can still be found in
Chile today, suggesting that the transition towards a mature production
structure has yet to be completed.
An analysis of the impact of recent structural reforms on the Latin
American countries must start from the understanding that the countries are
all very different from each other, and that no single “story” of the impact of
the reforms can adequately describe their experiences. First, the countries differ
in their accumulated technological capabilities and in the degree of
technological maturity present prior to the recent structural reforms, such
that their responses were bound to be different. Second, they initiated the
17
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1. When using the term macroeconomic policy regime in this book, I refer to a combination of fiscal,
monetary, exchange rate, and tariff policies together with changes in property rights.
2. The notion of sustainability requires some discussion. It can refer solely to the sustainability of the
key macroeconomic prices (exchange rate, interest rate and so on) that stem from a programme of
macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform. It can also refer to a broader notion of political
sustainability, which is related to the behaviour of other variables such as the unemployment rate or
the degree of equity with which the benefits of productive modernization and productivity growth
are distributed among the population. The drastic increase in open unemployment or a very
inequitable pattern of distribution can militate against the long-term sustainability of the structural
reform programme, even if the key macroeconomic prices are kept reasonably close to equilibrium.
3. See Katz (1996). Much research remains to be done on these issues, however.
processes of trade liberalization and market deregulation at different points
in time, and they were therefore affected differently by the ups and downs of
the international capital market. Finally, they all differ, too, in the depth and
internal consistency of their macroeconomic stabilization cum structural
reforms policy packages, as well as in the extent to which they received external
support during the implementation of these measures. This means that, a
priori, large differences can be expected to prevail among the countries with
regard to the actual results attained from the application of the structural
reform programmes.
Despite such differences, an overall assessment of the impact of the
reforms in the macroeconomic policy regime is in order,1  as it can demonstrate
who has won and who has lost as a result of the changes, how the countries
are performing today under a new macroeconomic policy regime and whether
the new growth paradigm is actually sustainable.2
The approach used in this book draws extensively on Schumpeter’s
metaphor of the creative destruction processes. Latin America is currently
undergoing fundamental changes in the model of production organization,
as well as in its institutional and regulatory regimes. As a result of history and
accumulated technological capabilities, in combination with recent market-
oriented structural reforms, each of the region’s societies is going through its
own episode of destroying an old, inward-oriented organizational model,
while gradually (and painfully) developing a new, more outward- and market-
oriented model, whose basic structural features are still being forged and
whose long-term behaviour is thus largely unknown. This building-up process
is proving to be highly heterogeneous across industries, regions and firms. It
also generates social exclusion and can rightly be described as strongly
inequitable. I argue here that a study of the emerging issues of structure and
performance must be set in a micro-to-macro context, capable of uncovering
how different types of firms, industries and regions within any given country
have adapted to a new pro-competitive macroeconomic policy regime.
Unfortunately, macro-to-micro interdependencies have thus far received little
attention in mainstream economics, and many of the issues highlighted here
have remained almost unexplored.3  From this perspective, the interaction
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between economic, institutional and technological forces –which are not the
same for all fields of activity– explains the varying degree to which firms,
industries and regions managed to adapt to a more competitive, deregulated
and privatized economic regime. Schumpeter’s notion of the creative
destruction mechanism appears to be an adequate representation of what is
presently taking place in Latin America.
Most of the available literature on the impact of structural reforms in the
region is of a macroeconomic nature. It consequently fails to capture the
enormous role of meso- and microeconomic forces or of institutional and
technological variables, which influence the adjustment process of any given
economy to changes in its macroeconomic policy regime. Macroeconomic
theory is, by definition, blind to the profound degree of heterogeneity that
prevails among types of firms (e.g., large domestic conglomerates, local
subsidiaries of transnational companies, small and medium-sized family-
owned enterprises) or among regions or industries, as well as to the influence
such heterogeneity has on the way individual firms, regions or industries
adapt to a new macroeconomic policy regime. Such differences in adaptation
capabilities have a lot to do with who wins and who loses from structural
reforms. By the same token, macroeconomic theory also overlooks the reverse
effect, that is, the impact of different microeconomic responses on the long-
term sustainability of a given structural reform package. Consider, for example,
the case of an inadequate response of exports to a change in the exchange
rate. If exports do not grow as much as expected following the devaluation of
the local currency (as may have occurred in Brazil in the late 1990s), it could
be the consequence of an incorrect exchange rate –or of its rapid appreciation
through time– but it could also be the result of a low rate of innovation and
productivity growth in the years prior to the devaluation. Looking at the
adjustment path exclusively from a macroeconomic perspective almost
inevitably leads one to assess the sustainability of the long-term growth path
of an economy in terms of its macroeconomic prices (i.e., the exchange rate,
the interest rate, and so forth) and to disregard the way in which the underlying
institutional and technological forces condition the results of macroeconomic
policy changes. Productivity growth seems to depend precisely on these often
forgotten underlying forces.
Mainstream economics assumes that opening up to foreign competition
and deregulating and privatizing economic activities will necessarily push
an economy to a new equilibrium growth path, after a series of short-term
adjustments. What concerns the macroeconomist is not the institutional,
technological and organizational features of the new production structure, or
who wins and who loses during the adjustment process, but the fact that the
economy as a whole returns to a long-term equilibrium growth path, with its
external and fiscal accounts under control.
Such an approach to the study of growth is highly misleading, however,
if the goal is to understand what is happening in Latin America in the present
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transition to a more open, market-oriented and deregulated economic
environment. The growth rate of labour productivity has not been sufficiently
high in the region over the past two decades, and productivity growth has
been highly uneven among industries, regions and firms. Many industries
and activities have been seriously disrupted by trade liberalization and by
the massive influx of imported substitutes. Moreover, business concentration
and the share of transnational corporations in gross domestic product (GDP)
have dramatically increased during the adjustment process, which is a clear
indication that massive adverse selection and social exclusion resulted from
the reforms. Market failures, information asymmetries, the lack of competition
policies, the lack of a legal infrastructure defending local consumers and other
such “anomalies” of the Latin American economic and institutional landscape
account for many of the shortcomings emerging during the transition to a
more market-oriented regime.
Such “imperfections” of the price system, or of the institutional
infrastructure, had different effects on the adaptive capacity of different types
of firms, industries and regions of any given economy, as well as on their
transition to the new rules of the game. Consequently, while some parts of the
economy have witnessed gradual modernization and technological upgrading,
many Latin American countries have also generated large structural
unemployment, new forms of monopolistic behaviour and so forth. The
relative participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in GDP
has fallen, and the economy’s external sector has developed chronic long-
term weaknesses deriving from the fact that imports are growing much faster
than exports. These new issues have become painfully evident in many
countries of the region in recent years, undermining some of the significant
achievements attained through trade liberalization and market deregulation.
As a result of the above, it is now widely accepted that the expected results
from recent structural reforms have only partially been achieved, and that
vast sectors of society are being excluded from the benefits of the transition to
modernity. New problems of monopolistic practices have emerged; new
difficulties associated with the lack of markets and regulatory institutions are
obvious throughout the region. Both academic and political leaders are
currently searching for a new policy agenda that goes beyond the so-called
Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990) in order to deal with these new
issues. The measures under discussion include new regulatory policies capable
of better protecting consumers in the recently privatized sectors of the
economy; new competition policies capable of securing an adequate
functioning of markets now that mergers and acquisitions have become a
prominent feature of the region’s economies; new production and innovation
policies capable of enhancing the productivity growth rate and international
competitiveness; and new forms of collective action and clustering at the local
and municipal levels capable of inducing synergies and positive externalities.
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Such a new policy agenda seems to demand a number of institutions that
are a normal feature of mature capitalism, but that are often lacking in
developing societies. The public and private sectors need to forge a new style
of interaction if the long-term efficiency and equity benefits of structural
reforms are to eventually reach the vast majority of the population and not
just a privileged minority as it presently does (Stiglitz, 1998b).
This book examines some of the recent changes in the performance of the
Latin American economies. It explores the links between changes in the
macroeconomic policy regime and changes in the pattern of production
specialization attained by different countries in the region over time. Many
activities and industries managed to consolidate and are doing better than in
the past. These include non-tradables sectors producing services such as
telecommunications, energy or water sanitation; the natural resource–based
industries, which produce commodities such as iron and steel, pulp and paper,
and vegetable oil; and the assembly industries (maquiladoras), which produce
electronic equipment, video recorders, televisions and clothing, mostly for
the United States market. In all of these areas, local subsidiaries of transnational
firms and large domestic conglomerates gained participation in the 1990s.
Entry and exit of firms in the various markets of the economy were quite
significant, as trade liberalization efforts induced a dramatic transformation
of each sector’s competitive and technological regime.4  Although structural
reforms were not the only force inducing such changes –institutional and
technological forces certainly had an independent role– it is nevertheless true
that recent policy changes acted as a major filter, mostly leaving SMEs out of
the race. In that process, old forms of organizing production gradually
disappeared, being substituted by new management styles and more
decentralized, just-in-time and computer-based production arrangements.
Unfortunately, economists have made little progress to date in the
understanding and theoretical conceptualization of these processes. Neither
their micro-to-macro nature nor the high degree of interdependency among
the underlying economic, institutional and technological forces has been
addressed in any depth, and many issues remain to be explored. Consequently,
the region still lacks a policy agenda that will accelerate the pace of innovation
and productivity growth that characterize the individual economies under
present circumstances. Approaching this task from a narrowly macroeconomic
perspective makes it all the more difficult to understand what is actually going
on in the production, institutional and technological spheres of society and
what will it take to improve overall performance.
4. The idea of sectoral technological regimes has recently been examined by Carlsson (1995), Malerba
(1997) and Ferraz, Kupfer and Hauguenauer (1995). My use of the term is clearly linked to that
proposed by these authors.
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The book is divided into seven chapters, which are organized into three
parts. Part One (chapters I and II) presents the micro-to-macro analytical
framework that underlies the research. The literature on technological change
does not provide a satisfactory micro-to-macro explanation of the sources of
productivity growth or why specific industries, regions and firms in a given
economy modernize over time. Despite the fact that questions of economic
growth have been central to the economics profession since the time of Adam
Smith, we still lack a universally accepted theory in this field.
At least three schools of thought contest this issue. Chapter I briefly
reviews these, together with their individual contributions to an understanding
of the growth process. It also posits the need to study macroeconomic and
microeconomic variables together in an effort to grasp how economic,
institutional and technological forces condition the process of catching up or
lagging behind experienced by any given country, industry or region during
periods of growth.
Chapter II centres on specific micro- and macroeconomic aspects of the
restructuring process that stemmed from changes in the macroeconomic policy
regime. The chapter argues that the process entails a profound change in
relative prices as well as in society’s institutional and regulatory environment.
The impact of these changes varies across countries and fields of economic
activity. The devaluation of the local currency, for example, favours export-
oriented, natural resource–based industries. At the same time, it erodes the
competitiveness of import-substitution industries geared primarily towards
the domestic market, as these industries normally operate with a high
proportion of imported inputs (which become significantly more expensive
after the devaluation). The Latin American capital goods producers have
therefore been negatively affected; they have had difficulties confronting new
external competition after recent trade liberalization efforts and have lost
participation in domestic markets and exports.
Chapter II also argues that macroeconomic policy changes have prompted
the entry and exit of firms in almost every other activity. This process has
significantly altered market structure and performance at the individual
industry level and generated new sectoral technological and competitive
regimes which are still very imperfectly understood.
These intra-industry episodes of structural transformation have been
accompanied by inter-industry changes that are gradually altering the overall
pattern of production specialization attained by each of the economies in the
region. This second phenomena is reflected in shifts in the relative weight of
the various production activities in GDP. Many countries in the region show
a gradual but steady change of this sort beginning in the 1970s. Two main
models have been consolidated. The first entails a clear specialization in natural
resource–based industries that are highly capital intensive in nature and feature
very low domestic value added. This pattern of specialization prevails in
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, where the leading manufacturing sectors are those
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that produce basic commodities such as iron and steel, pulp and paper,
vegetable oils, aluminium and fishmeal.
Mexico and some of the smaller Central American economies have
proceeded along a different route. They have specialized in assembly industries
(maquiladoras) that mainly cater to the United States market, producing goods
such as garments, video cassette recorders, televisions and computers. In many
of these industries, nearly 98% of the value of production consists of imported
parts and components that are immediately re-exported after being assembled
into final goods. These activities, like the processing of natural resources, are
characterized by low domestic value added, although with the passage of
time and the spread of just-in-time production practices, some firms have
developed in-house engineering capabilities on the basis of which to handle
quality control and logistics.5
Both models of production specialization –the capital-intensive, natural
resource–based model of the Southern Cone countries and the maquila-based
model of Mexico and many smaller Central American countries– have done
well over the last two decades and have attained rapid growth. The same is
true of non-tradables sectors such as telecommunications, energy, transport
and water and sanitation services. The automobile industry is another
successful performer: it received preferential treatment from the economic
authorities in all the countries in the region and therefore managed to grow
faster than average, irrespective of the trend towards market liberalization
and deregulation imposed on the rest of the economy. In contrast, labour-
intensive industries producing wage goods, such as shoes, garments and
furniture, and research and development (R&D) and engineering-intensive
industries producing capital goods, machine tools and pharmaceutical raw
materials have done rather badly during the structural adjustment process.
In sum, trade liberalization, market deregulation and privatization,
together with historical trends, have led to the gradual consolidation of new
patterns of production specialization throughout the region. The new leaders
are natural resource–processing industries, maquiladoras, non-tradable goods
and, finally, the auto industry, which managed to receive preferential treatment
throughout the region. This transformation in the pattern of production
specialization was not necessarily caused by the structural reforms, as the
evidence shows that it was already underway in the 1970s, long before the
implementation of the structural reforms actually began. The reforms certainly
accelerated the process, however.
5. It is perhaps excessive to identify Mexican industry exclusively with the maquila model. Significant
specialization has also occurred in basic industrial products such as cement, beer and glass, in which
large national conglomerates have undertaken substantial expansion programmes in recent years
(Dutrenit, 1998). Given the dominant pattern, however, stress is placed here on Mexico’s currently
leading role in maquila industries. On the technological content of third-generation maquilas, see
Buitelaar, Padilla and Urrutia (1999) and Alonso, Carrillo and Contreras (1999).
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Part Two of the book looks at the available empirical evidence on technical
change, innovation and productivity growth. It also examines the impact of
recent structural reforms on three indicators: (i) job creation, (ii) the
comparative performance of SMEs and large companies and (iii) the new
structure and behaviour of the region’s external trade accounts for
manufacturing. Countries have become heavy importers of capital goods and
intermediate inputs for manufacturing production, while they have increased
their exports of products with low value added. Can they successfully maintain
balanced external accounts under such conditions? Should policy measures
be adopted to change the production and export mix?
Chapter III starts by examining labour productivity growth in various
countries of the region, including an analysis at the three-digit level of
aggregation of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) for
27 different industries in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. The
chapter then compares the Latin American indicators with the corresponding
figures for the United States over the same period. The aim is to see whether
the productivity gap is narrowing or if, alternatively, it is increasing through
time. This part of the study seeks to answer several questions. What are the
observed long-term differences in performance between countries and
industries in the region? How much improvement was attained in the 1990s
relative to previous decades? Which are the successful sectors and which are
the laggards in the various countries of the region?
This chapter shows that some industries are indeed converging with the
international productivity frontier. The recent structural reforms, however,
cannot be regarded as the ultimate cause of such convergence. A great deal
also occurred in this respect during the import substitution industrialization
(ISI) period, particularly in countries such as Argentina, Colombia and Mexico.
In other words, history matters, and the technological knowledge some of the
countries accumulated during the ISI period is a central component of many
catch-up stories now observed vis-à-vis the international technological frontier.
Chapter IV explores labour productivity and technological change in non-
manufacturing activities, concentrating on mining and telecommunications.
The chapter shows that the process of technological modernization and the
closing of the productivity gap found in some fields of manufacturing can
also be found in these non-industrial activities.
Much of the technological modernization that occurred in these sectors
is frequently attributed to privatization and the entry of new large foreign
firms into the economy. As was to be expected, the entry of foreign operators
brought about a radical change in the structure and performance of these
activities, as well as their rapid technological modernization.
Not all the countries of the region followed the same route, however, of
using privatization as a means of modernizing public utilities or the mining
industry. In some cases, such as the Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile
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(CODELCO), the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), or the
Administración Nacional de Telecomunicaciones de Uruguay (ANTEL), the
decision was made to retain the firms under public ownership but
concomitantly to force them into modernization and technological upgrading
by exposing them to stronger competition. This option usually triggered a
healthy response from the public firms, which proceeded to implement major
actions on the technological and organizational front. This suggests that it is
not necessarily privatization per se, but rather the gradual introduction of a
new, more competitive culture and discipline, that induces modernization
and technological upgrading. At the same time, consumer protection and the
enforcement of competition policies seem to have been somewhat easier in
these cases than in those in which large foreign firms attained a strong market
position in the domestic market. Domestic consumers often paid a high price
for the transition to a more privatized production structure when this took
place under monopoly conditions.
Part Three of the book addresses policy issues. What must the countries
of the region do to accelerate their productivity growth rate, improve labour
absorption and move towards a more equitable pattern of distribution of the
benefits of the transition to a more open, deregulated economy? This part of
the book consists of two chapters. Chapter VI discusses three main institutional
topics that condition what might be attempted in the near future with regard
to public policy: (a) the new international trade disciplines emerging from
the Uruguay Round (1994) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), with which the Latin American countries will have to comply; (b)
the new market-oriented ideology now prevailing across the region, which
makes it very difficult to discuss industrial policy issues in a dispassionate
way; and (c) the major recent changes in the region’s innovation systems,
which affect future capabilities for generating endogenous technical progress
and productivity growth. In the years ahead, all three institutional constraints
will influence what countries can and want to achieve in the direction of
“reforming the reforms” as they seek to enhance their international
competitiveness and the equity consequences of the transition to more open,
deregulated regimes.
Finally, chapter VII examines a possible agenda of future interventions.
Issues such as structural unemployment, chronic trade deficits in
manufacturing and the lack of opportunities for SMEs to join the
modernization process have to be addressed by future policy makers. There
is a need to create markets where they do not exist, as in the case of long-term
financing for SMEs. There is also a need to correct for market failures wherever
externalities, public goods and other so-called anomalies make current prices
a particularly bad proxy for equilibrium prices. Similarly, there is an urgent
need to create new regulatory agencies and judiciary systems capable of
implementing stronger competition policies and consumer protection actions
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in the recently privatized areas of the economy, where weak antitrust legislation
has led to large rents and monopolistic practices. There is also an urgent need
for innovation policies that can help develop domestic technological
capabilities that would accelerate the process of catching up with the
international productivity frontier. Finally, collective action capable of
generating externalities and synergies at the local and municipal levels should
also be promoted as part of the new policy agenda.
In all of these areas, the countries of the region should, in the near future,
explore new patterns of interaction between the public and private sectors,
experimenting with new institutions in order to identify by trial and error
what works and what does not. Uncertainty and imperfect information make
it impossible to know a priori exactly what will be effective in each particular
country, industry or region, and countries must therefore proceed through
learning by doing in the field of policy design and implementation. Very
different types of capitalism coexist around the world. The Scandinavian model
is one. That of the United Kingdom is another –and no less capitalist, for that
matter. There are also Canadian, French, Israeli and Italian variants. The
relation between the State and civil society is very different in each of the
above models of social and market organization. Countries differ in the degree
to which they establish safety nets for social protection and in the extent to
which they defend local identities, counteracting adverse selection. It is still
too early to predict the true, long-term face of Latin American capitalism. The
processes of opening up to foreign competition and of deregulating and
privatizing economic activities have barely begun, and it is already clear that
the Argentine brand of capitalism is going to be different in the long run from
the Chilean or Brazilian models, for example. The construction of citizenship,
the development of domestic production and technological capabilities and
the transition to a knowledge-based economy will surely follow very different
routes in each national context. The discussion of what lies ahead in each
country will be lengthy and difficult. This book seeks to contribute to the









This chapter examines the influence that macro-, meso- and
microeconomic forces have as determinants of investment and innovation.6
It also explores the coevolution of economic, technological and institutional
forces conditioning such behaviour. Only after exploring such
interdependencies is it possible to proceed with the study of how the recent
structural reforms have affected Latin American economies during the course
of the last two decades.
Conventional neoclassical theory gets around many of the complexities
of these processes by convenient simplifying assumptions. Institutions –apart
from the market itself– do not play any role at all, and technology is regarded
as an exogenously given, freely available and perfectly understood set of
blueprints that the individual businessperson can find on some existing shelf.
The explanation of the innovation process revolves around the notion of the
representative firm, which is a highly stylized and very simple description of
what a firm actually is. Specifically, the neoclassical firm is completely rational,
always understands what needs to be done and always does exactly what is
best, given exogenously determined circumstances. It has access to perfect
6. The present theoretical framework has much in common with the one employed by Moguillansky and
Bielschowsky (2000) to study investment behaviour in Latin American economies. Both works are part
of a wider research program undertaken by ECLAC to examine the impact of recent structural reforms
throughout the region. For an overview of the program, see Stallings and Peres (2000).
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factor markets that supply the optimal factor quantities at equilibrium prices.
Knowledge is a free good to which the firm has instant access without incurring
adaptation costs. There are no direct interdependencies, externalities or
synergies, such that price signals are a true reflection of the firm’s marginal
cost of production and of the marginal benefit consumers receive from
spending their money.
When receiving the Nobel Prize in Economics at Stockholm, Robert Solow
described the neoclassical metaphor as follows (Solow, 1988):
The idea is to imagine that the economy is populated by a single immortal
consumer, or a number of identical immortal consumers…. [This
consumer] is supposed to solve an infinite time utility-maximization
problem…. For this consumer every firm is just a transparent
instrumentality, an intermediary, a device for carrying out intertemporal
optimization subject only to technological constraints and initial
endowments. Thus any kind of market failure is ruled out from the
beginning, by assumption. There are no strategic complementarities, no
coordination failures, no Prisoners’ Dilemmas.
The end result is a construction in which the whole economy is assumed
to be solving a Ramsey optimal-growth problem through time, disturbed
only by stationary stochastic shocks to tastes and technology. To these
the economy adapts optimally. Inseparable from this habit of thought is
the automatic presumption that observed paths are equilibrium paths.
So we are asked to regard the construction I have just described as a model
of the actual capitalist world.
In an analytical context of this kind, technological knowledge as a factor
of production and learning as a process by which the firm accumulates
experience acquire a highly simplified specification, which does not take into
account either uncertainty or the fact that knowledge has many attributes of a
public good. In the neoclassical world, knowledge is always completely written
and codified, and it never demands experimentation, research or trial and
error. Learning thus becomes entirely predictable and formalistic, free of failure
or uncertainty. The neoclassical firm behaves as a robot, with no individual
habits and routines; this conceptualization is unable to accommodate the rich
body of organizational knowledge featured in other interpretations of the firm
(Penrose, 1951; Chandler, 1990).
Despite these limitations, the neoclassical simplification is useful in that
it facilitates the aggregation of individual firms into a collective construction
called industry to which is assigned an imaginary average collective behaviour.
This is obviously an artefact, but it does provide a map of reality at a
manageable scale, although in the process of aggregation it loses the details
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of the topography it aims to describe. If the purpose of enquiry is precisely to
examine these topographical details, then the neoclassical map may not be
the best one available.
Various authors have developed non-conventional approaches for
exploring many of these issues, including Bain (1956, 1966), Scherer (1980),
Simon (1955, 1959), Chandler (1990) and the so-called evolutionary or neo-
Schumpeterian scholars such as Freeman (1974, 1994), Dosi (1982, 1988) and
Boyer (1986, 1991). These authors set aside the neoclassical notions of
equilibrium and the representative firm, coming much closer to reality as they
try to understand microeconomic behaviour under conditions of imperfect
information, uncertainty and the search for new production routines. They
conceptualize knowledge as an incomplete set of blueprints whose
components have to be discovered through trial and error and the
accumulation of experience.
The neoclassical model presents a stylized analytical discourse of a
deductive nature, which is clearly at odds with the inductive, empirical stand
taken by industrial economists and evolutionary scholars. Neoclassical
economists can thereby operate with a clear-cut description of the
microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic models. They can then proceed
quite easily with the notion of an aggregate equilibrium growth path, which
is precisely what evolutionary economists are unable –and unwilling– to
describe. For them, the economy functions in a perpetual state of imbalance
and is not proceeding towards a “meta” equilibrium path.
Figure I.1 presents a stylized overview of the forces involved, which can
help distinguish the conceptualizations of the growth and innovation processes
offered by the different schools of thought. The figure highlights the role that
macro-, meso- and microeconomic variables play as determinants of
innovation and investment in any given economy. The upper right-hand box
identifies the conventional macroeconomic forces that affect investment and
innovation decisions, while sectoral and microeconomic variables are shown
in the upper and lower left-hand sections. As mentioned above, neoclassical
authors pay little attention to this second set of variables, instead explaining
productivity growth in terms of savings and investment, capital accumulation
and factor substitution processes induced by changes in relative factor prices,
as well as by exogenous technical progress.
In contrast, the non-neoclassical explanation of productivity growth is
far more complex, and it is informed by institutional and socio-anthropological
factors that are completely alien to the neoclassical growth story. This approach
broadens the analytical framework for understanding the evolutionary path
of any given economy to incorporate the institutional and organizational forces
that underlie the growth process. In an evolutionary analytical environment,
the firm is influenced not just by conventional macroeconomic variables, but
also by forces deriving from the highly specific, localized institutional
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environment in which the firm has to operate, that is, by forces which are
important at the sectoral or local level, but which lack significance for the
economy as a whole. Intellectual property rights, sectoral technological
agencies and institutions, research universities or banks belong in this
particular group of determining factors, and they clearly affect individual
firm behaviour in the growth story told by evolutionary economics.
In addition to macroeconomic variables, therefore, other forces –often of
a sectoral nature– need to be taken into account as determinants of investment
and the innovation process and of the propensity of individual firms to invest
and innovate.
Thus far, the discussion has mainly focused on the links between macro-
meso- and microeconomic variables as determining forces of firm behaviour.
The next question is how such behaviour would respond to changes in the
key macroeconomic prices of the economy (i.e., the exchange rate, the interest
rate, the real wage rate) as well as in the institutional and regulatory
environment, as a consequence of the application of a macroeconomic
stabilization cum structural reforms policy package.
Figure I.1
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Such a package necessarily entails a drastic change in the set of relative
prices prevailing in the economy, as well as in the institutional and regulatory
framework within which individual firms operate. Policy packages of this
sort are normally implemented precisely with the purpose of sharply altering
the existing set of incentives in an attempt to correct a situation of extreme
macroeconomic imbalance, with the external and fiscal accounts out of control.
This environment raises the degree of uncertainty and deteriorates the
confidence of the domestic and international business community.
Consequently, the propensity to invest and innovate falls quite significantly;
firms are concerned about short-term considerations, such as protecting their
cash flow or limiting their exposure to inflation, and they are wary of taking
long-term decisions surrounded by uncertainty, such as installing new
production capacity or introducing product or process innovations. It is
reasonable to assume that under such circumstances firms tend to abandon
projects that involve an extended planning horizon and to concentrate on
short-term survival strategies.
A. The Three Phases of a Macroeconomic Stabilization
and Structural Reform Policy Programme
An episode of macroeconomic stabilization cum structural reform
develops through three different phases. These range from an initial phase of
extreme macroeconomic turbulence, in which savings and investment rates
fall and the level of economic activity declines, to a final stage in which the
external and fiscal accounts become more manageable and closer to
equilibrium in the context of a clear revitalization of the savings and investment
rates. At that point, entrepreneurs’ “animal spirits” emerge once again. Figure
I.2 presents a simple, stylized illustration of the situation.
During phase I, the economy’s capacity for honouring its external debts
appears to be severely damaged. The public sector is strongly underfinanced
and has to borrow from the Central Bank, from local capital markets or from
external sources. It is forced to offer a higher (and increasing) interest rate in
order to get access to funds in an economic environment that is growing more
uncertain by the day.
Under such conditions, the economy gradually settles into a pattern of
recession and inflation, which has varying effects on the different sectors of
the economy and even on different firms within any given sector of economic
activity. With regard to the former, those sectors that are closest to the natural
comparative advantages of the country tend to react best to a change in the
macroeconomic policy regime. The macroeconomic stabilization programme
usually involves a devaluation of the exchange rate, which generates a better
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response from export-oriented, natural resource–based industries than from
import-substitution industries catering to the domestic markets.
With regard to differences among firms within a given sector of economic
activity, it seems reasonable to expect that firms will react defensively to the
prevailing circumstances by trying to reduce production costs, gain flexibility
and liquidity and avoid medium- or long-term commitments. It is crucial for
any given firm to reduce its exposure to inflation; it therefore minimizes sales
on credit, stocks of intermediate parts and so forth. Obviously, some firms
will find it easier to respond than others, and they will be more successful in
carrying out such changes.
The following empirical evidence supports this argument. Chile
implemented a structural reform package in the early 1970s, following the
military takeover that brought Gen. Pinochet to power. The resulting
contraction in the level of economic activity and the simultaneous massive
arrival of imports after tariff reductions caused a large number of firms to exit
the market, and the unemployment rate reached more than 20% of the labour
force. Between 1974 and 1982, 7,000 industrial firms closed down in Chile,
during what must be considered the first phase of the Chilean macroeconomic
stabilization process. This is about 16% of the total number of industrial firms
registered at that time by the National Institute of Statistics. Most of the firms
that shut down were medium-sized enterprises involved in the production of
Figure I.2
PHASES OF THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
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wage goods, such as garments and shoes, and metalworking firms producing
simple capital goods and consumer durables. The case of Argentina is in no
way different. About 15,000 firms closed down during Argentina’s
macroeconomic stabilization process in the late 1970s, and the size and sectoral
distribution of the exiting firms is similar to that observed in Chile.
In the simple model presented in figure I.2, the initial phase of intense
macroeconomic uncertainty and imbalance tends to be followed by a second
phase in which the stabilization process begins to operate. The trade deficit
declines as imports fall and exports grow. The loss of reserves is brought under
control. The inflation rate drops, and the interest rate begins to come down.
Such events constitute clear signals that a gradual recovery is underway and
that the internal market is starting to grow again.
In that context, firms become alert to future business opportunities. The
process is slow at first, but it acquires strength as the overall level of economic
activity expands. Central to second phase is the gradual increase in the use of
installed production capacity, although this does not necessarily mean that
firms are undertaking new investment decisions. How long the defensive
mood will last is difficult to tell a priori. Many other institutional issues might
be at work, conditioning the way a given firm reacts to events in a gradually
stabilizing economy.
It is only in the third phase of the adjustment process that the economy
begins to show clear signs of the long-term sustainability of the new set of
relative prices, and the business community gradually becomes proactive
again. The country’s international risk rating tends to fall, and savings and
investment, as well as foreign flows of non-speculative capital, begin to grow
again. Firms are now more prepared to undertake new investment
programmes to expand installed capacity, hire new labour and realize long-
term innovation efforts. The latter are linked to the launching of new products
and the installation of new production processes. The opening of new
production capacity appears as the clearest indication that the economy has
regained stamina and that animal spirits are back in place.
This simplified description of the three phases of an adjustment cycle
illustrates two important points. First, when macroeconomic stabilization and
structural reform come together (as was the case in several countries in the
region in the 1970s and early 1980s), firms must simultaneously cope with the
contraction of the domestic market, on the one hand, and the massive arrival
of imports (due to the reduction of tariffs), on the other. The difficulties
prompted by these two circumstances are exacerbated when firms must also
adapt to a new macroeconomic policy regime in which many subsidies are
eliminated and competition from external sources becomes a daily fact of life.
Second, although macroeconomic forces do matter, sectoral and
microeconomic considerations clearly play a very important part in explaining
why, under the same set of circumstances, some firms forge ahead and cope
with the new circumstances while others simply fail to do so and eventually
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must exit the market. Sectoral and microeconomic forces that might have little
or no significance at the macroeconomic level thus constitute a key factor
causing certain industries (and firms) to do better than others after a change
in the macroeconomic policy regime. Economists have recently begun to
develop the concept of sectoral technological regimes (Malerba, 1997) in order
to identify a specific cluster of localized forces and economic actors –firms, banks,
technical schools, public research and development institutes, chambers of
commerce, and so forth– that jointly master a set of technological disciplines,
forms of human resource training, and styles of communication and interaction,
which provide the underlying social capital to support the functioning of specific
sectors of economic activity. The interaction between all these actors is regulated
by explicit and implicit rules, conventions and habits which are broadly
understood by the members of the cluster. This concept of “sectoral institutions”
is pertinent to the arguments developed in this book.
B. Changes at the Meso- and Microeconomic Levels during
the Different Phases of the Stabilization and Structural
Reform Programme
We have thus far presented a very simple, stylized description of the
changes that take place at the macroeconomic level during the various phases
of a broad structural reform programme. A question comes immediately to
mind. Should we expect all sectors of production and economic activity to
react equally to the new macroeconomic policy regime, or should we a priori
expect the impact to be different across firms and sectors?
Sectors of economic activity differ in the factor intensity of their respective
production functions as well as in terms of the underlying institutional
environment in which they operate. Some, such as the natural resource–
processing industries, make intensive use of natural raw materials; property
rights to these resources –e.g., mines and forests– seem to be a crucial factor
in the decision making of firms in these sectors. Other sectors make intensive
use of unskilled labour, as in the case of industries producing garments,
footwear or furniture. A third subset of industries includes all sectors that
make intensive use of engineering services and technological knowledge, and
here intellectual property rights seem to be the prime consideration. The typical
sectors in this group are those producing pharmaceutical raw materials, capital
goods, machine tools and other similar knowledge-intensive products. Given
these differences in the factor content of the respective production functions
and in the institutional environment, it seems reasonable to expect that the
various activities will be affected differently by changes in the exchange rate,
the interest rate, the real wage, the degree of tariff protection and the regulatory
environment.
37ECLAC
Further research confirms this a priori perception. Natural resource–based
industries that are geared to the production and export of industrial
commodities have benefited the most from trade liberalization efforts and
have significantly improved their insertion in world markets. These sectors
include pulp and paper, vegetable oils, iron and steel, aluminium and fishmeal.
In addition, the assembly industries (maquiladoras), which mainly operate
under the control of large United States, Japanese and Korean multinational
firms, and the automotive industry, which has enjoyed preferential treatment
from various governments of the region, have also managed to grow well
under the new rules of the game.
The sectors that have suffered the most from trade liberalization and
market deregulation measures are those producing capital goods,
pharmaceutical raw materials and other knowledge-intensive goods and
services. Other sectors that have lost out include those producing non-durable
consumer goods like footwear, clothing or furniture, all of which are intensive
users of unskilled labour. Small and medium-sized family enterprises (SMEs)
figure prominently in all of these lagging sectors. The exit of firms –particularly
SMEs– has been significant in these industries, where the massive arrival of
imports has significantly damaged the competitive position of domestic
enterprises.
A simple model can be used to describe the adjustment process of any
given industry in which domestic demand contracts at the same that imports
flood in as a result of tariff reductions. The model quite closely reflects
developments in sectors such as footwear, clothing, textiles and machine tools
(Katz, 1986; Katz and Vera, 1997; Kassai, 2000).
Imagine an industry in which one large leading company co-exists with
a number of smaller companies that produce imperfect substitutes for the
goods made by the leader. Given high import tariffs, the price of the imported
substitutes is very high. Hence they are not marketed locally at the start of the
sequence of events to follow. The model incorporates three actors: a large
company, many SMEs producing substitutes for the product of the large firm
and the (potential) importers.
Changes in relative prices following macroeconomic stabilization and
structural reform efforts have three effects: (i) a downward movement of the
demand curve; (ii) an increase in the average and marginal cost curves of the
various producers; and (iii) a decline in import prices due to tariff reductions.
The price of imported substitutes falls, and imports now enter the market. At
the same time, the recession triggered by higher interest rates causes aggregate
demand to fall, which forces firms to search for ways to reduce costs in an
effort to defend their market share.
What are the dynamics of the case described in the model? As the price
of imported substitutes falls, imports tend to flood the market. Demand
contracts, and the demand curve moves inwards. Local production costs
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increase, and domestic firms must simultaneously adapt to a fall in demand
and to the entry of cheaper imports. Some manage to lower their costs by
rationalizing production practices and laying off workers, but others are
incapable of doing so. To facilitate the analysis, assume that only the oligopolist
has accumulated technological capabilities on the basis of which to introduce
labour-saving organizational changes in its plant, thereby lowering production
costs. The remaining firms in the industry are gradually forced to leave the
market. Only two actors remain at the end of the sequence: the importers and
the large company, which has managed to reduce costs by means of
disembodied technical changes, without undertaking major new investments.
The share of imports in total supply increases significantly as small companies
are forced to leave the market.7
As already mentioned, once the macroeconomic adjustment process
begins to gain ground, inflation slows under the pressure of imports, the fiscal
and external deficits are brought under control, and internal demand gradually
picks up. Real wages begin to recover, and GDP begins to grow.
The new structural conditions, however, preclude a return to the previous
market structure. Imports now control a significant share of the market, and
only a few firms managed to survive the transition process, lowering their
costs mainly by reducing their wage bill. Many firms –mostly SMEs– were
forced to close during the crisis.
It is in the third phase of the macroeconomic stabilization and structural
adjustment programme that the market begins to expand again. The demand
curve moves outwards, prompting proactive investment behaviour on the
part of surviving firms. This leads to the installation of new production
capacity, the modernization of plants, and the launching of new products that
are closer to the international state of the art. The domestic market –and not
just exports– again becomes attractive to local firms and begins to operate as
an engine of growth. This stimulates investment and technological
modernization in local firms geared towards meeting renewed domestic
demands.
The new market structure tends to consolidate in the third phase. The
firms that managed to survive the crisis now share the expanding domestic
market with the importers. The substantially increased share of imports, the
exit of many small firms, the growth of installed capacity and the technological
modernization of a few firms in the industry are central features of the new
market situation generated by the application of the macroeconomic
stabilization and structural reform programme. Under the new circumstances,
7. There have been many cases of regulated liberalization in which the oligopolist (the large firm in the
initial situation) is granted exclusive legal authorization to import, as in the automotive industry. This
obviously reduces the disciplining role of external supply in the local market, and prices do not fall
to the degree that they would with unrestricted liberalization.
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both the average plant size and the degree of business concentration increase,
and the industry moves into a new competitive and technological regime that
differs significantly from the previous one.
Why are some companies able to survive and to sustain their long-term
competitiveness, despite the fact that they do not undertake new investment
or technological modernization efforts during the first two phases of the
stabilization programme? As shown in chapter II, firms with very different
levels of operational efficiency co-exist within a given industry at any point
in time. Changes in relative prices therefore do not affect all firms in the same
way. When the price of imported substitutes falls, some firms are unable to
cover their variable production costs, and they are forced to stop production
before other firms do so. Their exiting the market leaves room for imports
and, to a lesser extent, the remaining domestic firms to increase their share of
total sales. Greater accumulated technological capacity clearly improves some
firms’ chances of adapting to the new market conditions by reducing costs,
simplifying product ranges or implementing other measures aimed at gaining
economies of specialization. Similarly, not all firms have the same access to
the necessary financing and technology for restructuring their plants and
modernizing their product design. Market failures in the supply of long-term
financing to SMEs appear here as a major source of difficulties in the adaptation
processes.
A range of circumstances thus explains why some firms survive the
transition towards a more competitive market environment while others do
not. Some of these circumstances reflect the role of accumulated technological
capacities at the level of the firm. Others reflect market imperfections that
lead to exclusion or adverse selection. Specific characteristics of the domestic
market, such as geographical isolation and small size, also seem to aid survival,
as these factors entail high transport costs that discourage would-be importers
from entering the market after tariff reductions have been enforced. Finally,
company survival in Latin America also seems to have depended quite strongly
on opportunistic behaviour and financial speculation on the part of individual
firms in response to the high degree of macroeconomic uncertainty and
turbulence (Mizala, 1992). “Rough waters favour the fisherman,” says the
proverb, and its validity seems to be confirmed by the fact that a firm’s chances
of surviving were clearly influenced by windfall gains obtained from
speculative activities in a non-transparent, highly volatile economic scenario.
As macroeconomic stability is restored, entrepreneurial spirit revives and
some firms begin to explore the possibility of investing in new production
facilities. The new balance between local production and imports tends to
stabilize. Only a few local companies survive the transition to the new market
environment. From this perspective, recent trade liberalization efforts can be
said to have acted as a winnowing mechanism, bringing about a new market
structure and competitive and technological regime at the sectoral level.
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The economics profession clearly lacks a good macro-to-micro theory with
which to understand situations of this sort. Furthermore, it lacks a theory of
“business demography” to explain the entry and exit of firms in the market,
which would identify who wins and who looses in these situations and why
this happens. The available empirical evidence seems to indicate that the
surviving firms in each market were not necessarily the best ones.
Much of the previous discussion is based on lessons derived from
individual case studies, which show remarkable regularity across industries
and countries, regardless of whether they involve the manufacturing of
footwear, furniture, machine tools or clothing. The generalized
interdependencies between macro- and microeconomic processes and the joint
impact of economic, technological and institutional forces are clearly evident.
Trade liberalization and market deregulation efforts carried out in the context
of large-scale market failures in factor markets and asymmetric information
across firms have caused a dramatic transformation of sectoral competitive
and technological regimes. Economic concentration has increased, as has the
exit of small and medium-sized family firms from almost every market. These
circumstances help explain the highly chaotic nature of the process under
examination. To date, economists have made little progress in explaining this
complex set of interdependencies and remain rather blind to the
microeconomic consequences of the reforms.
C. Failure of the Macroeconomic Stabilization Efforts
The preceding section presented the main features of the stages through
which an economy can be expected to proceed in response to a structural
reforms policy package, together with the likely reaction of individual firms.
The analysis obviously entailed a simple, stylized sequence which did not
address the many circumstances that could go wrong in the process of
implementing the adjustment programme, thereby throwing the economy off
its long-term stabilization path. In fact, many programmes of this type have
failed as a result of both internal inconsistencies and significant changes in
the general conditions under which they were intended to operate.
In his study of the Brazilian economy, José Carlos Miranda notes that
from 1981 to the early 1990s, Brazil implemented nine stabilization plans, 15
wage policies, 19 changes to the exchange regime, 22 proposals for the
renegotiation of the foreign debt and 20 fiscal adjustment programmes. “These
failed adjustments show how difficult it has been for the Brazilian economy
to secure fiscal, monetary and exchange equilibrium simultaneously”
(Miranda, 1996). Why has it been so difficult to perform well on this front?
In a recent study, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Stephany Griffith-Jones
identify a number of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, both internal
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and external to any given economy, that influence the process of structural
adjustment and that can cause macroeconomic stabilization efforts to fail. These
authors detect at least five reasons why this might happen: “First, external
capital flows should consistently go to augment aggregate investment and
not be diverted to consumption. Second, an aggressive domestic savings effort
is called for: from the outset of a debt cycle, the marginal savings rate must be
kept at a level that is much higher than the country’s average savings rate
and also considerably greater than the investment rate…. Third, the investment
must be efficient. Fourth, the country must aggressively invest in tradable
goods in order to be able to create a trade surplus large enough… so as to
service the debt. Fifth, creditors must be willing to provide stable and
predictable flows of finance on reasonable terms.” They go on to add: “These
conditions may not all be complied with in practice. Countries may experience
an ongoing substitution of domestic savings by foreign savings; investments
may not always be efficient or channeled sufficiently into tradable goods, and
creditor behavior may differ from the desired pattern” (Ffrench-Davis and
Griffith-Jones, 1995, p.228). In other words, many things can go wrong during
any given macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform programme,
thereby creating new imbalances in the economy and renewing
macroeconomic uncertainty.
Miranda (1996) and Fanelli and Frenkel (1996) go a step further in
analysing the micro- and macroeconomic interdependencies involved. They
argue that a series of failed attempts to stabilize the macroeconomy could
eventually generate long-term defensive attitudes among individual firms.
According to Miranda, “Macroeconomic uncertainty and the failure of various
attempts at stabilization in Brazil beginning in the early 1980s provoked
adaptive behaviour among both firms and economic institutions. In the end,
the preferred option among firms was to adopt defensive actions. A vicious
circle was thus established, whereby macroeconomic imbalances and defensive
microeconomic actions ended up by retrofeeding on themselves.” (Miranda,
1996, p.174). Frenkel and Fanelli note that macroeconomic instability leads
firms to operate with a low-risk, highly conservative portfolio of choices that
tends to be suboptimal from the viewpoint of a long-term growth strategy.
Miranda concludes that an economy-wide regime of this sort ends up
stimulating rent-seeking microeconomic strategies.8
The essence of the interdependencies between the micro- and
macroeconomic spheres emerges quite clearly. The former is not solely a neutral
8. It should be noted, however, that structural reform efforts are not always undertaken in combination
with macroeconomic stabilization programmes. The two were implemented together in Argentina and
Chile in the 1970s, but not in Argentina or Mexico in the 1990s.
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sounding board of macroeconomic disequilibrium, as macroeconomists
sometimes think. Rather, it acts as a dynamic factor in its own right, reinforcing
critical components of aggregate disequilibrium. The length and depth of the
contraction of GDP following the application of a macroeconomic stabilization
and structural reform programme depend to a large extent on how the various
economic activities react through time to changes in the macroeconomic policy
regime. If the objectives of the programme are inconsistent with the
instruments used by the economic authority, then the programme will
eventually fail. Also, if the global context changes significantly –the Brazilian
devaluation, for example, in the case of Argentina– the inconsistency between
the parameters of the adjustment process and the expected results will
immediately become clear.
D. Coevolution of Economic, Technological and Institutional
Forces During the Structural Adjustment Process
Classical economists took for granted the idea that a complex network
of interdependencies among economic, technological and institutional forces
provides the backdrop for the long-term growth of any given economy. The
first three chapters of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations are devoted to an
examination of the forces that give shape to the social division of labour
and their links to human invention aimed at discovering new, more efficient
ways of doing things, including the design and construction of new
machines. Those chapters reveal a clear perception of the coevolution and
interdependency of these different spheres of human activity. Modern growth
theory, in contrast, offers a highly stylized, aggregate vision of why a given
society grows, but unfortunately it is far removed from the systemic
coevolution highlighted here.
The growth process involves changes in institutions and technologies
as much as changes in economic variables. This is why the process has to be
understood as coevolutionary. Although each of these spheres follows its own
independent dynamics, the three influence each other as they evolve over
time. Trade liberalization lowers the domestic price of capital goods and
induces their faster introduction to the economy. But such faster introduction
comes hand in hand with the entry of new firms and the introduction of new
models of production organization. Institutions, in the sense of habits or
patterns of economic behaviour, tend to change as foreign firms enter the
economy, which, in turn, modifies the sectoral technological and competitive
regimes. A growth theory that does not reflect either this systemic coevolution
of economic, technological and institutional factors or the simultaneous
working of macro- and microeconomic forces is reductionist and of limited
heuristic value.
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In the present Latin American context, individual firms are gradually
embracing a new competitive discipline and accepting new market rules.
Inward-oriented economies did not induce competitive behaviour on the part
of individuals and firms because they were isolated from foreign competition
by high tariffs. The gradual assimilation of the new procompetitive regime
will undoubtedly take time, as it involves a slow process of learning at the
microeconomic level.
In a parallel development, Latin American countries are also going
through a complex process of change in their institutional and technological
environment. Many institutions, such as intellectual property rights or
property rights with respect to natural resources, are presently changing under
the pressure of a new worldwide institutional climate. Similarly, production
processes are gradually shifting away from an electromechanical foundation
towards an electronic, computer-based one involving real-time, continuous-
flow forms of production organization. Firms along the whole production
chain are therefore having to adapt to a new model of production planning
and organization.
Although the countries of the region have changed dramatically in each
of these spheres over the course of the last two decades, they still lag behind
the more developed countries in every one of them. The gap is narrowing,
but much remains to be done before the region can achieve world-class
production structures, mature institutions prototypical of modern capitalism
and local technological capabilities comparable to those of industrialized
societies.
The recently implemented structural reforms constitute a valuable step
in the right direction, but convergence towards international patterns of
social and industrial organization is proving to be much slower and more
difficult than initially expected. Such convergence has been characterized
by adverse selection, social exclusion and various costs deriving from market
failures, asymmetric information and lack of institutions. The recent
experience of the so-called countries in transition (i.e., the formerly socialist
countries) reveals a similar pattern of adaptation to a new macroeconomic
and regulatory regime. Conventional neoclassical thinking holds that
opening up to foreign competition, deregulating markets and privatizing
economic activities are sufficient conditions for eventually securing a new
equilibrium growth path more in line with the “true” opportunity cost of
the available resources. It also assumes that what is good for microeconomic
efficiency would necessarily be good for equity. The facts simply do not
bear out such expectations. Academic economists, international agencies and
governments in the region are increasingly inclined to believe that market
failures, the lack of institutions and the existence of asymmetries and
imperfections in the access to information and factor markets are responsible
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9. Illustrative in this regard is the non-orthodox discourse with which Joseph Stiglitz sought to shake
World Bank thinking in recent years. Many of his recent arguments have a deeply structuralist tone,
which approaches ECLAC’s vision of the development process. See Stiglitz (1998a, 1998b).
10. Saxonian (1995) brilliantly examines the question of what it takes to create social capital in any given
society and how different the process might be even in two regions of a single country.
for the less-than-satisfactory overall outcome of the reforms.9  They
increasingly speak of the need to create markets and institutions that
counteract adverse selection and inequitable patterns of access to the benefits
of modernization. Many of these issues are addressed in later chapters of this
book.
The growth issues examined here involve a number of social and
anthropological dimensions that economists are not particularly well equipped
to deal with. Economic models are normally institution-free, and they are
generally insensitive to the gradual learning process any society goes through
in the accumulation of domestic technological capabilities. They are similarly
insensitive to the way each particular society undertakes the creation and
destruction of social capital.10  In sum, received models of economic growth
leave a lot to be desired; they are of only limited help in understanding the
processes highlighted here.
The countries of the region have achieved a great deal in the 1990s as a
result of trade liberalization and market deregulation. Much remains to be
achieved, however, if they are to attain faster growth, a better productivity
performance and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of the transition
to modernity. Only then will it make sense to think of the Latin American
countries as developed societies.
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CHAPTER II
THE DYNAMICS OF THE INDUSTRIAL
RESTRUCTURING PROCESS
The structural transformation of the Latin American manufacturing sector
described in the previous chapter can, for analytical purposes, be divided
into two sets of events. The first is related to the restructuring process that
takes place within a given manufacturing sector through the entry and exit of
firms. The second concerns changes in the inter-industry pattern of production
specialization, which occur when particular manufacturing activities gain
relative participation within aggregate industrial GDP. These processes take
place simultaneously, although the analysis addresses them separately.
A. The Selection Process Among Firms in a Given Industry
Any given industry comprises firms of very different levels of production
efficiency. The age and structure of the capital goods available to different
firms and the choice of production organization vary quite significantly, even
among close competitors. Consequently, a wide range of unit production costs
and profit rates generally coexist within a single field of economic activity at
any point in time. In practice, the observed differences are much wider than
conventional price theory might lead economists to expect, as such analyses
predict a high degree of homogeneity among the various firms in an industry.
In effect, if firms are assumed to have perfect information, technology to be a
freely accessible good, and factor markets to be competitive and well behaved,
then there is little reason to expect a priori that cost might differ significantly
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among firms. In reality, however, the differences are quite sharp. In his
pioneering book, G.W.E. Salter (1960) cites British manufacturing data that
reveal differences of up to 7:1 in the unit production costs of firms that
supposedly compete with each other.
Salter ’s book describes a simple model of an industry’s dynamic
transformation on the basis of the entry of new firms, which bring in new
technology in the form of new products or production processes. If the new
technology allows them to produce at lower costs or to introduce a better
product, then the market price for the product in question will fall. Marginal
firms that cannot cover variable production costs at the new price will be
forced out of the market. In Salter’s model, firm demography, that is, the
pattern of firms entering and exiting an industry, takes a very simple
specification. Exogenous technological change allows a new entrant to incur
lower production costs and thereby to reduce the market price, putting out of
competition those firms with older technologies which cannot cover their
variable production costs
In reality, the process of firms entering and exiting the market has been
significantly more complex and messy in the region’s recent episode of
industrial restructuring than that described in Salter’s model. Transport costs
and tariffs influence the role importers play as potential competitors in
domestic markets. Furthermore, factors markets are imperfect, firms have
asymmetric information, and they usually command a less-than-perfect
understanding of the production technologies with which they operate. Some
firms obviously adapt better than others to changes in the macroeconomic
policy regime, and these firms gain participation in the market. The remaining
firms languish or even exit the market altogether. Initial differences in
technological and management capabilities affect the firms’ ability to confront
major macroeconomic changes, but this is certainly not the only factor at play.
The dynamics of sectoral restructuring also involves an important element of
randomness, because the adjustment to the new circumstances occurs amid
severe macroeconomic turbulence and uncertainty. Because factor markets
do not behave adequately, opportunities for adaptation are not perfectly
distributed across firms in an industry.
Salter’s well-behaved model clearly does not consider these issues. They
need to be taken into account, however, to explain why some firms adapted
better than others during the recent transition to a new macroeconomic policy
regime experienced throughout Latin American manufacturing industries.
The available empirical evidence indicates that the firms that managed to
survive the period of macroeconomic turbulence often were not the firms that
operated the best production facilities or that had most recently invested in
upgrading their technology. Rather, firms frequently resorted to speculation
and opportunism to survive the recession and macroeconomic turbulence.
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Salter’s model is consistent with the three phases of macroeconomic
stabilization and structural reform discussed in the previous chapter, as well
as with the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction, which serves as the
basis for this analysis of the industrial restructuring process in Latin America.
Firms tended to exit the market in the first phase of the adjustment process,
whereas most firms that entered the market did so during the third phase of
the sequence, after the economy had settled into a more stable and more reliable
long-term growth path. Figure II.1 offers a stylized representation of this
process, together with its counterpart in terms of productivity growth. The
vertical axis measures the industry’s average productivity, while the horizontal
axis measures the average plant size in the sector. The first distribution of
productivities and plant sizes describes what the industry looked like before
the structural reforms were actually enforced; the second characterizes the
industry after the reforms.
Figure II.1










P: Average sectoral productivity before trade liberalization
P1: Average sectoral productivity after trade liberalization
S: Average size of firm before liberalization
S1: Average size of firm after liberalization
Average plant size
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Improvements in productivity come from two sources: (i) the entry into
the market of new firms that are bigger and more productive than the existing
firms and (ii) the exit of many small firms, presumably the less efficient ones
in the industry. What is the relative importance of these two effects? At what
point in the structural adjustment cycle do they occur? How do the various
branches of manufacturing differ in this regard?
As far as the exit of firms is concerned, Mizala reports that some 7,000
Chilean firms closed down in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, most of them
medium sized (see figure II.2). For different reasons, small and large firms found
it relatively easier to survive the drastic change in the macroeconomic policy
regime that was implemented in Chile following the military coup of 1973
(Mizala, 1992). In Argentina, an estimated 15,000 industrial firms exited the
market during the trade liberalization process implemented in the late 1970s.
In both cases, the exodus was particularly intense in labour-intensive industries,
such as those producing garments, footwear and textiles, as well as in metal-
working industries producing capital goods and machine tools. (Katz, 1986).
Source: Alejandra Mizala, “Las reformas económicas de los años setenta y la industria
manufacturera chilena”, Colección estudios CIEPLAN, No. 35, Santiago, Chile, September 1992
(1975-82); Fiscalía Nacional de Quiebras (1983-93).
Figure II.2




















































Many sectoral studies illustrate the dynamics of this process. In the
Argentine steel industry, for example, half of the firms registered by the
industry in the early 1970s left the market in the 1980s: the number of firms
fell from 59 in 1975 to 26 in 1992 (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 1995). The Chilean
footwear industry constitutes another example. The number of firms in the
industry fell from 275 in 1979 to 186 in 1982 (Kassai, 2000). In the Argentine
vegetable oils industry, the number of firms fell from about 70 in the 1970s to
approximately 50 in the early 1990s (Obschatko, 1997). Similar trends occurred
in the Argentine and Brazilian pulp and paper sectors (Bercovich, 2000) and
the Chilean copper industry (Cáceres, Cárdenas and Katz, 2000). In all of these
cases, intra-industry restructuring involved a process of selection among firms
and a major transformation of the sector’s technological and competitive
regime. Business concentration increased in every case, and a certain fraction
of the firms approached international productivity standards. Nelson (1997)
describes this as an evolutionary process using a biological metaphor,
according to which firm “genotypes” and sectoral and national “phenotypes”
underlie the restructuring episode.
Turning now to the entry of new firms into the market, fragmentary
evidence indicates that this occurs in a context of increasing levels of technology
and market concentration. In the case of the Argentine iron and steel industry,
for example, two large-scale, state-of-the-art steel mills were set up in the 1990s
by Acindar S.A. and Techint S.A. The industry was thus restructured around a
new model of industrial organization in which two large domestic
conglomerates assumed control of the sector (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 1995).
Techint S.A. now operates as a global player on the international seamless tubes
market, with nearly one quarter of total world sales.
The Argentine vegetable oils industry is another case at point (see Table
II-1). The restructuring of this sector was associated with the entry of a new
generation of plants, which not only were bigger in size, but also incorporated
a different basic process technology. The industry gradually moved towards
catalytic-based production processes, which required a radical change in
engineering disciplines and production organization. Furthermore, the
industry’s technological and institutional infrastructure evolved together. New
firms entered the market, and new forms of vertical integration developed
between production, transport, dock facilities and overseas shipping
(Obschatko, 1996). The privatization of State railways and docks facilities, in
particular, paved the way for the forging of new linkages between primary
production and downstream processes in the production chain. This clearly
indicates that economic, technological and institutional forces were
interdependent, and they must be examined together as elements of a single
process in the restructuring of the activity as a whole.
In sum, the empirical evidence supports the idea that intra-industry
restructuring processes are strongly related to the exit of firms from the market,
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the entry of new state-of-the-art firms and a gradual transformation of the
sector’s technological and institutional base. Such evidence confirms that
restructuring triggers a major transformation in industry’s organizational
regime, involving the coevolution of economic, technological and institutional
forces.
B. Changes in the Relative Share of Industries During the
Structural Adjustment Process
In the last two decades, two quite different models of production
specialization have emerged in Latin America, partly, but not entirely, as a
result of the recent structural reforms. The first, which is mostly to be found
in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, features a strong shift towards natural resource–
based industries that manufacture products such as vegetable oils, pulp and
paper, iron and steel, fishmeal, aluminium, orange juice and other
commodities. These industries are generally capital intensive and highly
automated; they use continuous-flow production processes and relatively little
labour.
The second model of production is centred in Mexico and some of the
Central American countries, which have specialized in in-bond assembly, or
maquila, industries producing computers, televisions, VCRs and garments for
export to the United States. These sectors are intensive in their use of low
skilled labour. Mexico’s maquiladoras generated a dramatically large number
of new jobs in the 1990s. They use state-of-the-art, just-in-time technologies,
Table II.1
ARGENTINA: FIRMS, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
IN THE ARGENTINE VEGETABLE OIL INDUSTRY,
1973-1974 and 1993-1994
PERIOD NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PRODUCTION TONS / PLANT TONS / EMPLOYEE
FIRMS EMPLOYEES  VOLUME (THOUSANDS) (THOUSANDS)
(THOUSANDS
OF TONS)
1973-1974 67 6,895  1,740  26  252
1993-1994 59 4,943 12,196 207 2,472
Source: Edith Obschatko, “Industrialización basada en recursos naturales: El caso del complejo
oleaginoso argentino”, Buenos Aires, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), 1996 (unpublished).
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with a unit import content as high as 98% of the total value of shipments.
These firms employ total quality techniques, Kanban and sophisticated
production logistics, most of which is generated by the international parent
firm rather than by the domestic subsidiary itself. They pay a small fraction
of the wages prevailing in more developed countries (no more than 10%),
and they are almost exclusively geared to supplying the United States market
(Buitelaar et al, 1999).
Suppose the manufacturing sector has only two industries, one producing
wage goods of low capital intensity for domestic consumption and the other
producing either a raw material–based industrial commodity (say, iron and
steel) or a product assembled in a maquiladora (say, computers) for export.
Further assume that as a result of the macroeconomic stabilization programme,
the domestic market for wage goods undergoes a severe contraction, while
the export industry is clearly induced to expand. Following the implementation
of the structural reforms, the two industries grow at different rates, as a result
of the differential impact of the reforms. The different growth rates reflect not
only the impact of the domestic structural reforms, but also the different
elasticities of demand of the two goods. It seems reasonable to assume that
the elasticity of demand faced by maquiladoras is much higher than that faced
by the natural resource–processing industries exporting industrial
commodities to world markets. The maquiladoras producing for the United
States market are likely to have a higher long-run growth potential than the
natural resource–based industries, simply because the international market
for industrial commodities grows much more slowly than the market for
electronic durables. Both industries feature low domestic value added, but
the maquila industry is likely to grow faster, export more and absorb more
labour. The natural resource–based industries, in contrast, are likely to grow
more slowly and to absorb less labour.
To what extent does the empirical evidence support the above argument?
Table II.2 shows the changes in the region’s pattern of production specialization
over the last two decades. The data show a clear shift in favour of natural
resource–based industries in the South American countries and towards the
maquila sector (including the vehicle industry) in Mexico. Specifically, the
natural resource–based industries classified by the ISIC as 341, 351, 354, 355,
356, 371 and 372 gained ground in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. In
Mexico, the automotive sector doubled its relative participation in the country’s
industrial output. At the same time, the labour-intensive industries producing
wage goods for the domestic market lost ground throughout the period in
each of the countries under examination.
These results point to a deep-rooted paradox. Market-oriented
Washington-consensus economists advised Latin American countries to
pursue trade liberalization in order to provoke a dynamic shift in the domestic
production structure towards what they perceived to be the region’s natural
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comparative advantage, namely, cheap unskilled labour. The Mexican and
Central American restructuring process seems to have gone in this direction,
but this was not the case in the South American countries. On the contrary,
natural resource–based industries producing industrial commodities are
strongly capital intensive and computer based, and they employ relatively
little labour. In addition, all the countries in the region have lost ground in the
labour-intensive industries producing footwear, clothing and furniture as a
result of tough competition from countries such as China, the Philippines or
Vietnam, where wages are just a fraction of the already very low rates paid by
most Latin American countries. The region’s labour costs are becoming too
high, relatively speaking, for countries to continue to attract investment in
maquiladoras, and yet the wages paid in the region are so low that countries
cannot develop an attractive domestic market to serve as the foundation for
growth in the years ahead.
The two processes examined so far can now be put together to attain an
evolutionary picture of the recent restructuring process in Latin American
countries. First, the internal structure and performance of industries have
changed. Second, the overall pattern of production specialization has gradually
been transformed in favour of low value-added maquiladoras and natural
resource–based industries. In other words, at the industry level, restructuring
Table II.2
CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
IN TOTAL MANUFACTURING OUTPUT, 1970-1996
(Percentages)
ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA MEXICO
SECTOR 1970 1996 1970 1996 1970 1996 1970 1996 1970 1996
I 15.6 13.1 18.8 22.8 14.9 10.2 10.7 10.5 13.3 13.9
II 9.9 12.1 9.9 8.7 7.7 2.0 2.9 6.5 5.5 10.8
III+IV 36.2 45.7 35.8 42.4 43.2 56.2 45.7 51.2 46.8 46.5
V 38.2 29.0 35.5 26.1 34.2 31.6 40.7 31.8 34.4 28.8
Source: Author’s compilation, on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial
Dynamics (PADI), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago,
Chile.
Sector I: Metal-working industry, excluding automobiles (groups 381, 382, 383 and 385 of the
International Standard Industrial Classification, or ISIC).
Sector II: Transport equipment (ISIC group 384).
Sector III + sector IV: Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (ISIC groups 311, 313 and 314) and
natural resource–processing industries (ISIC groups 341, 351, 354, 355, 356, 371 and 372).
Sector V: Labour-intensive traditional industries (ISIC groups 321, 322, 323, 324, 331, 332, 342,
352, 361, 362, 369 and 390).
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triggered a process of selection among firms, while at the country level, the
overall production fabric has shifted in favour of static comparative
advantages.
C. The Destruction of Human Capital During the Structural
Adjustment Process
The sequence of events described up to this point has an obvious impact
on the locally accumulated stock of technological capabilities and engineering
skills. Just as old vintages of machinery and equipment are rendered obsolete
by the rapid importation of new, computer-based machines, so, too, does
human capital lose its relevance in the new production environment, despite
having been painfully developed during the ISI decades. Plant engineers who
were previously employed to extend the life cycle of the available machines
can now be cut from the payroll, since capital equipment can easily be replaced
earlier, at a lower cost and embodying computer-based process technologies.
Whole research and development (R&D) and project engineering departments
have been eliminated as public firms providing telecommunications, electricity
and transportation services have been privatized and transferred to foreign-
run public utilities. These and similar developments brought about the
“destruction” of human capital and domestic technological capabilities. Some
of these capabilities were successfully transferred to other areas of the economy,
where they are now being applied to new knowledge intensive activities such
as the development of software. The extent to which this has taken place,
however, varies widely across nations, regions and industries. Research is
simply lacking on these matters to provide the basis for understanding what
has actually happened on this front.
Despite the limitations of the available data, these processes present an
obvious paradox. Companies, industries and regions are approaching world
standards, but they are doing so on the basis of imported, rather than domestic,
know-how and technology. Having specialized in activities with a low
domestic value added, many Latin American industries are now competing
well in the low-value-added extreme of the production chain, and for such
purposes, they are using less locally developed or adapted product designs
and process technologies. Figure II.3 presents a stylized representation of the
argument. It shows that a fall in the relative price of imported substitutes for
domestic capital goods induces more utilization of the former (a move from
C to D in the figure). As a consequence, fewer engineers are needed at the
shop-floor level, since their skills had previously been used to extend the life
cycle of the available equipment. This second change is represented by a move
from B to A in figure II.3.
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Nonetheless, it can still be argued that the creative phase of the famous
Schumpeterian metaphor can be expected to emerge eventually. Very little
has been seen so far, however, although as mentioned above, some interesting
developments are underway in relation to computer software and services
involved in the transition to a knowledge economy. A tiny fraction of local
skilled human resources seems to be moving that direction at present.
This concludes the presentation of the conceptual framework of this study.
The next section explores the performance of the region’s manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sectors with regard to labour productivity growth. It also
examines the productivity gap that Latin American countries and industries
exhibit vis-à-vis the international productivity frontier. Together with the
conceptual discussion, the empirical evidence reviewed below offers the reader
an overall interpretation of what has happened in Latin America as a result of
history, on the one hand, and the recent market-oriented structural reforms,
on the other.
Figure II.3
CHEAPER IMPORTED CAPITAL GOODS AND THE CONTRACTION IN
THE DEMAND FOR LOCAL HUMAN CAPITAL
Domestic capital goods
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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND LABOUR
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICAN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Having thus far examined the analytical arguments underlying the
present enquiry into the impact of recent structural reforms, the book now
turns to the empirical evidence. Are Latin American countries and production
activities performing better as a result of these market-oriented reforms? Are
there differences across countries or sectors of economic activity in this respect?
The discussion centres on the notion of labour productivity growth, as
explained in the next section.
A. Labour Productivity as a Proxy for Technical Change
Technological progress is a crucial force determining the structure and
performance of any given society. Despite the importance of innovation for
economic growth, the economics profession still lacks a unified, universally
accepted theory explaining the variables that stimulate its generation,
adaptation, diffusion and utilization in the production of goods and services.
As early as 1930, Sir John Hicks made an initial inroad into the subject when
he differentiated between autonomous and induced innovation, arguing that
the former depends on the dynamics of science and the later on the relative
prices of capital and labour. As labour becomes dearer with the passage of
time, businesses search for labour saving innovations which would allow them
57
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to produce at lower costs. On the other hand, in many fields of human
knowledge, it is clear that the demand for improved technology exists and
that innovation would be handsomely rewarded, but such progress requires
prior advances in physics, biology, genetics and other basic sciences, which
are lacking.
Until rather recently, technological change was regarded as exogenous to
the economic system. When it was treated as endogenous, the analysis tended
to be formalistic. Conventional neoclassical models simply fail to capture either
the large degree of uncertainty, imperfect understanding and trial and error
or the essential element of creative destruction that usually accompany the
generation of new technical knowledge
The shortcomings of received theory become even more evident on
considering technical progress in the developing world, where not much
contribution is ever made to the international technological frontier, but where,
nonetheless, a significant amount of knowledge is generated through the
adaptation to local circumstances of technical knowledge developed in more
advanced industrial societies. Every blueprint, engineering manual or patent
has a component that must be developed through trial and error,
experimentation and localized research; it cannot simply be plugged in to
any and all situations and used as is. Rather, the utilization of knowledge
normally involves the generation of additional, incremental units of knowledge
that are required to adapt the original idea to the specific circumstances in
which it is to be applied. This must be done in situ, so as to make the original
blueprint or engineering manual workable under a set of environmental
conditions which are different from those that surrounded the original design.
Received theory offers no advice on how to differentiate such adaptive
learning efforts, which generate something new –that is, something that was
not available before, even if it is only a minor addition to the state of the art–
and factor substitution, which incorporates something already available in
response to changes in relative factor prices. Even in the latter case, however,
some amount of adaptation is required for the local utilization of a previously
available piece of knowledge, such that technical progress and factor substitution
along a given production function become almost inseparable from one another.
As Salter notes, a change in a given production function obviously entails a
virtually inseparable mix of factor substitution (in response to changes in relative
prices) and technical progress (i.e., movements of the production function
outwards, spurred by genuinely new technological knowledge). While the
former force is closely linked to the spread of available technologies in society,
the latter reflects the search for new ways of doing things, new products or new
productive processes. The two forces are inextricably linked, however, and are
thus difficult to isolate in practice (Salter, 1960).
Technical change can be measured indirectly by following the flow of
inputs required for its generation (e.g., R&D expenditure, investment in pilot
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plants or experimental equipment) or it can be measured directly using a proxy
for its impact (e.g., number of new products, number of patents or simply the
rate of productivity growth attained by a region, industry or firm) (Freeman,
1974; Schmookler, 1966; Pavitt, 1984; Terleckij, 1959). This chapter uses labour
productivity growth and the labour productivity gap with the United States
manufacturing sector as proxy variables for technical progress. The central
purpose of the analysis is to examine how the rate of labour productivity
growth behaved before and after the recent structural reforms and whether
Latin American countries and industries are catching up or lagging behind
the world’s outward-moving productivity frontier.
B. Labour Productivity in the Latin American Manufacturing
Sector Before and After Recent Structural Reforms
This section estimates labour productivity growth for the industrial sector
of various Latin American countries and individual industries at the three-
digit level of aggregation of the International Standard Industrial Classification
(ISIC). The aggregate analysis of the manufacturing sector is based on nine
countries, while the analysis of specific industries draws on five countries,
namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. The chapter uses the
PADI database (Programme for the Analysis of Industrial Dynamics), which
was recently compiled by ECLAC’s Division of Production, Productivity and
Management. PADI provides information on value added, employment,
wages, labour productivity (measured as value added per capita per year),
unit labour costs and gross unit margins for the period 1970-1996. The data
make it possible to compare countries in the region with each other and also
with the United States.
Table III.1 presents the labour productivity indicators for the
manufacturing sector as a whole for nine countries in the region plus the United
States. The indicators are calculated for the period 1970-1996 and for the 1990s
separately. Note that the 1990s demonstrate a significant acceleration in the
labour productivity growth rate in most Latin American countries and also in
the United States.
For the longer period, 1970-1996, four countries in the region (Argentina,
Colombia, Mexico and Brazil) managed to attain a rate of labour productivity
growth in manufacturing production that was higher than that of the United
States. This implies that although the productivity gap between these three
countries and the United States is still large in absolute terms, in relative terms
it is getting smaller.
Table III.2 breaks down labour productivity growth by decade, using
the United States as a benchmark. The table shows that Argentine industry
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Table III.1
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR
PRODUCTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING AND IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1970-1996 (%)
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT EMPLOYMENT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
COUNTRY 1970-1996 1990-1996 1970-1996 1990-1996 1970-1996 1990-1996
Argentina 1.18 4.87 -2.62 -3.15 3.80 8.02
Brazil 2.81 2.26 0.95 -6.41 1.86 8.67
Chilea 2.76 6.40 1.51 3.49 1.25 2.91
Colombia 3.98 3.52 1.24 -0.22 2.74 3.74
Costa Ricab 4.39 n.a. 4.83 n.a. -0.44 n.a
Jamaicab 0.11 n.a. 1.66 n.a. -1.55 n.a
Mexicoc 3.79 2.27 0.91 -0.03 2.88 2.30
Peru 1.17 5.09 2.85 1.97 -1.68 3.12
Uruguaya 0.61 -1.46 0.37 -8.58 0.24 7.12
United States 2.39 5.04 0.35 0.30 2.04 4.74
Source: Calculated on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial Dynamics (PADI),
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago, Chile.
a/ Data up to 1995.
b/ Data up to 1992.
c/ Data up to 1994.
Table III.2
INDUSTRIAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY VIS-À-VIS THE UNITED STATES
MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1970-1996
(United States = 1.00  in 1970)
COUNTRY 1970 1980 1990 1996
Argentina 0.42 0.41 0.55 0.67
Brazil 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.37
Chilea 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.20
Colombia 0.29 0.25 0.37 0.34
Costa Ricab n.a. n.a. 0.15 0.14
Jamaicab 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.13
Mexicoc 0.32 0.30 0.44 0.38
Peru 0.33 0.25 0.16 0.15
Uruguaya 0.35 0.22 0.20 0.22
Source: Calculated on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial Dynamics (PADI),
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago, Chile.
a/ Data up to 1995.
b/ Data up to 1992.
c/ Data up to 1994.
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began the 1970s at just over 40% of United States industrial labour productivity
in manufacturing; it ended the period under consideration at nearly double
that initial level, reaching close to 70% of the United States rate. Colombia
and Mexico also attained improvements, although smaller than Argentina.
Brazil was basically stagnant in 1970-1990 but then achieved very significant
labour productivity improvements in 1990-1996, which allowed it to partially
close the productivity gap with the United States by 1996. In contrast to these
four cases, Chile and Costa Rica maintained a fairly constant relative labour
productivity gap with the United States, while the gap tended to increase in
Jamaica, Peru and Uruguay. Chile is interesting in that despite having doubled
its labour productivity growth rate in manufacturing after the implementation
of structural reforms, it ended the period with slight decline vis-à-vis its
position in 1970.
Returning to the countries that partially closed the relative labour
productivity gap with the United States, practically all of the narrowing of
the gap attained by Colombia and Mexico took place during the period 1970-
1990, and their relative performance then deteriorated somewhat in the first
part of the 1990s. In the case of Argentina, about half of the relative
improvement vis-à-vis the United States took place between 1970 and 1990,
and the other half occurred during the 1990s. In other words, in all three cases,
an important part of the closing of the labour productivity gap with the United
States occurred before those countries fully embarked on structural reform.11
Brazil is different in that the closing down of the gap occurs in the 1990s.
Using the rate of labour productivity growth vis-à-vis the international
productivity frontier as a reasonable proxy for technological change thus
demonstrates that the ISI period contributed significantly to the relative
catching up or lagging behind of these economies; the recent structural reforms
do not explain the lion share of what seems to be happening on this front.
Argentina, Colombia and Mexico were closing the relative labour productivity
gap before the structural reforms of the 1990s. The long-term relative
performance of Colombia and Mexico actually deteriorated in the first half of
the 1990s. On the other hand, both countries demonstrated very significant
productivity improvements in 1998-2000, but unfortunately these two years
are still too recent to be included in the database and thus could not be made
11. It should be recalled that the liberalization and deregulation of the region’s economies did not begin
in the 1990s. Argentina, for example, made steady progress in that direction in 1976, under the
administration of Minister Martínez de Hoz. Import tariffs were cut, price controls were eliminated,
and similar measures were adopted. Although the liberalization and deregulation failed in 1981, signs
of the restructuring of the productive apparatus were evident long before the 1990s. The same can be
said of Colombia and Mexico. See Katz and Kosacoff (1989). What happened in the 1980s as regards
the relative labour productivity gap with the United States, however, owed less to the fact that the
countries of the region enjoyed significant productivity improvements than to the fact that the United
States performed particularly poorly. See Benavente and others (1997).
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part of the analysis here. Argentina continued to narrow the relative labour
productivity gap in the first half of the 1990s, much as it had done in the 1970-
1990 period, but it stagnated in the late 1990s (which is similarly not reflected
in the data).12
In none of the other cases did the relative labour productivity gap in
manufacturing shrink in the 1990s, despite the significant increase in the
growth rate of per capita output experienced by most countries in the region.
Because the United States also attained a very significant improvement in its
long term labour productivity growth rate, the net balance can be positive or
negative depending on the particular case examined. Chile and Costa Rica
exhibit no relative improvement on this front, while Jamaica and Peru clearly
worsened in relative terms.
C. Labour Productivity Growth at the Individual
Industry Level
This section examines labour productivity growth vis-à-vis the United
States at the individual industry level for 27 sectors in five Latin American
countries, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Table III.3
presents the results. A coefficient greater than 1 indicates that between 1970
and 1996, that particular industry tended to close the labour productivity gap
with its United States counterpart, while a coefficient of less than 1 means
that the gap increased. The table shows great heterogeneity across industries
within a given country, as well as large intra-industry differences across
countries.
Between 1970 and 1996, 22 out of 26 industries in Argentina narrowed
their relative labour productivity gap with the United States counterpart.13
Six did so significantly, having doubled their relative position when compared
to the base year (1970). This appears in the table as a coefficient equal to or
greater than 2. In Brazil, 21 industries closed the relative labour productivity
gap during the same period, though only three did so significantly. In
Colombia, 17 industries tended to close the gap, five significantly. In Mexico,
as well, 17 closed the gap, four significantly. Finally, only 12 industries in
Chile tended to close the labour productivity gap with the United States. The
data thus indicate a very heterogeneous inter-industry pattern of responses.
The industry data confirm the aggregate result, showing a relatively better
12. With regard to the region’s relative success in the first half of the 1990s and relative failure in the
second half, and how this is related to the workings of international capital markets, see ECLAC (2000).
13. The data for sector 353 (oil refining) are not reliable and thus are omitted from this analysis.
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Table III.3
RELATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GAP IN MANUFACTURING
VIS-À-VIS THE UNITED STATES, 1970-1996a
(United States = 1.00)
ISIC GROUPb ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILEc COLOMBIA MEXICOd
311 Foodstuffs 1.10 1.14 0.67 0.93 1.21
313 Beverages 1.04 0.72 0.91 0.79 0.83
314 Tobacco 0.74 0.21 0.76 0.28 0.38
321 Textiles 1.67 1.43 0.77 1.23 0.75
322 Clothing 1.17 1.20 0.75 1.30 1.85
323 Leather products 1.38 0.93 0.45 0.58 0.97
324 Footwear 0.78 1.13 0.65 1.03 0.72
331 Wood 0.55 0.87 0.97 0.94 0.94
332 Furniture 2.69 1.40 1.13 0.85 0.96
341 Paper and cellulose 0.99 1.26 1.10 1.12 1.03
342 Printing and publications 1.21 0.86 1.43 0.89 1.03
351 Chemical industry 1.92 1.18 1.79 1.09 0.88
352 Other chemicals 1.98 0.60 0.97 0.86 0.58
353 Oil refining 1.22 1.57 3.35 0.28 0.30
354 Coal products 1.85 2.07 2.14 2.10 1.55
355 Rubber products 1.55 2.55 0.41 1.36 1.24
356 Plastic products 0.81 1.25 0.51 1.50 1.25
361 Ceramics 1.33 1.20 0.45 2.24 2.47
362 Glass 1.91 1.92 1.67 1.57 1.60
369 Metallic 2.35 1.28 1.68 1.36 1.39
371 Iron 2.54 1.97 1.33 2.82 1.54
372 Non-ferrous metals 1.28 2.50 0.43 1.92 2.39
381 Metal products 2.07 1.78 1.22 1.79 1.39
382 Non-electrical machinery 1.91 1.12 1.31 0.75 0.72
383 Electrical machinery 2.68 1.97 0.94 0.99 1.76
384 Transport equipment 2.00 1.33 0.76 2.07 1.81
385 Professional scientific
instruments 1.29 1.48 1.22 3.27 3.81
390 Other manufactures 0.52 0.76 0.92 1.26 2.19
Source: Calculated on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial Dynamics (PADI),
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago, Chile.
a/ The figures in boldface identify industries that are rapidly catching up.
b/ International Standard Industrial Classification.
c/ 1970-1995.
d/ 1970-1994.
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performance in Argentina, followed by Brazil, Mexico and Colombia. Chile
performed the worst of the five in terms of converging with United States
manufacturing labour productivity.
Table III.4 reports the inter-industry coefficient of dispersion around the
average rate of convergence. The coefficient is smaller in Argentina and Brazil
than in the other three countries, reflecting the fact that the closing up of the
relative labour productivity gap tended to be a more generalized phenomena
(i.e., more widespread across industries) than in the other economies. Chile
again stands out with greater structural heterogeneity in its inter-industry
responses. If anything, this structural heterogeneity increased through time.
In the other four cases, the dispersion coefficient fell in the 1990s, which
indicates that the faster labour productivity growth of this decade was more
evenly distributed across the industrial spectrum.
Table III.4








Source: Calculated on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial Dynamics (PADI),
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago, Chile.
a/ Data through 1995.
b/ Data through 1994.
D. The Acceleration of Labour Productivity Growth in the
1990s and the Impact of the Structural Reforms
One of the stated purposes of the present enquiry was to obtain some
measure of the impact of the recent structural reforms on productivity growth
and on the technological gap between Latin American countries (and
individual industries) and the international productivity frontier. Did the
reforms alter sectoral trends with regard to labour productivity growth vis-
à-vis the United States? The first step towards answering this question is
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estimating the relative labour productivity growth rate of the various industries
in the countries under consideration, vis-à-vis their counterpart in the United
States, over the period 1970-1990. The exercise provides the basis for analysing
the evolution of relative labour productivity growth in the 1990s.
As shown earlier, all of the countries except Mexico managed to grow
faster in terms of industrial labour productivity in the 1990s than in the two
earlier decades. This also happened in the United States, however, so having
grown faster in the 1990s was not necessarily a sufficient condition for closing
the relative productivity gap with United States manufacturing production.
For that to have occurred, they would have had to grow even faster than the
rapidly growing United States manufacturing sector. Was this the case? The
results vary by country. Mexico’s labour productivity growth was slower in
the first half of the 1990s, causing the relative gap with the United States to
increase compared to its relative performance in the previous two decades.
Colombia, Chile and Peru all experienced faster labour productivity growth
in the 1990s than in the two previous decades, but they did not grow faster
than the United States manufacturing sector. Consequently, they show no
relative improvement (and even a marginal decline in the case of Colombia)
vis-à-vis their performance in the 1970-1990 period. Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay posted a faster rate of labour productivity growth than the United
States in the 1990s, thereby closing the gap with the evolving frontier. Only in
the case of Argentina does this appear to be the continuation of a long-term
trend that was already present in the previous two decades. In Brazil and
Uruguay, the 1990s represent a significant discontinuity with the 1970-1990
period, in which the relative situation improved very modestly (Brazil) or
deteriorated (Uruguay).
Table III.5 presents estimates of what happened in terms of relative labour
productivity growth during the period 1970-1990 for 27 industries in the five
countries under consideration. The data are equivalent to those presented
earlier in table III.3, but they cover the two decades preceding the structural
reforms of the 1990s, whereas table III.3 covers the entire 1970-1996 period. A
coefficient greater than 1 indicates that the industry in question was converging
with the United States in terms of labour productivity during these two
decades, while a coefficient of less than 1 indicates that it was falling behind
this benchmark.
A significant number of industries were already narrowing the labour
productivity gap with the United States prior to the structural reforms of the
1990s. This was the case in 16 out of 27 industries in Argentina and Brazil, 17
in Chile, 23 in Mexico and 24 in Colombia. This evidence indicates that the
pro-market reforms do not fully explain the recent trend towards convergence
with the international productivity growth frontier shown by particular
industries. The structural reforms have accelerated the pace, but they did not
trigger the process, which in many cases was already underway in previous
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Table III.5
RELATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GAP VIS-À-VIS THE UNITED
STATES INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, FOR LATIN AMERICAN
INDUSTRIES, 1970-1990
(United States = 1.00)
ISIC GROUPa ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA MEXICO
311 Foodstuffs 0.96 0.91 0.72 1.19 1.34
313 Beverages 0.87 0.78 0.89 0.94 1.14
314 Tobacco 0.72 0.36 1.41 1.11 0.69
321 Textiles 1.40 1.48 0.85 1.48 1.01
322 Clothing 0.80 1.06 0.80 1.01 2.44
323 Leather products 0.78 1.17 1.12 1.06 2.20
324 Footwear 0.62 1.0 0.65 1.63 0.93
331 Wood 0.57 0.65 1.45 1.39 1.29
332 Furniture 1.88 1.0 1.00. 0.89 1.12
341 Paper and cellulose 0.85 1.20 1.61 1.50 1.40
342 Printing and
publications 1.09 0.74 1.27 1.08 1.35
351 Chemical industry 1.78 1.12 3.10 1.42 1.16
352 Other chemicals 1.80 0.70 1.15 1.01 0.79
353 Oil refining 0.60 1.44 3.56 0.36 0.41
354 Coal products 1.29 1.80 1.47 2.84 2.00
355 Rubber products 1.00 0.95 0.66 1.39 1.21
356 Plastic products 0.60 0.86 0.73 1.40 1.45
361 Ceramics 0.65 0.80 0.25 1.96 2.45
362 Glass 1.52 1.37 2.10 1.69 1.68
369 Metallic 1.19 0.85 1.50 1.69 1.69
371 Iron 1.70 1.42 1.30 3.34 2.17
372 Non-ferrous metals 1.15 1.53 0.68 2.10 2.37
381 Metal products 1.75 1.08 1.14 1.28 1.40
382 Non-electrical
machinery 1.47 1.03 1.00 0.79 0.74
383 Electrical machinery 1.79 1.14 1.00 1.20 1.82
384 Transport equipment 1.01 0.83 1.00 1.44 1.81
385 Professional scientific
instruments 1.78 1.46 0.81 2.76 4.35
390 Other manufactures 0.76 0.86 0.66 1.47 2.39
Source: Calculated on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial Dynamics (PADI),
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago, Chile.
a/ International Standard Industrial Classification.
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decades. Comparing the results of tables III.3 and III.5 shows that of the 22
(out of 27) industrial sectors that narrowed the relative labour productivity
gap in Argentina vis-à-vis the United States between 1970 and 1996, 16 were
already doing so during the ISI period. The reforms appear to be associated
with significant improvements in the relative performance of sectors like
leather products, ceramics, non-metallic minerals, transport equipment, and
iron and steel, but in many other industries the relative gap was already closing
well before the structural reforms of the 1990s.
Of the 21 Brazilian industries that managed to narrow the relative labour
productivity gap with the United States between 1970 and 1996, 15 were
already doing so in the previous two decades. Prominent among the sectors
that improved their relative performance after trade liberalization were
transport equipment, non-metallic minerals, non-ferrous metals, wood
products, and iron and steel.
In the case of Chile, of the 13 industries that closed the relative labour
productivity gap with the United States in the period 1970-1996, 12 were
already doing so during the period 1970-1990. The industries that improved
their long-term relative productivity in the 1990s include printing and
publishing, ceramics, non-metallic minerals and non-electrical machinery.
In sum, the data prompt the following conclusions:
(i) Some countries of the region, particularly Argentina, Colombia, Mexico
and Brazil, were relatively more successful than others in closing the labour
productivity gap with the United States. By contrast, the relative performance
of Chile and Costa Rica was fairly stable, while Jamaica, Peru and Uruguay
suffered relative deterioration.
(ii) Labour productivity improvements and the closing of the gap with
the United States reveal a high degree of heterogeneity among industries and
countries.
(iii) The growth rate of labour productivity clearly increased in the 1990s in
most of the Latin American countries, but this also happened in the United States.
(iv) Consequently, Latin America’s improved performance with regard
to labour productivity growth in the 1990s does not necessarily translate into
a closing of the relative gap with the United States.
(v) The narrowing of the labour productivity gap with the United States
was already taking place in many countries and industries prior to the
structural reforms of the 1990s.
(vi) As a result of the recent reform efforts, some new industries joined
the group of successful industries that were already closing the labour
productivity gap with their United States counterparts. The specific industries
varied across countries, but the groups were similar in Argentina and Brazil,
on the one hand, and Colombia and Mexico, on the other.
(vii) The data do not support the conclusion that trade liberalization and
market deregulation efforts were a necessary and sufficient condition for
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successfully converging with labour productivity standards in the United
States. Structural reforms undoubtedly increased competitive pressure, and
this was important for boosting the growth rate of labour productivity. The
empirical evidence shows, however, that segments of the region’s
manufacturing sector were already converging with international patterns of
efficiency well before the onset of the structural reforms. The reforms
accelerated the process, but they did not trigger it amid generalized failure.
E. Why Some Industries Catch Up While Others Fall Behind
in the Process of Economic Growth
The data presented in the preceding sections help identify which
industries have done well and are gradually converging with the international
productivity frontier and which are falling behind international standards.
They do not, however, explain why this is happening.
In principle, at least two different, but complementary, explanations might
apply. The first highlights domestic circumstances, whereas the second stresses
the role of external factors. Given that the phenomenon in question is the
relative productivity performance vis-à-vis the international productivity
frontier, either a rapid expansion of domestic labour productivity or a slow
outward movement of the frontier could cause an improvement in the relative
performance. The literature on growth identifies a deceleration in the
productivity growth rate of the United States between the mid-1970s and the
mid-1980s; this opened the possibility for Latin American countries and
industries to converge with the United States during that period even without
significant improvements of their own in labour productivity.
Similarly, a successful domestic performance in a particular industry could
be the result of macroeconomic variables (e.g., aggregate demand growing at
a rather fast pace) or, alternatively, it could be a consequence of sectoral
variables that affect one specific field of economic activity, but not others (e.g.,
special legislation affecting the automobile industry). The policy signals given
to a particular economic activity can spur a rapid process of investment and
growth beyond what is happening in the economy at large.
This brief discussion demonstrates how the explanation of why countries
and industries catch up or fall behind is far more complex than can be
addressed here. A sector-by-sector examination of the local and external
reasons for the narrowing or widening of the gap between specific industries
and the international benchmark is obviously beyond the scope of this book.
Preliminary evidence indicates, however, that macroeconomic forces,
represented by the overall growth rate of the economy, do matter as explanatory
variables in the success or failure of most industries in the convergence process.
In principle, we could expect convergence to be easier wherever aggregate
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demand is expanding rapidly. Success breeds success, as development
economists often suggest. This is supported by the cross-section estimates
presented in table III.6, in which the industry’s growth rate throughout the
period 1970-1996 is used as an independent variable to explain changes in the
relative labour productivity gap with United States manufacturing.
Table III.6
CROSS-SECTION REGRESSIONS BETWEEN INDUSTRY GROWTH
AND CHANGES IN THE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GAP VIS-À-VIS
UNITED STATES MANUFACTURING, 1970-1996
COUNTRY REGRESSION STANDARD ERROR R2 F STATISTIC DEGREES
COEFFICIENT  OF FREEDOM
Argentina 0.77 0.13 .59 33.56 23
Brazil 1.13 0.06 .95 419.05 22
Chile 0.68 0.14 .55 22.39 20
Colombia 0.89 0.25 .33 12.59 25
Mexico 1.17 0.21 .57 31.97 24
Source: Calculated on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial Dynamics (PADI),
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago, Chile.
Leaving aside the case of Colombia, for which our statistical results are
rather poor, the regression coefficients seem to confirm the hypothesis that
the overall growth rate of the economy has a significant impact on the
performance of the industrial sectors. Within an expanding global environment
the industries that grow faster open up more opportunities for new investment
and productivity growth. By contrast, slow growing industries are likely to
foster defensive business practices and fewer opportunities for productivity
improvement. This cursory analysis obviously needs to be complemented by
other macroeconomic as well as sector-specific variables, describing both the
domestic and foreign situation of each specific industry, to more fully explain
why particular industries catch up or fall behind in the long-term process of
economic growth.
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F. Sectoral Competitive and Technological Regimes14
The restructuring process that each particular industry has gone through
over the course of the last two decades –which is partly explained, as already
seen, by long-term historical trends in industrial organization and partly by
the response of firms in that industry to changes in the macroeconomic policy
regime– assumes a highly idiosyncratic pattern, one that differs across sectors
and countries. This pattern is termed the sectoral competitive and technological
regime. As a result of both historical trends and the recent structural reforms,
a large number of industries in the region are undergoing a major
transformation in their competitive and technological regime, moving
outwards to an entirely new model of structure and behaviour. Tariff and
non-tariff barriers to competition have fallen; the age and modernity of
production facilities have improved; product designs have been brought closer
to international standards; production organization has become less vertical;
industries have become more concentrated; and the degree of foreign
participation has increased at the expense of SMEs and large domestic
conglomerates. The sum of all these processes constitutes a major change in
an industry’s competitive and technological regime.
Industries clearly demonstrate sharp differences in the extent to which
these changes have already taken place. In some cases, the process is very
advanced or even finished; in others, it is currently in the middle of the
transition period. Economists have made little progress to date in
understanding these processes of structural transformation. They can thus
offer little guidance on how micro- and macroeconomic forces (i.e.,
technological, economic and institutional) shape the long-term structural
transformation of a sector.
Take, for example, the recent structural transformation of the iron and
steel industry (ISIC group 371 in the previous tables). Argentina, Brazil and
Colombia exhibit a remarkable convergence with labour productivity in the
United States, while Chile and Mexico show moderate success. In other words,
all five countries improved their relative labour productivity position vis-à-
vis the United States in the period under study. What explains this outcome?
The weak technological performance of the United States iron and steel
industry is clearly part of the explanation. This is well documented in the
14. A series of recent studies, including those by the Italian economist Franco Malerba, stress sectoral
systems of innovation and production as an explanatory framework for the varying growth
performances of different productive activities. Such authors argue that the base of technical
knowledge differs by sector, as do institutions and direct and indirect forms of interaction among
particular firms. This triggers extremely heterogeneous dynamics of sectoral development. The idea
is very close to the argument presented here. See Malerba (1997).
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literature and does not need much discussion here. Basically, steel mills in the
United States experienced major difficulties in adopting process innovations
that had already been implemented in the European, Korean and other iron
and steel industries. This does not wholly explain what happened in Latin
America, however. Consider the case of Argentina. As mentioned in chapter
II, the Argentine steel industry underwent deep structural changes in the 1980s
and 1990s, including the privatization of Somisa, a large public firm. Many
SMEs left the steel market or were taken over by either Techint S.A. or Acindar
S.A., the two largest domestic conglomerates in this field. In 1975, the sector
had 59 industrial plants; at the start of the 1990s, it only had 26. When the
State plant was privatized, it was acquired by Techint S.A., which also
purchased the Mexican firm TAMSA and Venezuela’s SIDOR, as well as forging
strategic alliances with large European groups through which it acquired
control of Italian iron and steel mills. In other words, Techint S.A. repositioned
itself as a world player in the international arena, despite the sharp decline
Argentina experimented in aggregate investment rates throughout the 1980s.
The company is now a global actor, with diversified businesses throughout
the world in iron and steel and in the production of seamless tubing. The
microeconomic and sector-specific factors underlying the behaviour of this
firm hold important clues to what industrial organization is all about and
how it relates to growth theory generally. Macro-, meso- and microeconomic
forces of a technological, institutional and economic nature have all clearly
played a role, and their interdependence requires further examination.
The restructuring of the Argentine iron and steel industry is a clear case
of a rapidly changing competitive and technological regime, featuring the
exit and entry of firms; the adoption of new technologies by surviving firms;
falling tariff protection; foreign direct investment by large domestic
conglomerates; an increasing rate of business concentration; a dramatic change
in sectoral institutions; and shifting microeconomic patterns of conduct in
response to government actions. A new competitive and technological regime
now governs the process of capital accumulation and surplus appropriation
within the sector, which must be taken into account in analysing the long-
term growth path of this industry.
A similar analysis could be carried out for a number of Brazilian, Chilean,
Colombian or Mexican industries. In many cases, this process actually started
in the late 1970s and early 1980s and then accelerated in response to changes
in the macroeconomic policy regime. The process was not triggered by the
reforms; it was merely aided by them.
Fully understanding these processes would facilitate efforts in the policy
arena. Entering into the design and implementation of policy actions without
a clear analytical background of what has been happening all along –and
blindly accepting the idea that markets function well and that opening up to
external competition and privatizing and deregulating economic activities is
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enough to stimulate an optimal adjustment process– would probably not
produce socially desirable results in terms of the structure and performance
of the various manufacturing activities in the economy. A complex research
agenda lies ahead, with many new questions. Some of these questions are
explored later in this book.
Table III.7
ARGENTINA: STRUCTURAL CHANGE, ENTRY AND EXIT OF FIRMS IN
THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, 1975-1992
1975 1980 1985 1990 1992
Integrated Altos Hornos Altos Hornos Altos Hornos Altos Hornos Altos Hornos
Zapla Zapla Zapla Zapla Zapla
Somisaa Somisaa Somisaa Aceros
Acindar Acindar Acindar Paraná
Siderca Siderca Siderca Acindar
Siderca
Total integrated 1  4  4 4 4
Semi-integrated Aceros Aceros Aceros Aceros Aceros
Bragado Bragado Bragado Bragado Bragado










Total semi-integrated 10 5  2 2 1
Total mills 47 38 36 33 21
Total industry 59 47 42 39 26
Source: Daniel Azpiazu and Eduardo Basualdo, “La internalización reconsiderada: el caso de
Siderar”, Buenos Aires, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), 1995
(unpublished).
a/ Sociedad Mixta Siderúgica Argentina.
b/ Industria Argentina de Aceros.
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CHAPTER IV
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND LABOUR
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN NON-
MANUFACTURING SECTORS:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND MINING
Thus far the discussion has addressed whether the Latin American
manufacturing sector managed to close the relative labour productivity gap
with the international productivity frontier in the last three decades, in
particular after the market-oriented structural reforms were introduced in
the 1990s. This chapter shows that many of the processes that took place in
the region’s industrial sectors extend to non-manufacturing fields as well,
including telecommunications and mining. The acceleration in the growth
rate of labour productivity in the 1990s and the gradual closing of the relative
labour productivity gap with the international technological frontier were, in
fact, more system-wide phenomena affecting many other production activities
beyond industry itself.
A. The Telecommunications Sector
The Latin American countries have followed markedly different
strategies for restructuring and modernizing their telecommunications
industries. Some countries –notably Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and,
more recently, Brazil– opted for the privatization of the sector, although they
pursued very different ideas about its simultaneous deregulation and the
enforcement of discipline through competition from new entrants. At one
extreme, Chile decided very early in the restructuring process to deregulate
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the sector and to allow for stronger competition. At the other extreme,
Argentina and Mexico similarly privatized the telecommunications industry,
but they accepted a temporary monopoly which was to last around a decade.
Costa Rica and Uruguay, in contrast, chose not to privatize
telecommunications. They have sought to modernize the sector technologically
while retaining State ownership of fixed telecommunications services and
allowing for deregulation and greater competition in mobile
telecommunications and high value-added services.
Both strategies have had positive consequences in terms of accelerating
growth, upgrading the quality of service and stimulating the technological
modernization of the telephone system. All of the countries reduced their
labour productivity gap vis-à-vis the international productivity frontier, with
regard to both quality and quantity. Despite such widespread advances,
however, the countries that implemented privatization in combination with
market deregulation performed significantly better from the perspective of
consumer’s welfare than did those that opted for privatization in a monopoly
context.
1. Alternative Strategies and Labour Productivity Growth in the Latin
American Telecommunications Industry
Figures IV.1 and IV.2 show that labour productivity in the
telecommunications sector increased substantially in the 1990s. This was the
case both for the region as a whole and for each of the individual countries
under study.
Initial conditions varied substantially across countries when authorities
in the region first began to discuss the privatization of telecommunications
services. Some countries –Argentina, for example– were significantly more
pressed for fiscal resources than others, such as Chile. The Argentine
government was therefore less concerned about promoting microeconomic
efficiency in the sector than about securing the cash flow from the transaction.
The initial heterogeneity among the countries of the region generated a wide
range of privatization conditions, regulatory frameworks and bargaining
capabilities of local public officials vis-à-vis interested multinational firms.
Given such diverse experiences, each national case merits separate
examination, irrespective of the fact that all the countries underwent










1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996












1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
United States Latin America
Figure IV.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES: PRODUCTIVITY IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, 1986-1996
(Number of lines in services per employee)
Source: Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senén González, La privatización de las telecomunicaciones en América
Latina: empresas y sindicatos ante los desafíos de la reestructuración, Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1998.
Source: Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senén González, La privatización de las telecomunicaciones en América
Latina: empresas y sindicatos ante los desafíos de la reestructuración, Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1998.
Figure IV.2
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, MEXICO AND URUGUAY: PRODUCTIVITY OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 1986-1996
(Number of lines in services per employee)
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2. The Initial Situation
The performance of the telecommunications sector prior to the reforms
was clearly disheartening (see table IV.1). Available literature on this topic
offers several explanations for this poor performance. Some authors emphasize
the bureaucratic-hierarchical governance model common in public enterprises.
Public ownership is scarcely an organizational model inducing innovation
and productivity growth. Public firms are described as having soft budget
constraints and being governed by hierarchical and command relationships
rather than by price signals, market rules and efficiency incentives. State firms
are not subject to a conventional market discipline. Career advancement is
dictated more by seniority than by performance. Dismissal is rare, and trade
unions have a privileged position in the labour force. The hierarchical-
bureaucratic model was quite prevalent among State firms in the region’s
telecommunications sector during the ISI period. Although these firms
managed to grow and to earn a profit, they were neither innovative nor
especially keen to increase productivity. They routinely planned the installation
of new lines by means of public surveys, neglecting more sophisticated ways
of projecting demand on the basis of consumer’s purchasing power, the income
elasticity of demand for telecommunications services and international
comparisons. The outcome was that the number of lines grew at a ritualistic
3% to 4% per year, but dramatically long waiting lists accumulated for the
installation of new lines as well as for the repair of the decaying physical
infrastructure.
A second explanation of the prevailing inefficiency puts more weight on
the deterioration of the operating conditions that these firms suffered in the
1980s as a result of the debt crisis. According to studies in Argentina and
Chile (Moguillansky, 1999), firms entered a stage of dramatic financial disarray
when governments attempted to use them as an instrument for macroeconomic
stabilization during periods of high inflation. This explains why the
privatization of the telecommunications industry received strong support from
the population, as many people were frustrated by the low quality of service
and the unresponsiveness of public firms to their needs.15
15. Walter and Senén González (1998, p.33) emphasize the stagnation that precedes privatization, an issue
that is also addressed by Celani (1998, p.13). To explain the lack of reaction in Argentina to
denationalization of the telecommunications industry, the ending of job guarantees and the division
of the State company into two firms, Celani cites the “economic-financial disorder caused by the state
of neglect of the lines, the exchanges and everything that had to do with business practice and
investment.” By contrast, in Mexico the transition from State ownership to free competition seems to
have been relatively untraumatic (Walter and Senén González, 1998, p.43).
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Whether because they were highly bureaucratized firms to start with or
because their performance deteriorated badly in the 1980s, the privatization
of these firms brought about a major transformation of the structure and
performance of the telecommunications industry within each country. The
transfer of telecommunications firms to the private sector entailed significant
changes in their modus operandi. The degree of vertical integration was
reduced, and subcontracting was rapidly increased. Investment and
technological strategies changed dramatically, as did firm ideology regarding
labour relations, governmental relations and general public relations. It was
nothing less than a quiet revolution, involving a shift from a hierarchical
organizational model based on command to one founded on market rules
and disciplines.
3. The Institutional and Regulatory Framework
Three main sets of factors seem to have influenced the way in which the
privatization of the telecommunications sector was conducted in the region.
The first concerns the nature of the regulatory framework and the requirements
specified by the government for the tender.16  These legal instruments
Table IV.1
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SECTOR AT THE END OF THE 1980s
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR ARGENTINA CHILE BRAZIL MEXICO VENEZUELA STANDARD
Local calls completed (%) 49 97 39 92 49 96
Long-distance calls
completed (%) 29 93 n.a. 90 31 89
Lines out of service (%) 45 7 5 10 n.a. 3
Repair time (days) 14 3 2 4 4 2
Installation time (days) 600 10 300 100 180 4
Source: A. Whilhelmus van der Krogt, “The Case of Telecom Services in Chile and Argentina”,
Ph.D. dissertation, Amsterdam University, 1996, p. 167.
16. On the Argentine case, see Celani (1998, p.15). The authorities’ haste to make the transfer prompted
some difficulties, such as the absence of a pre-sale regulatory body that could take part in the process
from the outset. The National Telecommunications Commission was created after November 1990, and
the privatization itself was overseen by other bodies that later played no role.
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established the minimum general conditions that winning firms were expected
to meet. They also specified the minimum new investment and number of
new telephone lines per year that the government expected out of the
privatization process. Countries display enormous differences in the initial
bargaining details that each specified for the privatization. In general, the
newly arriving firms met their obligations, and the fixed telephone
infrastructure expanded very rapidly, as did the rate of digitalization of the
communication network.
Second, the internal culture and long-term strategy of the firm taking
over the contract also played an important role in conditioning the outcome
of the programme. Of particular importance in this regard was the firm’s
technological history, its participation in international alliances with other
large telecommunications operators and its links with the international capital
market. Many of the new operators entering the Latin American
telecommunications sector were public firms in their respective countries, such
as Telefónica (Spain), France Télécom, and Stet (now Telecom Italia). Some
had a markedly engineering culture, whereas others were more customer-
oriented (Walter, 2000).17
Finally, the regulatory agency clearly influenced the evolution of the
process. Some countries established the relevant regulatory agency before
privatization, and the agency was thus able to play an active role in designing
the regulatory framework for transferring the firm to private hands. Other
countries set up the agency after the privatization had already taken place,
when it was obviously much more difficult to change the rules without
violating contracts, established property rights and credibility.
The complex interdependency between the regulatory framework, the
investing firm’s management culture and strategies and the activities of the
regulatory agency significantly affected the sector’s performance following
privatization. In addition, the telecommunications industry gradually began
to encounter increasing competitive pressure from mobile phones, cable
television and, increasingly, the Internet. Incumbent operators were thus
challenged to maintain their market position in the face of new technologies
and new firms entering particular market niches.
Each of the actors participating in this market has undergone a process
of adaptive learning. The institutional and regulatory environment slowly
improved almost everywhere as competition became stronger. Local
17. In a recent study on Argentina’s telephone privatization, Walter (2000, p.22) writes: “In particular, one
company seems more geared to process changes (Telecom), while the other puts more emphasis in
changing its image (Telefónica). The two strategies are reflected in different organizational structures
(engineering leadership versus business leadership) and, of course, in investment policies (emphasis
on the substitution of switching exchanges against emphasis on expanding the household network and
replacing obsolete couplings in the household network).”
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institutions gradually assumed a growing role in the area of consumer
protection, championing the right of marginal regions and consumers to be
connected to the network. In light of such developments, it is fair to say that
society as a whole benefited from privatization, as competition became more
significant and the different actors gained experience with the new regime.
The privatization of the telecommunications sector in Latin America was
thus marked by several common elements: (i) poor initial performance
indicators; (ii) a weak regulatory environment (except in Chile and, more
recently, Brazil, which capitalized on the experience and problems emerging
from the earlier privatizations in Argentina and Mexico); (iii) varying degrees
of fiscal urgency on the part of the privatizing government; and (iv) entry of
new firms providing mobile telecommunications and value-added services,
which challenged the market power of incumbent fixed telecommunications
service providers. How did the structure and performance of the sector
changed thereafter?
4. New Investment and the Installation of Fixed Telephone Lines
Because no single, universal story can adequately describe the regional
experiences, a comparative examination of specific national cases is necessary
to arrive at an understanding of the successes and failures of the privatization
of telecommunications in the different countries. The process began in Chile
in 1981, when the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) sold
80% of the stock of two regional service suppliers, the Compañía Nacional de
Teléfonos and the Compañía de Teléfonos de Coyhaique, to VTR
Telecommunications S.A. The 1982 General Telecommunications Law and its
later modifications established the regulatory framework and the incentives
regime under which the privatization of the Empresa Nacional de
Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) and the Compañía de Teléfonos de Chile (CTC)
would occur a few years later. In 1986, 30% of ENTEL was sold through the
local stock exchange, and 1987 saw the start of the sale of CTC. The latter
ended in 1988 with CTC’s transfer to the Bond Corporation (an Australian
firm) by means of public tender and the sale of shares. In the case of ENTEL,
the transition phase lasted two more years, ending in 1990. That same year,
the Bond Corporation sold its share in CTC to Telefónica of Spain, which had
also acquired ENTEL stock in the stock exchange.18
18. The Chilean literature on these issues often represents the Bond Corporation as an opportunist firm
that bid up the price of the company in a few years and then abandoned the business, leaving
practically nothing behind in the local context. Interviews at different levels of CTC reveal that Bond’s
technological and organizational legacy was not so meagre, especially as regards the transition to
cellular telephone service and the firm’s opening to international capital markets.
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In Argentina, the first attempt to introduce private-sector participation
in the telecommunications sector was made in 1987, during the presidency of
Raúl Alfonsín. Telefónica again emerged as the international operator most
interested in offering administrative management and technology to ENTEL,
Argentina’s State-owned fixed telephone company. For political reasons,
ENTEL initially was to be restructured and upgraded, but not privatized. It
was only in 1989, during the Menem administration, that ENTEL was slated
for privatization. The basic telephone service was given to two operators,
Telefónica de Argentina S.A. and Telecom de Argentina S.A. The former
consisted of Spain’s Telefónica (34%), Citibank (20%) and Techint, a private
Italian-Argentine group (6%). The latter comprised France Télécom (18%),
Italy’s Stet (18%), Morgan Bank (6%) and Pérez Companc, a private Argentine
group (18%).
In Mexico, two large phone companies controlled the market before 1950,
namely, Ericsson and a local firm that was later absorbed by the then-private
Telmex. The State acquired a 51% share of Telmex in 1972. Reprivatization of
the firm began in 1990, when Telmex was sold to the Carso group and its
partners, France Cables et Radio (an affiliate of France Télécom) and
Southwestern Bell. This concession contemplated quality improvement
commitments, a minimum 12% growth rate for the installation of new lines
and respect for workers’ rights to employment and collective bargaining. In
1995 the federal government passed the Federal Telecommunications Law.
This law established the details of the regulatory framework that was to
develop competition and give juridical security to investors, and it granted
the winning company sole market presence until 1996.
As mentioned earlier, fixed telecommunications services were clearly poor
in all of the countries in the region before privatization. Indeed, in the early
1980s the region had, on average, 7 lines per 100 inhabitants (with 12 in
Argentina and 10 in Chile, Mexico and Costa Rica), against an average of
almost 50 lines per 100 inhabitants in the developed countries. In the extreme
case of Argentina, less than 50% of telephone calls were properly completed,
the waiting period for installing a line was estimated to be 5 years and the
average repair time was 15 days.
The above does not mean, however, that the State firms did not grow and
make money. Nor does it mean that they did not have significant in-house
technological capabilities. Chile had 4 lines per 100 inhabitants in 1969 and
almost 10 in 1988, when the Bond Corporation took charge of CTC. This implies
a 4% annual growth rate, which can hardly be regarded as stagnation. Similarly,
the number of lines per employee increased from 42 in 1969 to 66 when the firm
was transferred to the Bond Corporation, and the firm invested about $370
million (at 1996 prices) between 1969 and 1988, or about $20 million a year.
The annual reports of CTC and ENTEL reveal that in the 1980s, gross
fixed investment did not surpass $100 million a year. In the period 1990-1994,
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this figure quadrupled to an annual average of about $400 million. Investment
growth was spectacular after 1996, surpassing $1 billion a year. The
telecommunications sector captured 5.5% of total annual gross investment in
the period 1990-1997, which is more than double its share in the 1980s
(Moguillansky, 1999). The dynamism of the sector is reflected in the fact that,
in a rapidly growing economy, telecommunications grew faster than average.
Such investment allowed an expansion from about 11 lines per 100 inhabitants
in the 1980s to 25 lines today.
The Argentine case is similar. The sector was by no means stagnant under
public ownership, but its growth rate was much lower than after privatization.
Between 1991 and 1997, in contrast, the Argentine telecommunications sector
shows investments of about $15 billion, or some $850 million annually. The
sector was thus one of the most dynamic in the economy, capturing about 4%
of total annual gross investment. Total telephone lines increased from 3,600,000
lines, or about 12 per 100 inhabitants, before privatization to about 7,500,000,
or about 24 lines per 100 inhabitants, in 1997.
5. Other Indicators of Sectoral Improvement
The discussion has thus far centred on conventional indicators of
productivity (i.e., lines per worker) and sectoral performance (i.e., lines per
100 inhabitants). Both measures show that the privatized firms underwent
clear improvements in the 1990s. Other indicators that support this conclusion
include the following: (i) the system’s degree of digitalization; (ii) the waiting
period for receiving a new telephone line; (iii) available number of public
telephones; and (iv) daily average pending repairs. All of these indicators
demonstrate very significant improvements in the 1990s. Despite differences
across countries, convergence with international standards is quite evident in
each of the countries under examination (see, for example, figure IV.3).
Various other indicators of overall sectoral improvement can be found.
Among them are the entry of new firms and human capital improvements.
The industry’s “fabric” became more dense and sophisticated. In the case of
Argentina, for example, the entry of new equipment suppliers and
subcontractors was quite considerable, as illustrated in table IV.2. Similar
developments can be found in Chile. Both countries also exhibit a significant
number of new software firms entering the market, first supplying services to
the telecommunications industry and later expanding to other areas such as
mining, air traffic control, military logistics, pension fund systems and health
insurance. Firms like Sonda, North Supply and Rimpex exemplify such
developments in Chile, where they contributed to building an increasingly
sophisticated, complex information-technology culture in the 1990s. A similar
phenomenon occurred in Brazil and Mexico.
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Figure IV.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES: DEGREE OF
DIGITALIZATION OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, 1986-1996
Source: Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senén González (eds.), La privatización de las telecomunicaciones
en América Latina: empresas y sindicatos ante los desafíos de la reestructuración, Buenos Aires, EUDEBA,
1998.
Table IV.2
ARGENTINA: GROWING COMPLEXITY OF THE ARGENTINE TELECOM
PRODUCTION STRUCTURE AFTER PRIVATIZATION
SERVICE PROVIDERS BEFORE CURRENT PROVIDERS
PRIVATIZATION




Telintar (Telefónica and Telecom)
Call Back (many United States companies)
Alternative networks ENTEL Mobile telephone service:
Miniphone (Telefónica and Telecom, for
the Federal Capital and
Greater Buenos Aires)
Unifón (Telefónica, southern region)
Personal (Telecom, northern region)
CTI North (except the Capital and Greater
Buenos Aires)
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Advances in the sector’s structure and performance were accompanied
by the rejuvenation and professionalization of its human capital, which has
been recycled and upgraded through the incorporation of a younger, better
trained crop of workers, engineers and technicians. For Argentina, figures
IV.4 and IV.5 show that by the early 1990s, the upgrading of human capital
had become an important part of the human resource management
programmes of the new telecommunications companies.
SERVICE PROVIDERS BEFORE CURRENT PROVIDERS
PRIVATIZATION
CTI South (except the Capital and Greater
Buenos Aires)
Movicom (Federal Capital and Greater
Buenos Aires)
Cable (CATV):
Various modem cable suppliers










Supply of inputs Siemens Siemens











Source: Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senén González (eds.), La privatización de las telecomunicaciones en
América Latina: empresas y sindicatos ante los desafíos de la reestructuración, Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1998.
Table IV-2 continue
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Figure IV.4
TELEFÓNICA DE ARGENTINA: AVERAGE AGE AND TENURE OF
PERSONNEL, 1990-1993
Source: Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senén González, La privatización de las telecomunicaciones en América
Latina: empresas y sindicatos ante los desafíos de la reestructuración, Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1998.
Figure IV.5
TELEFONICA DE ARGENTINA: PROPORTION OF PROFESSIONALS IN
THE WORKFORCE
Source: Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senén González, La privatización de las telecomunicaciones en América















Walter and Gore (1996) describe the situation in Argentina as follows:
“Telefónica recently opened its training centres in a 25,000 square meter
building to train operational, technical and executive staff. In 1993, Telecom
invested $4.5 million in remodelling an old ENTEL building into a training
centre. This covers 6,600 square meters, with a capacity of 800 students per
day, and includes 10 multimedia classrooms, 12 laboratories, and a
documentation centre connected to databases from all over the world….
Training is provided by technicians from the equipment and technology
suppliers, particularly in relation to digital technology and fibre optics. The
courses are open to other companies linked to Telecom, such as Startel,
Movistar and Telintar.” The authors estimate that Telecom devotes some 52
hours per employee per year to training, which is equivalent to about 3% of
total hours worked. This approaches the standards of France Télécom.19  These
findings suggest that the upgrading of human capital parallels the
modernization of the firm’s hardware, and that embodied and disembodied
technological change are closely complementary and inseparable.
6. Privatization versus Modernization of State-Owned
Telecommunications Firms
Costa Rica and Uruguay chose to follow a different route from that
pursued in Chile, Argentina and Mexico. They retained State ownership over
basic telecommunications services but introduced stronger competitive
pressure by deregulating mobile telecommunications and high value-added
services. Both countries have had considerable success in their attempts to
modernize State-owned fixed telephone companies.
A recent study of the Uruguayan case describes the transformation as
follows: “The number of telephone lines in use currently surpasses the figure
considered acceptable for a country with a per capita GDP like Uruguay’s.
This is estimated at about 23 telephones per 100 inhabitants by the International
Telecommunication Union. The whole network was digitalized by July 1997,
and practically no demands for new lines go unmet. In other words, Uruguay
has performed extremely well in the Latin American context without
19. By way of example, the authors examine a training programme to familiarize workers with the use
of digital measuring instruments. External instructors are included on the teams in each operational
unit. The authors estimate that some 3,200 people received training in this programme, with each
course lasting 360 hours per team. With regard to the impact of training on the productivity of the
firm, the authors cite a worker who claimed that before training each team fixed three to four faults
a day, whereas now they fix six to seven. After comparing performance per team before and after
the training, the authors estimate performance improvements of about 60%. See Walter and Gore
(1996).
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privatizing the sector as did other countries of the region…. According to
surveys carried out in 1988, 26% of the population said that ANTEL worked
well or very well. The percentage had climbed to 80% by 1994, when ANTEL
broke Movicom’s monopoly in mobile telecommunications services, created
its own company and began to compete in the market” (de Wolf, 1998, p. 246).
Costa Rica offers another example of successful performance without
privatization. A recent study by Barbosa (1999) reveals that the number of
telephones per 100 inhabitants increased from just 10 in 1987 to 20 in 1997.
Such coverage is comparable to that of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, which
are the most advanced cases in the region.
The acceleration of technological upgrading in Costa Rica’s
telecommunications sector took place in the 1990s and is thus very recent (see
table IV.3). Even so, the number of employees at the Instituto Costarricense
de Electricidad (ICE) per 1,000 telephone lines fell from 10 to 6 in the decade.
In the late 1990s, the United States firm Millicon was eliminated from the
mobile telephone business and absorbed by ICE, following a lawsuit arguing
that the concession of the service to Millicon was unconstitutional. As in
Uruguay, the State company has taken charge of accelerating the local diffusion
of mobile telecommunications technology.
The final message of the experiences in Costa Rica and Uruguay is that
the privatization of public telephone companies was not the only way of
inducing their technological modernization. It is the discipline of markets,
the so-called invisible hand of competition, and not necessarily who owns
the company, that induces technological change, innovation and, consequently,
lower costs and prices. When privatization and market deregulation were
implemented simultaneously (as in Chile), the technological modernization
of the sector brought about significant welfare gains to local consumers. On
the other hand, when the privatization of public firms occurred under
monopoly conditions (as in Argentina or Mexico) prices did not fall
significantly, until after the industry began to feel the challenge of mobile
telecommunications services in the 1990s. The deregulation of the sector and
the entry of new suppliers of mobile and high value-added services –including
Internet– is what forced the incumbent fixed telecommunications firms in
Argentina and Mexico to reduce telephone charges and lower their profits.
7. The Development of Regulated Competition in the
Telecommunications  Sector
Laffont and Tirole (1998) present a pioneering exploration of the
development of regulated competition in network industries such as
telecommunications, electricity and gas. These sectors operate through the
interconnection of nodes, which move from generating centres, through
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switching, to the user’s home. Such activities have high fixed costs and large
economies of scale, and they have long been considered the typical case for
public monopolies. The monopoly situation fosters significant inefficiencies,
however. “At least two large sets of factors have encouraged the movement
in favour of institutional reform in industries of this sort. On the one hand, the
monopolist has few incentives to reduce costs. If resources are squandered,
prices are adjusted such that the monopolist recovers his ‘desired’ rate of return.
No great understanding of incentives theory is necessary to see that the ‘cost-
plus’ nature of industries with a regulated rate of return do not exactly tend to
perform brilliantly as regards costs and prices” (Laffont and Tirole, 1998, p. 4).
According to Laffont and Tirole, the deregulation and privatization of
industries of this sort stems from the perception that they do not promote
innovation or the maximization of consumer welfare. Technological change
would offer potential new entrants greater capacity to respond to consumer
demand, but their entry tends to be blocked by discriminatory pricing on the
part of incumbent firms.
Table IV.3
COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR,
1987-1997
INDICATOR 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number of workers 3,170 3,174 3,262 3,267 3,245 4,269 4,907 5,410 5,307 4,434 4,547
Workers per 1,000 lines n.a. 10.9 10.8 10.6 9.9 9.8 9.5 8.8 8.4 7.3 6.3
Lines
Installed (thousands) 283 287 302 308 324 338 408 500 543 628 694
Use of installed
capacity (%) 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.83 0.85
Pending demand
(thousands) n.a. 13.9 29.1 45.3 63.8 71.7 84.0 61.0 66.1 78.4 49.4
Density per 100
inhabitants 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.6 10.7 13.2 14.5 16.2 17.89 19.5
Calls completed (%)
National n.a. 54 50.8 49.6 50.1 49.9 47.0 46.3 48.8 50.3 52.0
International n.a. 58 56.1 67.3 57.2 58.2 55.8 55.8 68.5 59.3 60.0
Response to breakdowns
in 24 hrs or less n.a. 76.8 73.8 58.2 58.3 44.8 35.0 36.1 68.4 75.8 n.a.
Source: Gustavo Barbosa, “Crecimiento, empleo y equidad en América Latina: cambio tecnológico
en el sector de energía y telecomunicaciones en Costa Rica”, Economic Science Research Institute
(IICE), San José, Costa Rica, University of Costa Rica, unpublished, 1999.
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In the 1980s, several English-speaking countries tried to set price caps in
the telecommunications sector. They fixed a ceiling on the average service
price that the incumbent firm could charge, but let the company apply price
discrimination in response to demand elasticities and competitive pressure
in particular market segments. The assumption was that the use of maximum
prices would produce incentives for the incumbent to invest in expanding
and adequately maintaining the industry’s infrastructure. This model was
not successful, however. First, the regulator had incomplete information about
the producer’s costs; this hampered the fixing of precise maximum prices
and prompted unwanted fluctuations in the incumbent’s rate of return. Second,
the setting of price caps induced firms to “capture” the regulatory agency.
Third, it aroused legitimate concerns that the incumbent firm could reduce
maintenance expenditure beyond reasonable limits with the purpose of
lowering production costs.
In light of such difficulties, the deregulation and liberalization of the
industry appeared to constitute another possible alternative, since an
impersonal market mechanism would regulate prices and service quality.
Unfortunately, things are not that simple. Given the high capital costs incurred
by the incumbent firm, barriers to entry are extremely high, which hinders
the creation of a truly competitive market. New entrants must use the physical
infrastructure owned by the dominant firm, and the associated access tariff is
hard to estimate a priori. This entry cost normally constitutes a significant
fraction of the production costs of new entrants (Laffont and Tirole estimate it
at up to 50%). It is also a significant source of income for the incumbent, and
a key determinant of its rate of return on investment. It thus has a substantial
impact on the company’s propensity to invest, thereby affecting the growth
rate of the network and its maintenance. This is the source of a key regulatory
dilemma: a very high access fee prevents entry and negatively affects consumer
welfare; a very low access fee negatively affects the incumbent firm’s rate of
return and its propensity to invest.
The foregoing analysis highlights the complexity of the regulatory
problem and the difficulty of balancing the two sides of the dilemma.20  In
Latin America, this is currently the crux of the matter in the telecommunications
20. In a recent newspaper article, the general director of Chile’s CTC wrote: “The experience of the last
five years indicates that fixing interconnection tariffs is the cornerstone of competition in
telecommunications. Without fairly priced interconnections, there can be no competition. If local firms
are not adequately compensated, there will be little incentive to invest in local telephone service. At
the same time, if interconnected competitors are charged more than a fair price for the use of the
infrastructure, they will have no incentive to enter the market. If they are charged less than fairly,
many operators will enter the market, but this will not foster investment in infrastructure…. Thanks
to the introduction of competition, and as the result of the decline in access charges, long-distance
national calls increased by a factor of 2.2, and prices fell by 28%” (El Mercurio, Monday, 10 May 1999;
author’s translation). These remarks show the importance of this issue for the growth rate of the
network and consumer welfare.
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field. The key question seems to be how to develop new forms of regulated
competition in each country given the prevailing technological and competitive
regime. The pace at which the telecommunications sector is to grow in the future
and the extent to which it will pass on the benefits of technological modernization
to consumers will be closely related to the way in which institutions mature
and develop on this front.
B. The Mining Sector
Many of the issues examined above in relation to the recent transformation
of the Latin American telecommunications sector carry over to the mining sector.
Here, too, the relative productivity gap with industrialized countries narrowed
significantly in the 1990s, as a result of both the arrival of foreign firms that
introduced new production and organizational technologies and the technological
upgrading of local companies. This process involved the coevolution of economic,
technological and institutional forces. In the 1980s and 1990s, many Latin American
countries introduced fundamental changes in the property rights regime
governing the mining sector. This institutional reform caused a massive inflow of
foreign private investment into the Chilean, Argentine and Peruvian mining
sectors, triggering a major transformation of the industry’s technological and
organizational regime. Particularly in the case of Chile, local engineering firms,
domestic suppliers of simple capital goods and intermediate inputs (such as
pumps, motors, mechanic belts and explosives), public and private institutions
involved in the training of human resources, research and development
laboratories in universities and technical schools and various other actors in the
mining sector all experienced a gradual process of learning and upgrading over
the course of the 1990s. As in the case of telecommunications, this process was
essentially a system-wide evolutionary event involving the gradual development
of a new mining culture within the local society.
1. Institutions, Property Rights and Investment in the Latin American
Mining Sector in the 1990s21
Latin American countries have recently shifted from a paradigm of
national sovereignty, under which mines, oil fields, waterways and forests
were defined as public property, to one of private property, under which the
private ownership of these resources is granted as a constitutional right to
both national and foreign firms.
21. This section draws on Moguillansky (1999), who analyses the impact of structural reform on mining
investment in Latin America.
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Chile was the first to move in this direction with the modification of its
investment law in 1974 (Decree Law 600), right after Gen. Pinochet came to
power. This aggressive strategy would later be followed by Argentina, Brazil
and Peru. The change in the property rights regime was part of a more general
market-oriented renovation of the overall policy regime, whose main purpose
was to attract large multinational investors to the country. In a complementary
move specifically aimed at the mining sector, the Government granted special
tax concessions to foreign mining firms investing in new mines.
Chile’s new constitution of 1980, Peru’s Decree 708 of the early 1990s and
Argentina’s amendments to the mining legislation of 1993-1995 significantly
altered the institutional and fiscal landscape surrounding the mining sector.
These changes, together with the high quality of the available natural resources,
led to a sharp increase in investment from both foreign firms and large
domestic conglomerates. The opening of new mines in recent years, in turn,
significantly altered sectoral performance and market structure.
2. Changes in Industrial Organization in the Mining Sector
Further understanding of the systemic nature of the sectoral process of
technological upgrading experienced in the region in the 1990s must take into
account the multiplicity of firms and institutions that make up a country’s
mining industry at any given point in time. These include the mining
companies directly involved in the extraction and refining of different metallic
and non-metallic minerals, equipment and intermediate-input suppliers,
engineering firms, public R&D institutes in universities and technical schools.
To varying degrees, all of these actors take part in the system-wide
transformation induced by the rapid expansion of the industry, through the
development of downstream effects, externalities (positive and negative) and
synergies.
As far as mining itself is concerned, four different types of firms can be
identified: public mining companies, locally owned mining conglomerates,
subsidiaries of large transnational corporations and small and medium-sized
firms. The different downstream impacts of these four types of firms emerge
quite clearly in an analysis of the structure and performance of each (Cáceres,
Cárdenas and Katz, 2000).
The Chilean case is a good example of the differences in organization
and behaviour that are commonly found among the different types of mining
companies. The State firm Codelco (Corporación Nacional del Cobre) in many
ways confirms the conventional stereotype of a slow, bureaucratic firm,
burdened with ritualistic practices and routines. Codelco staged a dramatic
process of transformation and modernization in the 1990s, however, and is
now in the transition towards becoming a globalized, transnational enterprise,
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breaking with the stereotype of the past. Codelco is the world’s largest copper
producer (1,300,000 tons of fine copper per year). It employs close to 18,000
people. Four of the five mines that it exploits are old, which is why its average
productivity is lower than that of firms that exploit new, high-grade deposits.
In 1994, Codelco began an extensive programme of new investments involving
a drastic process of organizational and technological modernization. Many of
the engineering services demanded for such programme were contracted
locally. Transport, equipment maintenance and other production services were
subcontracted to small engineering firms operating within the mines
themselves. Codelco created its own research and development centre in the
mid-1990s, and took active steps in the direction of establishing strategic
alliances with global players in the international mining industry. Two aspects
of Codelco’s long-term market behaviour reflect the fact that it is a public
firm: first, investment in new production facilities is strongly dependent on
the availability of fiscal resources, which introduces an element of vulnerability
in its long-term performance; and second, the firm makes strong efforts to
develop downstream technological capabilities among local engineering firms
as well as among suppliers of different types of machinery and intermediate
inputs. It regards such efforts as socially profitable, even if they might not be
so from the point of view of profit maximization as typically pursued by the
private sector.
Private, locally owned mining conglomerates face a different set of
restrictions and opportunities than do public firms such as Codelco. The
Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile S.A. (Soquimich) is a good example of
this second type of mining company. Soquimich is a mining conglomerate
that produces iodine, nitrates and other non-ferrous items for the world
market; it employs close to 3,500 people. In 1988 the firm embarked on a large-
scale investment programme aimed at modernizing production facilities and
equipment and expanding its product mix. This strategy required the firm to
undertake a large number of new projects involving R&D, basic engineering
and project design efforts, for which it created its own research department.
The firm acquired mining rights for new investment projects both in Chile
and abroad; it started major exploration programmes, established strategic
alliances with international firms and secured financing by issuing American
Depository Receipts (ADR). All available evidence indicates that Soquimich
is currently running an ambitious programme aimed at establishing itself as a
global player in the world’s mining sector.
A third important group in the mining industry comprises large
transnational corporations with central headquarters and R&D facilities in
mining countries such as Canada, the United States or Finland, but which
exploit mines worldwide. These firms generally operate in developing
countries by means of local subsidiaries that carry out the actual mining
activities with little involvement in domestic R&D or engineering efforts, aside
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from what is strictly necessary for an efficient operation. The geographical
advantages arising from the high quality of the existing resources in a given
country, together with the local institutional and legal environment, are crucial
factors in the investment choices made by firms of this sort. They do not come
to a country with the purpose of developing local technological capabilities
or a domestic R&D infrastructure. They normally use international sources
for equipment and machinery, as well as for engineering services. Their
organizational and technological behaviour thus differs from that of the two
previously examined cases, coming closer to the enclave prototype whose
central feature is that of having low value added at the local level.
Minera Escondida Ltda. is a good example of this situation in the Chilean
case, although the firm has a significant downstream impact related to
environmental protection, urban development, shipping infrastructure and
so forth. Escondida is Chile’s second main copper producer (about 1,000,000
tons of fine copper a year), and it employs about 2,000 people. The firm belongs
to a consortium of multinational companies. The copper mine it owns has
been under exploitation since 1990; not only is it rich in copper, but it also
contains large reserves of gold. The firm’s production process was developed
entirely outside the country, and practically all the engineering services
required for start-up were provided by international engineering
subcontractors. Escondida makes few efforts in exploration for new local
deposits. Generally speaking, the firm acts conservatively, since it exploits a
new, high-grade, deposit and does not need to involve itself in major local
engineering efforts. The quality of the deposits guarantee high profits even
with low downstream efforts to create domestic technological capabilities.
Finally, the fourth type of mining company is the small or medium-sized
firm that exploits marginal deposits using labour-intensive technologies. These
firms generally lag far behind international production organization and
productivity standards, and because their operations are not environmentally
sustainable, they often present difficulties for public policy in the mining field.
The number of mining companies of this sort fell sharply in Chile in the 1990s,
from 120 to about 12, while their labour force declined from 4,500 employees
to less than1,000. Small entrepreneurs are generally leaseholders, rather than
owners, of mines whose exploitation is very costly and of very low yield
(Cáceres et al, 2000).
In sum, the Chilean mining industry exemplifies the major differences in
structure and performance that normally prevail among public mining firms,
domestically owned conglomerates, subsidiaries of transnational corporations
and SMEs. These firms face different opportunities and constraints, such that
they can be expected to have a different downstream impact on the
development of domestic technological capabilities, including the
development of local engineering firms, support for domestic suppliers of
intermediate inputs and machinery and the creation of human capital in
universities and technical schools.
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Only a small number of Latin American engineering firms have the
capacity to manage large investment projects in mining. Basic process-
engineering know-how is normally supplied by international subcontracting
companies such as Fluor Daniel and Bechtel. With regard to detail engineering
and construction services, Chile exhibits a fairly strong domestic base of
national engineering firms which, in partnership with the above-mentioned
international firms, are able to take an active role in setting up mining
operations and erecting and maintaining refineries. In 1996, the three main
international engineering firms based in Chile employed 7,300 people, while
a dozen Chilean firms, which are smaller and less technologically advanced,
employed just over 2,000 professionals. These companies are mostly engaged
in the design and implementation of minor technological improvements in
established production facilities, although to a lesser degree they also
participate in the erection of new production sites. Such domestic capacity is
less common in Argentina and Peru.
Large international suppliers of mining equipment also play an important
role in this industry. In recent years, equipment suppliers have demonstrated
an increasing tendency to set up operations locally and to be physically present
in the mines, replacing the conventional “arm’s length” sales of machinery
and equipment with a complete package of collateral engineering services
related to their installation, followed by post-sales servicing. Capital goods
suppliers have thus moved into the creation of on-site technical departments
that provide real-time technical assistance at the mine or refinery. The growing
importance of the region’s mining industry has led to a reduction in delivery
times and in the time lag between the first international use of a new type of
capital equipment and its use in the region. In this respect, the gap with
international technological standards has clearly been falling .
3. Technological Changes in the Mining Sector
Technological progress in the mining industry comes in the form of either
large changes in process technology, which are usually associated with major
changes in machinery and equipment, or minor technical changes, which
encompass incremental changes in both organizational and process
technologies. They each play an important role in explaining the industry’s
long-term global performance, and they contribute to the forces that condition
the performance of individual firms.
Consider the following newspaper quotation: “Chuquicamata will
continue to produce for at least another 25 years (it opened up in 1915), by
which time the mine will be more than a kilometre deep. For more than 80
years, Chuquicamata has provided the country with more than 10 million
tons of copper. Although it is likely to continue to produce, it has undeniably





1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
aged…. Production is now centred in low-return zones; the mineral grade
has fallen to below 1% as a result of the exhaustion of the best areas” (El
Mercurio, 26 August 1998; author’s translation). This is reflected in figure IV.6,
which shows that there is a negative correlation between the age of a copper
mine and output. The grade of the extracted mineral declines as the
mineralogical complexity of the deposits increases through time.
The need to counteract this negative structural feature induces mining
firms to engage in the production of incremental units of technical knowledge,
as they search for process improvements that would allow them to cut costs
and sustain output simultaneously. These incremental units of technical
knowledge are called minor technical changes. In the mining sector, however,
the accumulated impact of so-called minor technological changes has a
significant aggregate impact on the general performance of the firm.
Technological change that is embodied in new machinery and transport
equipment is paramount for a firm’s performance. In the mining sector,
embodied technological change is concentrated in three main areas: (i) the
mine; (ii) the refining process; and (iii) environmental protection.
Figure IV.6
CHILE: COPPER GRADE OF THE CHUQUICAMATA MINE, 1976-2000
Source: Author’s calculation, on the basis of the annual reports of the Corporación Nacional del
Cobre de Chile (Codelco-Chile).
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With regard to the mine, firms generally act as passive recipients of major
technological changes embodied in new pieces of capital equipment designed
by equipment suppliers. Trucks and other pieces of transport equipment are
a good example in this respect. The increasing complexity of transport
equipment generated a trend towards subcontracting the necessary transport
services at the mine, leaving responsibility for truck dispatch and maintenance
with the supplier. What the firm actually acquires are effective hours of
transport services delivered at the mine.
Similarly, the region is not especially active in terms of R&D and
engineering efforts aimed at the design and construction of new production
processes. Most firms subcontract their basic engineering technology under
turnkey conditions with major international contractors like Fluor Daniel or
Bechtel. One of the few exceptions in this respect is the leaching technology
developed recently by Codelco; the firm has even had a degree of success
selling the leaching technology internationally.
Finally, technological efforts related to environmental protection are also
important in this sector. Investment is substantial, particularly in waste
management and control and in technology to reduce smelter pollution.
Codelco, for example, spent more that $700 million on environmental
protection between 1994 and 1999 (see table IV.4).
Table IV.4
CHILE: CODELCO INVESTMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, 1994-1999
(Millions of dollars)
PROJECT DIVISION 1997 1994-1999
Capture and treatment of gases Chuquicamata 6.1 64.3
Arsenic suppression plan Chuquicamata … 40.0
Management and cleaning gases
at Potrerillos smelter El Salvador 16.6 47.9
Potrerillos acid plant El Salvador 4.7 98.0
Los Leones tailings deposit Andina 6.8 56.8
Ovejería dam deposit Andina 64.3 243.9
El Teniente acid plant El Teniente 26.5 73.0
Third-stage of Carén dam El Teniente 3.0 35.8
Other smaller projects 4.1 79.1
Total 132.1 738.8
Source: Jaime Cáceres, Kattia Cárdenas and Jorge Katz, “Instituciones y tecnología en el desarrollo
evolutivo de la industria minera chilena”, Reformas Económicas series, No. 53 (LC/L.1349),
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2000.
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4. Prospects
The Latin American mining industry is undergoing a process of rapid
structural transformation. This process involves economic, institutional and
technological factors that evolve together, reinforcing the industry’s
convergence with international best practices. Changes in property rights and
in the fiscal treatment granted to international mining firms in the region, as
well as the availability of high-quality mineral deposits, caused a massive
inflow of foreign direct investment in the mining sector in the 1990s. This
strongly affected the structure and performance of the sector in countries such
as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Chile and Brazil developed
relatively strong downstream effects involving domestic engineering firms
as well as local suppliers of intermediate inputs and capital equipment. In
contrast, the mining sector in Argentina, Peru and Mexico more closely
resemble an enclave industry.
In the case of Chile, State-owned Codelco was instrumental in fostering
such strong downstream effects. Domestic technological capabilities diffused
among local engineering firms, suppliers of capital goods and intermediate
inputs, public R&D institutes and engineering departments at universities
and technical schools are therefore stronger in Chile than in other countries in
the region. Foreign firms that have recently entered the region’s mining sector
show little interest in engaging in the development of a strong local
technological infrastructure. These firms operate mostly on the basis of foreign
know-how and equipment, and given that they normally exploit new, high-
grade mines, they do not need to undertake in-house technological efforts.
Thus, the future long-term enhancement of domestic technological
capabilities is not particularly promising, aside from the developments in Chile
and Brazil. Enclave economies are often criticized for their low domestic value
added and their scarce impact on the development of technological capabilities
in the recipient environment. The current expansion of the mining sector in
Latin America does not seem to be much different in this respect. Mining
cycles are closely linked to the quality of available resources and to
international prices. The current growth in mining investment could eventually
decline, prompting a downward cycle similar to those already experienced
by the mining industry in earlier periods. Under such circumstances, it is
crucial for Latin American countries to seek to maximize the systemic effects
of the sector’s current rapid expansion. This requires governments to take a




THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS ON
EMPLOYMENT, THE TRADE BALANCE IN
MANUFACTURING AND THE RELATIVE
PRODUCTIVITY GAP BETWEEN
SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS
The two previous chapters examined how labour productivity growth
and the labour productivity gap with the international frontier evolved over
the last two decades in several countries of the region, both in manufacturing
and in non-manufacturing sectors such as telecommunications and mining.
The available empirical evidence shows that some countries (and industries)
managed to partially close the gap with the international frontier –represented
by United States manufacturing productivity– while others did not. The
evidence also suggests that new problems have emerged as a result of market
failures, information asymmetries, monopolistic practices and so forth.
This chapter investigates three specific topics: employment generation
and destruction associated with recent structural reforms; the evolution of
the relative productivity gap between SMEs and large firms; and the impact
of recent changes in production specialization on the region’s external balance
of trade. All three areas raise new questions and challenges that will have to
receive specific attention in the regional policy agenda for the future.
A. Employment
Chapter III showed that labour productivity growth in the 1990s was less
the result of a rapid expansion of output than of a strong expulsion of labour
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in the more successful areas of manufacturing production. This was especially
true in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. In contrast, Chile enjoyed considerable
job creation in the 1990s, after having had open unemployment rates of over
20% in the 1970s.22
Tables V.1, V.2 and V.3 examine the inter-industry relation between closing
the relative labour productivity gap vis-à-vis the United States and the
manufacturing branch’s employment performance (measured by whether it
created or destroyed jobs), for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, respectively. Each
table is constructed as a matrix, in which the upper left quadrant identifies
the industries that are catching up with United States productivity standards
while simultaneously creating new jobs; the upper right quadrant lists
industries that are similarly converging with the United States, but which are
reducing their absolute employment level; the lower left quadrant identifies
industries that are lagging behind the United States but creating new jobs;
and, finally, the lower right quadrant shows industries that are both lagging
behind the United States and destroying positions.
Weighting the relative significance of the various industrial sectors with
their share in industrial output at the end of the period under consideration
indicates that roughly 70% of Argentine manufacturing production was
gradually catching up with United States productivity standards while
simultaneously contracting employment in absolute terms. This strongly
confirms the argument that in the case of Argentina, convergence is more
closely associated with labour displacement than with a high growth rate of
manufacturing output. Only 20% of Argentina’s industrial output was
produced in industries that were simultaneously catching up with
international productivity standards and creating new jobs –and it is precisely
this combination that is the most valuable, as the narrowing of the gap involves
genuine technical progress rather than simply worker displacement at the
factory level. For example, the entire Argentine metalworking industry (sectors
381, 382, 383, 384 and 385 of the ISIC) was situated in the upper right quadrant,
indicating that it was doing relatively better than its United States counterpart
in terms of labour productivity growth, but that it was doing so as a result of
a deep reduction in employment. In fact, the Argentine metalworking industry
suffered a contraction of its labour force of well over 100,000 workers during
the period under examination.
The situation in Chile is clearly different. Only 12% of Chilean
manufacturing output was generated by industries in which the relative
productivity gap was being reduced vis-à-vis the United States at the same
time that workers were being dismissed in absolute terms. Conversely, 33%
of Chilean manufacturing production combined convergence and job creation.
22. On the impact of the reforms on employment, see Weller (2000).
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Table V.1
ARGENTINA: RELATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GAP AND JOB
CREATION BY MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1970-1996a
GENERATE EMPLOYMENT REDUCE EMPLOYMENT
Industries that are 311: Foodstuffs 354: Coal products
 catching up 321: Textiles 362: Glass
332: Furniture 369: Other non-metallic minerals
342: Printing 372: Non-ferrous metals
351: Chemicals 381: Metal products
352: Other chemicals 382: Non-electrical machinery
353: Oil refining 383: Electrical machinery
355: Rubber products 384: Transport equipment
371: Iron and steel 385: Professional scientific
  instruments
Industries that are 313: Beverages 356: Plastic products
 falling behind 314: Tobacco 361: Ceramics




341: Paper and cellulose
Source: Author’s compilation, on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial
Dynamics (PADI), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago,
Chile.
a/ The numbers correspond to International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) categories.
The differences in the distribution of the two countries’ industrial branches
within the matrix is consistent with the structural adjustment model presented
in Chapter II, which positioned Argentina and Chile in distinct phases of
adjustment following the implementation of the structural reforms. Chile is
the only country in the region to date that has managed to return to an
equilibrium macroeconomic growth path following the debt crisis of the early
1980s. In the 1990s, savings and investment returned to pre-crisis levels, and
many new manufacturing plants were erected. The overall rate of growth
increased significantly, as did the demand for labour, after a dramatically high
rate of unemployment –close to 22%– in the early 1970s when the reforms
actually started.
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The Argentine case is somewhat different. The investment rate plummeted
from 22% to less than 10% in the early 1980s. The economy entered a long
stagflation period, with open unemployment coming close to 20%. Although
recovery (phase II) started in the first half of the 1990s, investment in new
production facilities never reached the levels seen in Chile throughout the
1990s. Businesses maintained a defensive attitude, and animal spirits remained
low in the face of the macroeconomic uncertainty caused first by the Asian
crisis and then by the Russian and Brazilian ones. Under such circumstances,
labour productivity continued to grow at the plant site, but mostly as a result
of labour-saving changes being introduced in old manufacturing facilities.
Production processes were farmed out and labour continued to be dismissed
at the firm level, while the stagnant macroeconomic context prevented these
same workers from being reabsorbed elsewhere in the economy.
This analysis reveals the micro-to-macro nature of the problem, and it
explains why Chile and Argentina present such major differences in job
creation. In the Argentine adjustment process, large increases in labour
Table V.2
CHILE: RELATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GAP AND JOB CREATION
BY MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1970-1995a
GENERATE EMPLOYMENT REDUCE EMPLOYMENT
Industries that are 331: Wood products 342: Printing
 catching up 341: Paper and pulp 351: Chemicals
369: Other non-metallic minerals 353: Oil refining
371: Iron and steel 362: Glass
372: Non-ferrous metals
381: Metal products
Industries that are 313: Beverages 314: Tobacco
 falling behind 323: Leather products 321: Textiles








Source: Author’s compilation, on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial
Dynamics (PADI), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago,
Chile.
a/ The numbers correspond to International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) categories.
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productivity are the flip side of high structural unemployment. Chile is much
closer to macroeconomic equilibrium, which led many new firms to enter the
economy and subsequently improved employment absorption.
Mexico lies somewhere between Argentina and Chile. Some 37% of Mexican
manufacturing output was generated by industries that were closing the labour
productivity gap with the United States while simultaneously creating new
jobs, and 30% of industrial output can be traced to sectors that managed to
close the labour productivity gap but reduced employment in absolute terms.
Table V.3
MEXICO: RELATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GAP AND JOB
CREATION BY MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1970-1994a
GENERATE EMPLOYMENT REDUCE EMPLOYMENT
Industries that are 323: Leather products 311: Foodstuffs
 catching up 331: Wood products 322: Apparel
332: Furniture 342: Printing
341: Paper and pulp 354: Coal products
355: Rubber products 356: Plastic products
361: Ceramics 383: Electrical machinery
362: Glass 390: Other manufactures
369: Other non-metallic minerals




Industries that are 313: Beverages 382: Non-electrical machinery






Source: Author’s compilation, on the basis of the Programme for the Analysis of Industrial
Dynamics (PADI), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago,
Chile.
a/ The numbers correspond to International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) categories.
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Like Argentina, Mexico was in phase II of its macroeconomic adjustment process
throughout the 1990s. From that perspective, the fact that Mexico attained low
manufacturing investment in that decade reflects both the perceived
inconsistency of its macroeconomic adjustment programme and the appreciation
of the local currency prior to the 1994 devaluation. So far the Mexican example
resembles the case of Argentina in that it featured weak employment generation
in the context of the rationalization of old production facilities and the dismissal
of labour. The unemployment rate never reached the dramatic levels of
Argentina, however, largely because of a single factor: namely, the maquiladoras.
The strong boost given by the Mexican authorities to the maquila sector led
many United States, Japanese and Korean firms to install new production
capacity in Mexico to cater to the rapidly expanding United States market. These
new plants absorbed most of whatever new industrial investment Mexico
attained during the 1990s. Nearly 50% of the new jobs created in Mexico in the
1990s were in the maquila sector. The Mexican case thus combines the dismissal
of labour in a large number of industrial activities with job creation in the maquila
sector –albeit at much lower rates per hour.
Other countries in the region, particularly Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay,
seem to be closer to the case of Argentina, which points to the real weakness
of the new Latin American economic model in relation to employment creation.
Workers are dismissed at the factory level and labour productivity improves,
but these workers cannot find jobs elsewhere in the economy, given the
prevailing macroeconomic uncertainty and the resulting low rate of economic
growth and limited investment in new production facilities. Chile seems to
be the exception in this respect.
B. The Relative Labour Productivity Gap
Between Small and Large Firms
Small and medium-sized enterprises have had more difficulties adapting
to the new market-oriented policy regime than large domestic conglomerates
or local subsidiaries of transnational corporations. Numerous SMEs exited
the market following the recent trade liberalization and market deregulation
efforts, as a result of asymmetric information and imperfect access to factor
markets, in particular long-term capital markets and markets for technology.
This process was particularly marked in labour-intensive sectors such as
furniture, clothing and leather and footwear, as well as in engineering-intensive
sectors such as machine tools and agricultural machinery, in which family-
run SMEs usually predominate.
In Chile, for example, almost 40% of the manufacturing plants that exited
the market after the economy was opened up in the 1970s and early 1980s
produced labour-intensive goods such as footwear, clothing and furniture.
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Table V.4
500 LARGEST FIRMS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990-1992, 1995 AND 1998
TYPE OF FIRM 1990-1992 1995 1998
Number of firms 500 500 500
Private national 265 279 258
Foreign 142 154 202
Public 93 67 40
Sales (billions of dollars) 360.1 558.6 646.4
Private national 138.4 233.2 272.9
Foreign 95.8 164.9 250.1
Public 126.0 160.5 123.4
Share of total sales for the 500 (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0
Private national 38.4 41.8 42.2
Foreign 26.6 29.5 38.7
Public 35.0 28.7 19.1
Sectoral distribution (billions of dollars) 360.1 558.6 646.4
Primary sector 100.1 140.2 112.4
Manufacturing 152.1 241.6 267.9
Services 107.9 176.8 266.0
Sectoral share of total sales for the 500 (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0
Primary sector 27.8 25.1 17.4
Manufacturing 42.2 43.3 41.4
Services 30.0 31.6 41.2
Source: Division of Production, Productivity and Management of the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Investment Unit, on the basis of information
provided by América Economía.
Another 20% pertained to metalworking industries producing capital goods
and consumer durables. SMEs were clearly prominent in both areas. In
contrast, local subsidiaries of transnational firms and domestically owned
conglomerates adapted well to the new economic policy regime, and they
captured an increasing share of GDP. (Tables V.4 and V.5 show results for the
region as a whole).
Although globally SMEs are losing ground within GDP, there are
considerable inter-industry differences in relation to their relative labour
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Table V.5
100 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL FIRMS IN LATIN AMERICA,
1990-1992, 1995 AND 1998
TYPE OF FIRM 1990-1992 1995 1998
Number of firms 100 100 100
Private national 50 51 52
Foreign 46 48 47
Public 4 1 1
Sales (billions of dollars) 101.4 165.7 182.0
Private national 42.6 69.6 69.3
Foreign 53.6 91.9 110.5
Public 5.2 4.2 2.2
Share of total sales for the 100 (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0
Private national 42.0 42.0 38.1
Foreign 52.8 55.5 60.7
(Automobile industry) (25.1) (29.0) (30.4)
Public 5.2 2.5 1.2
Source: Division of Production, Productivity and Management of the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Investment Unit, on the basis of information
provided by América Economía.
productivity performance vis-à-vis large industrial firms. Table V.6 shows the
breakdown for the Chilean manufacturing sector, comparing the relative
labour productivity growth performance of small firms (10-50 employees)
and large companies (more than 51) in 23 branches at the three-digit level of
the ISIC. In 12 industrial branches, the relative productivity gap between small
and large firms tended to fall; it remained virtually the same in four industries
and tended to grow in the remaining seven cases.
To explore this mixed inter-industry response, the data were
disaggregated to the four-digit level of the ISIC, so as to reduce the degree of
heterogeneity within each branch. This was followed by an analysis of the
cross-section statistical relation of the relative labour productivity gap between
SMEs and large companies with three variables: (i) the growth rate of the
industry; (ii) the average increase in the industry’s skill level, as measured by
the increase in the numbers of engineers and technicians employed by the
industry; and (iii) the average increase in the industry’s capital per worker, as
measured by the per capita accumulated investment over the whole period
(1979-1995).
Table V.7 shows the simple correlation coefficients between these variables.
RG represents the relative labour productivity gap between SMEs and large
firms; GVP is the growth rate of output; IL is the accumulated investment per
worker throughout the period; and S/US is the variation in the proportion of
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Table V.6
CHILE: LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SMALL
AND LARGE FIRMS, 1979-1995
ISIC GROUPa RELATIVE GAP BETWEEN SMALL AND LARGE FIRMSb
Manufacturing branches in which small firms






331: Wood products 1.14
332: Furniture 1.63
351: Chemicals 1.54
356: Plastic products 1.22
369: Other non-metallic minerals 1.25
361: Ceramics 1.55
381: Metal products 1.22
384: Transport equipment 2.13




323: Leather products 1.03
342: Printing and publications 0.97
Manufacturing branches in which small firms
lost ground to large firms
341: Paper and cellulose 0.70
352: Other chemicals 0.84
355: Rubber products 0.70
362: Glass 0.65
382: Non-electrical machinery 0.89
383: Electrical machinery 0.79
385: Professional scientific instruments 0.88
Source: Author’s calculations, on the basis of data from the National Statistics Institute.
a/ International Standard Industrial Classification.
b/ Labour productivity of small and medium-sized firms divided by the productivity of large
firms.
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Table V.7
CHILE: INTER-INDUSTRY CORRELATION MATRIX, 1979-1995
GVPa RGb ILc S/USd
GVPa 1.00 0.41 0.06 -0.11
RGb 0.41 1.00 0.15 -0.19
ILc 0.06 0.15 1.00 -0.21
S/USd -0.11 -0.19 -0.21 1.00
Source: Author’s calculations, on the basis of data from the National Statistics Institute.
a/ Growth rate of the gross value of production.
b/ Relative labour productivity gap between small and medium-sized firms and large companies.
c/ Accumulated investment.
d/ Variation in the proportion of skilled and unskilled labour in each industry.
skilled and unskilled workers in each industry. Working at the four-digit level
provided 88 observations in the cross section regressions, and a correlation
index equal to or larger than 0.40 is statistically significant at the 95% level.
The regression analysis indicates that SMEs performed relatively better
than large firms in those industries that tended to grow faster than average.
The other two variables do not appear to be significant, suggesting that the
growth rate of each sector constitutes an overriding force influencing the
relative performance of SMEs. In other words, a rapidly increasing aggregate
demand facilitates the successful market insertion of SMEs. Access to factor
markets –e.g., long-term capital, technology, qualified human resources–
probably becomes easier when new opportunities open up at a faster pace as
a result of rising growth. Access is probably much tighter in production sectors
that are languishing or stagnant.
The structural reforms thus seem to have had a particularly damaging
impact on SMEs, since the large majority of firms exiting the market belong in
this group. But there seems to be an interesting inter-industry pattern of
differences in this respect: in those industries that experienced a rapid
expansion of demand (and output), SMEs tended to perform well relative to
large firms. By contrast, the relative position of SMEs tended to deteriorate in
those industries that grew slower than the sectoral average.
C. Towards a Chronic Trade Balance Deficit
in Manufacturing ?
Table V.8 outlines the trade balance in manufacturing for seven countries













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in manufacturing is increasing over time. Second, this is intrinsically linked
to the fact that all of the countries in the region have now become heavy
importers of capital goods, as well as of intermediate parts and components
for industry, while they have concentrated in exporting either low value-added
industrial commodities (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) or maquiladora
output (Mexico). The engineering-intensive metalworking industries (Sector
I) and the labour-intensive wage good industries (Sector V) have clearly fallen
behind in terms of productivity and have become relatively heavy importers.
It is in these industries that the region’s countries are now finding it
increasingly difficult to maintain a desirable trade balance, particularly as a
result of a high elasticity of demand for imported capital goods and vehicles.
In contrast, the natural resource–processing industries (sector III in the table)
and agro-industry and foodstuffs production (sector IV) post positive balances,
but they face a much lower elasticity of demand in world markets.
The data highlight one of the weakest points of the new Latin American
economic model. The countries under examination have developed an
intrinsically fragile external sector, wrought by the relative demise of the
metalworking sector and the contraction of local capital goods production,
on the one hand, and by the strong specialization in low value-added industrial
commodities, on the other. In fact, the Latin American economies have
specialized in goods for which foreign demand is growing far too slowly or
on which industrial countries impose heavy trade restrictions, such as agro-
industrial products. At the same time, they have become enthusiastic importers
of capital goods which they used to produce domestically but which have
fallen behind international best practices. This reveals a clear long-term
structural weakness of the new economic model.
Is this a new Achilles’ heel threatening the long-term sustainability of the
Latin American model? The sharp differences between Mexico and the South
American countries –especially Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay– are worth
noting here. Because of the spectacular growth of Mexico’s maquila exports in
recent years (currently 50% of total exports), the Mexican external sector poses
a somewhat different set of questions than that of the commodities-exporting
countries, and the cases have to be analysed differently. Of particular concern
is the issue of wages in the maquila industry. If Mexico is to continue to compete
in international in-bond assembly, it must pay the high price of setting wages
for maquiladora workers at a small fraction of wages in more developed
industrial countries, certainly well below what is needed for developing strong
domestic markets based on consumer purchasing power. Mexican wages must
be competitive with those of China or Vietnam in order to continue to attract
investment from maquiladora owners. Whether this is really a good long-term
option for the Mexican society remains open for future discussion.
This analysis of certain aspects of the current Latin American economic
model has identified several major new problems that will require attention
STRUCTURAL REFORMS, PRODUCTIVITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE110
in the near future: structural unemployment, the relative labour productivity
gap between SMEs and large firms and the long-term fragility of the foreign
trade balance in manufactures. The Latin American economies urgently need
to develop a new policy agenda in all three areas if they are to succeed in their
quest for more liberalized, deregulated macroeconomic policy regimes. Part
three of the book examines the possible content of such an agenda.
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PART THREE
TOWARDS A NEW POLICY AGENDA

CHAPTER VI
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ENVIRONMENT FOR THE CURRENT DEBATE ON
A NEW POLICY AGENDA
This part of the book –chapters VI and VII– is devoted to policy issues
related to the features of the Latin American economic model identified in
previous chapters. If the long-term sustainability and political legitimacy of
the current growth paradigm are to be maintained, labour productivity has to
grow faster and the benefits of the transition to a more open, deregulated
economy need to be better distributed among the various groups in society.
The invisible hand has already done its share. Countries must now complement
that process with the visible hand of Government and the synergies of
collective action on the part of civil society.
Four main sets of constraints condition what can and should be done in
the near future: (i) the new efficiency and equity problems the countries of
the region developed in the 1990s, including increased structural
unemployment (particularly in the Southern Cone economies) and lack of
opportunities for SMEs; (ii) the new international competitive disciplines that
emerged from the 1994 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT); (iii) the fragility of domestic technological capabilities in
relation to the urgent requirements for innovation in the region; and (iv) the
pro-market ideology now prevailing in the region, which makes it especially
difficult to address issues of market failure and the subsequent need for
intervention. All four elements inform the current debate on what needs to be
done in the future and what Governments want to do to increase production
and productivity and promote technological modernization and innovation.
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This chapter examines the present institutional environment; chapter VII then
discusses a possible policy agenda for the future.
A. The New International Trade Disciplines
The new trade disciplines to which Latin American countries must
gradually adapt are clearly biased against their future growth prospects. They
will nevertheless have to be taken into consideration when planning for
growth. Many practices that were common in the past are simply no longer
possible, and the region must now seek case-specific solutions to the new
institutional constraints in which Latin American societies operate.
Governments must now explore which options are still available within the
present institutional framework.
The Uruguay Round was negotiated between 1989 and 1993, ending with
the signing of the Final Act in 1994. This replaced the General Agreement of
1947 and successive rounds. The Uruguay Round went far beyond the Tokyo
Round (1973-1979) in liberalizing trade and eliminating non-tariff barriers,
with one clear bias: agriculture and foodstuffs, which did not received similar
treatment to manufacturing activities. The Uruguay Round also imposed new
restrictions in areas such as export subsidies, the treatment of foreign
investment and intellectual property rights. It created a new international
institution, the World Trade Organization (WTO), to oversee international trade
relations, together with a dispute-settlement body to deal with unfair practices.
The Uruguay Round Agreement can be seen as part of a gradual process
of normative harmonization among countries, in the context of a rapidly
globalizing world economy. Such growing harmonization introduces a number
of potentially damaging constraints for developing countries, but there always
remains a certain amount of freedom for each country to maximize its own
benefits while operating within the new rules. The bottom line seems to be
understanding the new disciplines fully in order to operate within them.
Several issues should be examined from this perspective, including export
subsidies, quotas or other physical restrictions on imports and local content
requirements. The Uruguay Round introduced important changes in each of
these areas. In the Tokyo Round, export subsidies were regulated in article 6
(on antidumping measures and reprisals) and article 16 of the General
Agreement. These articles defined export subsidies and damage as a
justification for reprisals on the part of the importing country. Both concepts
were left ambiguous in the Final Act of the Tokyo Round, leaving room for
debate. The Final Act of the Uruguay Round, in contrast, defined three types
of subsidies: those that are explicitly forbidden, those that are actionable, and
those that are non-actionable. Forbidden subsidies are those directly related
to exports, such as the various forms of drawback that governments use to
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promote exports. This restriction does not apply to drawbacks on temporary
imports of parts and components used in the production of export goods.
Actionable subsidies are those that are unrelated to trade and are specific to
certain industries or firms. These can affect export prices, and a signatory can
appeal to WTO’s dispute-settlement body if the subsidies damage domestic
output. Damage is defined as serious if the ad valorem amount of the subsidy
exceeds the value of production in the importing country by 5%. In these
cases, the burden of proof lies with the exporting country. Several such cases
have been challenged in court, including, for example, seamless tubes and
salmon. Consequently, a rich body of experience is accumulating on how to
defend exporters in developing countries against allegations of dumping,
which normally amount to a disguised attempt by industrialized countries to
protect firms unable to meet the competitive pressure of new, more efficient
producers. Now that some firms in developing countries have converged with
the international productivity frontier, less efficient suppliers located in
industrialized societies are bringing them to court to stop their competitive
entry.
Non-actionable subsidies are those of a general nature that have no direct
impact on export prices. They include subsidies for research and development
activities, environmental protection and special assistance for underdeveloped
regions.23
Countries have eight years, extendible to ten, to eliminate prohibited
subsidies. In the case of actionable subsidies, the importing country must show
serious damage to its production structure before the new trade rules are
applied to the exporting country.
With regard to foreign direct investment, the Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs) prohibit anything that is inconsistent with the fundamental
‘spirit’ of the Agreement. In particular, foreign and local firms are guaranteed
equal treatment, and domestic content requirements are gradually to be
eliminated.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
introduces new institutions deriving from the International Paris Convention
of 1863 on intellectual property rights, patents and trademarks. The
international regulatory body in this case is World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), which ensures that national and foreign firms receive
equal treatment in relation to the protection of property rights on knowledge-
generation activities and innovation. Patent rights should be similar in different
areas of the economy –whereas previously pharmaceutical and health-related
products were treated separately– and the protection of property rights should
not depend on the domestic use of the relevant know-how.
23. The so-called Annex VII countries are exempt from the obligation to eliminate prohibited subsidies,
on the basis of extreme poverty. These include, from Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua.
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The TRIPS Agreement has important ramifications for the
pharmaceuticals industry, in particular. The pharmaceutical industry’s lobby
is clearly behind recent changes in the national patent law of many Latin
American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. These laws
seek to restrict competition from local SMEs that copy the formula for
pharmaceutical raw materials early in the production cycle, thus challenging
the market position of large multinational corporations owning the original
molecules.24
Many of the institutions now regulating international trade are far from
beneficial to relatively less developed countries, while these countries have
obtained very few concessions in areas of great importance for their future
growth. It should be pointed out, however, that there is a significant degree of
freedom as to how each country interprets the new disciplines locally. Hence
the importance of countries learning about all the nuances of the regime in
order to take full advantage of the new institutional arrangements. This
domestic learning process will be a key factor in determining how and to
what extent each country can protect itself and benefit from the new
institutional environment prevailing at the world level.
B. The Fragility of Domestic Innovation
Domestic technological capabilities, as well as the structure and behaviour
of national innovation systems, have changed significantly as a result of the
recent structural reforms. Together with the new institutional environment
established by the Uruguay Round of the GATT, each country’s new
institutional environment for technology generation and diffusion will
certainly condition further improvements in efficiency and equity.
24. Because many Latin American and Caribbean countries based their pharmaceutical patent laws on
eighteenth century Spanish legislation, they only recently began to grant product patents in this field,
as opposed to process patents. The lack of process patents led to the rapid growth of national
pharmaceutical industries in the postwar period. In Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, for example, local
firms were able to displace multinational corporations from the domestic market in ethical products
by copying ingredients developed by the multinationals, because domestic legislation that did not
protect the patentability of pharmaceuticals. The same occurred many years earlier in Italy, Japan and
Switzerland, which violated the Paris Convention for decades (Penrose, 1951). In Latin America and
the Caribbean, however, pressure from transnational industry (especially the United States) forced a
change in the patent laws, such that products could be patented as well as processes. This substantially
consolidated the market position of big international laboratories to the detriment of local
manufacturers of pharmaceutical specialities and active principles. The role of the U.S. Pharmaceutical
lobby on the U.S. Trade Department has been documented by different authors, such as Mary Olson
from Washington University. See her CERP Publication 249 “Political influence and the development
of U.S. regulatory policy: The 1984 drug legislation”. The impact of the above on the Latin American
pharmaceutical industry has been examined in Katz (1997).
117ECLAC
Market organization and microeconomic behaviour related to innovation,
R&D activities and the generation and utilization of technical knowledge in
production activities have changed dramatically since the “inward-oriented”
ISI period. Many knowledge-generation activities have disappeared, to be
replaced by others that are more in line with the new production structure.
Public and private R&D labs and departments were closed, or their agendas,
aims and constraints significantly changed, following the privatization of
major fields in the economy. This process clearly conditions what it is possible
and desirable in terms of the future expansion of national innovation
capabilities and knowledge-generation efforts.
1. Innovation Efforts during the Import Substitution Period
Latin American countries historically have not been strong spenders in
R&D activities. They have rarely surpassed 0.5-0.7% of GDP (slightly higher
in some countries recently), whereas many developed countries and some of
the Asian nations spend 1.5%-2.5%. Furthermore, fully 90% of the region’s
R&D expenditure was traditionally carried out in public firms, universities
and technology institutes and laboratories. The remaining 10% was carried
out by the private sector, either by local subsidiaries of transnational
corporations, large domestically owned conglomerates or local SMEs. This
section briefly reviews some of the more prominent features of the innovation
system that developed in Latin America under the inward-oriented
industrialization model, in order to provide a point of reference for evaluating
the changes wrought by the structural reforms.
During the Second World War and in the early 1950s, each of the Latin
American countries developed a strong sector of public enterprises responsible
for the production of goods and services in fields such as telecommunications,
energy and transport and in defence-related industries such as iron and steel,
aluminium or petrochemicals. These production activities demanded not only
new production facilities –which were sometimes purchased on a turnkey
basis from international subcontractors– but also a steady flow of new
technologies and engineering services which had to be developed on site.
Many countries therefore created R&D departments and project-design groups
for the purpose of generating new knowledge and adapting imported
technologies to the local circumstances. As part of this State-led process, some
countries developed sophisticated know-how in frontier fields, such as nuclear
technology in Argentina and aeronautics in Brazil. Such developments were
to become important in the technological evolution of these countries many
years after the original start up of these activities. Thus in just two decades,
many of the region’s countries developed a vast State-led scientific and
technological infrastructure, laying the foundations of their future national
innovative system.
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During the ISI period, two types of firms carried out local R&D and
engineering activities, with distinct behaviour in knowledge generation and
knowledge utilization: transnational corporations and domestic SMEs.
Consider first the case of the local subsidiaries of large multinational
corporations. A large number of foreign firms entered the Latin American
countries right after the Second World War. These firms brought with them
new production and process technologies, as well as methods of production
organization that were often unknown locally. Their local activities had a
profound impact on the industrial culture of the time: they introduced working
habits, quality control guidelines, labour norms and standards methods for
upgrading suppliers and forms of subcontracting that were unfamiliar to the
local firms.
Although transnational corporations did not come to the region with the
explicit aim of developing local technological capabilities, they often ended
up doing so in practice. Given the firm-specific nature of technology as a factor
of production, and the need to adapt it to the specific circumstances that
surround its utilization in a particular production facility, many of these firms
were obliged to create engineering departments, as well as groups capable of
providing technical assistance to production engineers, in order to operate
efficiently in the local environment.
The technological efforts undertaken by such firms did not so much seek
to generate new products or production processes as to adapt to local
conditions the product specifications, process technologies and production
organization routines that were originally developed by the parent companies
for their home markets. They also sought to use raw materials that were
available locally. The technological efforts of this group of firms can thus be
seen as adaptive. They were not particularly interested in developing know-
how aimed at enhancing their exports possibilities, since most of them were
exclusively geared towards the domestic market.
The second broad group of firms contributing to technological innovation
in the region comprised small and medium-sized enterprises. A large number
of SMEs developed in the region in the immediate post-war years, when tariff
protection and subsidized public credit stimulated the formation of thousands
of family enterprises producing textiles, garments, footwear, machine tools,
equipment for the foodstuffs industry, furniture, agricultural machinery and
so forth. Many of these firms managed to grow rapidly during the 1950s and
1960s, in step with aggregate demand. Although many entered the market on
the basis of self-designed and sometimes quasi-artisan products and
production facilities, they gradually developed technological and engineering
capabilities which allowed them to significantly improve their plant layout,
product design engineering and production organization technologies. Many
of these firms designed and even constructed their own machinery and
equipment (Katz, 1974, 1982). It is quite clear that they underwent a highly
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idiosyncratic, long-term learning process. Unlike the subsidiaries of foreign
firms, SMEs created product and process technologies without any prior
support from abroad, apart from the simple copying of foreign technology
and the technical training that many immigrant entrepreneurs brought with
them from their home countries. Perhaps this explains why many industries
underwent a process of convergence with the international productivity
frontier long before the recent market-oriented structural reforms. Domestic
learning processes and the development of domestic technological capabilities
were clearly present during the import substitution period, with many
domestic firms advancing along their long-term learning curve. Nevertheless,
only rarely did they develop innovative products and production processes
that had repercussions beyond national borders (Katz, 1987).
Local SMEs thus constituted another important component of the national
innovative system in the ISI period. They developed a technological ‘culture’
based on copying foreign technology and adapting it to local needs, in the
context of imperfect information, inadequate access to world markets for
equipment and machinery and scant competitive pressure in their home
markets.
2. Post-reform Changes in National Innovation Systems and
Technological Capabilities
The structural reforms, on the one hand, and the gradual transition to a
world of real-time, computer-based production organization, on the other,
are dramatically changing the structure and performance of the region’s
innovation systems, together with the role of domestic technological
capabilities as a source of productivity growth. Some R&D and engineering
activities are no longer necessary, because knowledge can be obtained on-line
from foreign suppliers. Privatized firms in the telecommunications, energy
and transport sectors now rely on knowledge-generation activities carried
out in their respective headquarters, and they do not undertake R&D work of
great significance locally. Imported capital goods are cheaper and more
accessible today than in the past, leading many firms to replace them sooner
than before and to eliminate in-house engineering efforts aimed at extending
the life cycle of the available machinery. Consequently, the structure and
behaviour of the innovation system and the dynamics of the creation and
destruction of domestic technological capabilities are changing markedly.
The innovative system of the 1990s engaged the active influence and
participation of many new foreign firms that had recently entered the economy
either through the privatization of public utilities or through mergers and
acquisitions of domestic firms. The countries in the region thus moved towards
a more complex production structure, which is closer to international
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productivity standards, but which is less intensive in the use of local technical
knowledge and engineering services. This represents an important structural
fragility in the process of moving from simple, standardized commodities
towards goods and services with higher value added. The paradox of achieving
a more complex, closer-to-the-frontier production structure at the cost of a
weaker, more fragile national innovation system is a critical feature of the
new Latin American economic model, which must be taken into account in
the new policy agenda.




TOWARDS A NEW POLICY AGENDA
The discussion has thus far centred on a macro-to-micro interpretation of
the economic, institutional and technological transformation that the Latin
American economies (and industries) have been going through over the last
two decades. The recent market-oriented structural reforms accelerated this
transformation, but they did not actually trigger it. Countries (and industries)
were catching up with or lagging behind international productivity standards
well before the implementation of the reforms. History matters, and the
accumulated technological capabilities that the different countries (and
industries) managed to attain during the import substitution industrialization
period represent a key factor in explaining the reactions of different industries,
regions and countries to major changes in the macroeconomic policy and
institutional framework.
It cannot generally be argued that Latin American countries are doing
much better today than in the past, although the region is clearly performing
better in the macroeconomic fundamentals than during the inward-oriented
ISI period. High inflation rates are a thing of the past, and nobody in the
region today defends printing money as a way to stimulate the economy. The
region as a whole is significantly more open to trade, although major
differences seem to prevail in this respect between Mexico and the Central
American economies, on the one hand, and some of the South American
countries –namely, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay– on the other, in that the
former has a considerably stronger export orientation than the latter. (Chile
appears as an important exception within this group, as it now specializes in
natural resource–based industries). Maquila industries, producing garments
and electronic products for the United States market, seem to be the main
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explanation of the differences in export performance. Moreover, Latin
American countries significantly increased their demand for foreign capital
goods and parts for vehicles and machinery. The trade balance in
manufacturing reveals a chronic, long-term deficit which opens up major
policy questions for the future.
The differences in performance vis-à-vis the ISI period become
disheartening on comparing indicators of productivity growth and equity in
Latin American countries (and industries) during the market-oriented period
(i.e., the 1990s) with their record in previous decades. The picture is highly
heterogeneous among countries and scarcely satisfactory globally. Some
countries have increased their productivity growth rate –in both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing activities– and show evidence of
gradually converging with international standards for labour productivity.
In most of the cases in which this is happening, however, it is not the
consequence of a faster growth rate under full-employment conditions, but
rather the result of high rates of unemployment, certainly much higher than
these same countries exhibited in the past. Individual firms and industries
have displaced labour and improved their microeconomic performance, but
the economy as a whole has not been capable of returning to a growth path
that facilitates full employment. Other countries are not doing much better
than during the ISI period, and they are gradually lagging behind the
international productivity frontier. Because the United States increased labour
productivity faster in the 1990s than in the past, a faster productivity growth
rate alone was not sufficient for Latin American countries to close the
productivity gap with world standards.
The available evidence is also disheartening with regard to equity. In a
few cases –Chile, for example– the absolute number of poor households clearly
fell, but this was not the case in the large majority of the countries in the
region. Relative indicators of equity do not show clear signs of improvement,
either.
Table VII.1 and figures VII.1 and VII.2 summarize these processes. The
table uses six indicators to compare the economic performance of Latin
America during the ISI period with that of the 1990s, a decade in which most
of the region systematically attempted to introduce market-oriented liberal
reforms. The table shows mixed results for the region as a whole: inflation
rates were lowered and trade increased, but GDP growth and productivity
fell and poverty increased. Figure VII.1, which plots individual country
performance for GDP growth, illustrates that only a handful of countries in
the region grew faster in the 1990s than in the 1945-1980 period. The majority
have not been able to recover the pace of growth enjoyed before the debt
crisis of the 1980s. Figure VII.2 further indicates that only three countries




LATIN AMERICAN PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, 1945-2000 (%)
INDICATOR 1945-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000
Annual inflation rate 20.0 400.0 168.0 9.2
Annual growth rate of exports (volume) 2.1 4.4 9.4 11.1
Annual growth rate of imports (volume) 5.9 -0.8 12.8 12.3
Annual GDP growth rate 5.6 1.2 3.3 4.3
Per capita GDP growth rate 3.1 -1.8 1.6 2.2
Poor households (%) 35.0 41.0 38.0 38.0
Source: ECLAC, Equity, development and citizenship (LC/G.2071), Santiago, Chile, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2000.
Figure VII.1
AVERAGE ANNUAL GDP GROWTH, 1945-2000
Source: ECLAC, Equity, development and citizenship (LC/G.2071), Santiago, Chile, Economic
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Confronted with the above facts, mainstream economists argue that it is
necessary to wait longer while continuing with the same policy package, such
as privatizing those activities that have not yet been privatized and
deregulating markets (labour markets, in particular). A minority of more
heterodox economists considers that it is time to reform the reforms.25  While
these economists acknowledge the importance of the macroeconomic
fundamentals, they argue for introducing new policies that would foster better
micro- and mesoeconomic interventions and improve efficiency and equity
in the transition to a more open, deregulated policy regime. Imperfect factor
markets, asymmetries in the access to information and technology, and
externalities and synergies at the local level all indicate that this transition
could be carried out more efficiently and equitably than strict laissez-faire
principles have achieved to date.
I here joint ranks with those who argue that we need to reform the reforms.
In that spirit, this chapter examines the main components of a new policy
25.  The notion of reforming the reforms was first used by Ffrench-Davis (2000).
Figure VII.2
AVERAGE ANNUAL GDP GROWTH PER WORKER, 1945-2000
Source: ECLAC, Equity, development and citizenship (LC/G.2071), Santiago, Chile, Economic



































agenda that would be capable of enhancing the region’s productivity growth
performance and its convergence with international productivity standards,
while simultaneously improving the equity consequences of the transition to
a more open, deregulated macroeconomic policy regime. The specific package
will strongly depend on the theoretical preconception of the analyst regarding
the relative role of markets and government as determinants of microeconomic
behaviour. This, then, is the point of departure.
A. Neoclassical and Evolutionary Perspectives
on the Appropriate Policy Agenda
As discussed in chapter I, neoclassical growth theory provides a highly
stylized description of the forces that account for economic growth in modern
capitalism, based on the notion of the representative firm (Solow, 1988). The
firm is assumed to have perfect information and rational expectations about
the future, as well as a perfect understanding of and free access to its production
function. Factor markets supplying capital services and labour are similarly
assumed to operate perfectly. Under such conditions, microeconomic
behaviour is exogenously determined rather than influenced by context-
specific forces. Given this analytical background, mainstream economists
advocate generic interventions that are incapable of capturing the complexity
and specific characteristics of a country, region or industry. Opening up to
foreign competition, deregulating and privatizing economic activity and factor
markets, maintaining macroeconomic prices close to equilibrium and
upholding property rights are thus presented as general prescriptions that
are expected to work almost irrespectively of the place in which they are
applied.
Contemporary history shows, however, that this is seldom the case.
Consider, for example the recent example of the former Soviet Union, where
the above-mentioned policy package was enforced under the a priori
assumption that it would successfully develop the institutions of modern
capitalism. Yet they did not. Failure to understand the idiosyncratic nature of
a given society and economic environment can easily lead to wrong policy
prescriptions capable of worsening even further the circumstances that needed
to be changed. In other words, policy design and implementation must reflect
the specific nature of each country, industry or region, together with in the
coevolution of technological, institutional and economic forces.
The European discussion on technology and innovation constitutes a good
example of this argument. Although the debate on these issues centres on the
generic model of a market-oriented economy, the policy agenda implemented
in each country is highly context specific and far from neutral or horizontal.
Policies clearly reflect the enormous differences that prevail, for example,
STRUCTURAL REFORMS, PRODUCTIVITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE126
between France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in relation to the
relative role of markets and the State as determinants of long-term economic
performance. Market relations tend to take precedence in the British debate,
while in France the public sector maintains a central role in technological
development and innovation. In Italy, local and municipal relationships are
paramount, while in Germany, institutional functioning is strongly conditioned
by a long history of agreements and commitments between the banking sector,
firms and trade unions. These differences in market organization and the
relative role of markets and Government explain why the national innovation
systems function differently in each of the countries, why the various actors
in the system –firms, universities, banks, trade unions, technical and vocational
schools and so forth– form distinct patterns of interaction and why the
countries display major differences in technological and innovative
performance. Each of these four models of social organization prompts its
own set of social routines, corporate strategies and governance rules, giving
rise to very different forms of capitalism.
Understanding how a particular country behaves in the area of innovation
and technological change thus constitutes a major prerequisite for the
successful design and implementation of policies aimed at improving the long-
term productivity performance of the country. The inward-oriented growth
model that Latin American countries followed during the ISI period has been
replaced in recent years by a market-oriented model in which subsidiaries of
transnational corporations and large domestic conglomerates have gained
relative participation in both GDP and the political arena. State companies
have almost disappeared, and SMEs have lost participation in the production
structure as a result of their limited ability to adapt to the new incentives.
After a long period in which policy makers followed the principle of the
less intervention, the better, questions are now arising as to what kind of
government (with regard to size and degree of regional decentralization, for
example) can facilitate the institutional re-engineering efforts that must be
undertaken. It is not just a matter of the State improving its technical and
professional bodies, introducing incentives for them to work in the collective
interest and limiting the space for corruption and arbitrariness. Rather, policy
makers must forge new forms of cooperation and coordination between public
agencies and the private sector, as they search for a new style of governance
that is more conducive to growth than the approach that has thus far been
followed in the region.
Different models of market organization and different mixes of public-
private interaction clearly affect the way that each society manages the design
and implementation of technological and innovation policies. Still pending
in Latin America is a context-specific discussion of what it would take to apply
a new policy package capable of enhancing innovation and raising the
productivity growth rate in different countries of the region. In Chile, for
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example, trade liberalization policies stimulated the creation of a very dynamic
business community, which is strongly concentrated in a few new areas of
production: pulp and paper, minerals, fruit, salmon and fishmeal. Large
domestic conglomerates have taken the lead in these fields, expanding quite
rapidly over the last two decades through the construction of highly
competitive manufacturing facilities. Many of these firms have recently
decided to undertake direct investment projects in other countries of the region,
notably Argentina and Peru, thereby capitalizing on the experience garnered
in the course of their earlier expansion in Chile. These same firms, however,
currently display little energy for confronting the new wave of domestic mega-
mergers and acquisitions, and they are selling their domestic facilities to large
multinationals (mostly Spanish) that are taking control of sectors like banking,
fisheries and electricity services worldwide. Enhancing Chile’s productivity
growth and international competitiveness demands a context-specific
examination of the Chilean situation, on the basis of which to design a set of
policies that addresses the current economic, institutional and technological
features of the Chilean environment. Roughly the same can be said for the
other countries in the region. Indeed, all new technology and innovation
policies should be founded on the specific context of each national situation,
that is, the new policy agenda should be highly localized.
Finally, the implementation of new policies will be affected by uncertainty
and the lack of prior information as to what works and what does not. It will
thus be necessary to proceed by trial and error, experimenting with different
policy actions and then identifying useful elements. Rather than looking for
an optimum set of policies in advance, authorities should adopt a pragmatic
attitude of selection under uncertainty.
B. A New Agenda Addressing Issues of Production
Efficiency and Equity
This section examines three major areas of policy action, all of which
require prompt attention if countries are to build up new institutions and
develop new forms of interaction between the State and the private sector,
capable of recreating a new social climate more conducive to growth. These
areas are as follows: (i) the strengthening of regulatory actions in the recently
privatized sectors of the economy, such as energy or telecommunications,
which foster new forms of regulated competition with the aim of protecting
consumers; (ii) competition policies capable of securing an adequate
functioning of markets in the more concentrated business environment now
prevailing in Latin American countries; and (iii) the creation of a national
agency for innovation and competitiveness, responsible for horizontal, sectoral
and regional policies that enhance domestic productivity growth and the
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insertion of local firms in world markets. Only by making progress on all
three of these fronts can the region’s economies hope to increase the growth
rate, promote modernization and improve equity in the distribution of the
benefits of these processes.
1. The Development of Regulated Competition in Recently
Privatized Industries
As seen in chapter IV, several countries of the region opted for
privatizating such sectors as telecommunications, energy and water sanitation.
In most cases, however, such actions were undertaken without simultaneously
increasing the role of competition, instead allowing monopoly conditions to
prevail at least during the years immediately following privatization. It has
now become clear that privatization with competition had different
implications for social well-being than did privatization under monopoly
conditions, even if in both cases the industry in question went through a major
process of technological upgrading and modernization that brought it much
closer to international productivity standards. If domestic consumers are to
be adequately protected, competition has to be encouraged within these
industries through the enforcement of new regulatory actions.
Recent European discussions on this topic show that loosely regulated
privatizations repeatedly needed to be supplemented and adjusted in the
search for effective competition (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994, p. 355).
Similarly, many recent privatizations in Latin America clearly demand new
regulatory re-engineering efforts aimed at enforcing competition and consumer
protection. Problems seen in the region include the failure to adequately
provide the service (e.g., electricity cuts and water shortages) and
compensation mechanisms when such failure occurs; the creation of artificial
barriers to entry with a view to improving the future position of incumbent
firms; the unilateral control of essential facilities and key natural resources
along the production chain; uncertainty as to the mechanisms underlying tariff
changes; the consolidation of dominant positions by global holding companies;
the lack of legal protection for local minority shareholders; the absence within
the regulatory framework of the principle of “reasonable return” (or
“reasonable” profit rate), together with the lack of legal specification on the
transfer of efficiency gains to local consumers; and the appeal to international
jurisdiction, notwithstanding original agreements to submit grievances to local
jurisdiction.
The gradual development of regulated competition should guarantee an
adequate and sustainable service, on the one hand, and consumer protection,
on the other, within an overall framework of respect for the investor. The
regulatory framework must therefore contemplate the protection of the
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investors’ rights, but not the exploitation of market failures, asymmetries of
information and monopoly positions. Regulation should be accomplished by
law, not by contract. It is important for Latin American countries to gradually
develop their own regulatory skills, drawing on the accumulated legal and
judiciary experience of more mature industrial countries.
2. Competition Policy
Given recent increases in business concentration across the Latin American
production structure and the latest wave of mergers and acquisitions,
competition policies have become paramount for consumer protection and
the promotion of an efficient allocation of resources. The main purpose of
competition policies is to curb monopolistic practices by preserving the free
flow of information, discouraging the creation of artificial barriers to entry that
could allow incumbent firms to manipulate prices, blockading the use of new
technology, and so forth. Minority shareholders need to be protected from unfair
trade practices, and collusion among competitors should be discouraged through
new anti-trust legislation and judiciary practices (Scherer, 1980).
Recent trade liberalization and market deregulation efforts were based
on the expectation that markets are contestable and that the potential entry of
new rivals enforces market discipline among incumbent firms. This
assumption proved to be strongly unrealistic, however, especially in cases in
which patents and trademarks determine market structure and performance,
as in the pharmaceuticals industry, for example. In such cases, domestic prices
did not behave as originally expected, which resulted in significant losses in
consumer well-being after the recent structural reforms. Competition rules
need to be enforced in these industries in the near future (Katz, 1996).
Competition authorities will have to examine cases of this sort thoroughly to
determine whether higher prices stem from the introduction of innovations
or from anticompetitive practices.
3. Production and Innovation Policies
Failure in factor markets –particularly in long-term capital markets and
in the markets for technology and engineering services– is one of the key
elements in the marked differences that industries, regions or even individual
firms demonstrate in their ability to adapt to the new macroeconomic policy
regime. Not every firm or industry has similar access to factor markets, and
long-term opportunities and restrictions therefore vary considerably across
economic activities, industries and regions of an economy and strongly
condition the aggregate growth path.
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The discussion here covers to two main topics: (a) long-term financing
for SMEs and (b) research and development expenditure and local innovation
efforts, which affect the rate of innovation and productivity growth. Both are
part of the explanation of why Latin American countries today exhibit a low
productivity growth rate and find it difficult to improve their patterns of
international competitiveness.
(a) Policies Aimed at Strengthening the Long-term Performance of SMEs
SMEs producing goods and services constitute a significant part of an
economy’s structure. They affect the efficiency and international
competitiveness of sectors in which they participate as suppliers of large firms,
as in the case of the vehicle industry or agribusiness. They often form the
backbone of knowledge-intensive sectors such as biotechnology or software.
Because SMEs generally have a substantial share of labour intensive industries
producing wage goods, such as shoes, garments and furniture, they influence
the aggregate rate of employment generation for the economy as a whole.
Finally, they provide important services for natural resource–based industries,
such as in mining, forestry and fisheries. SMEs thus play a number of roles in
the economy: they generate employment, technology and exports, and their
overall importance should not be underestimated.
SMEs have not done well in Latin America, however, after the
implementation of the structural reforms. For reasons that have to do with
imperfect access to information and imperfect functioning of factor markets,
many SMEs have faced great difficulties in adapting to the new market-
oriented macroeconomic policy regime. A large number have been forced to
exit the market as a result of increasing competition from imported
intermediate inputs, which has caused a great degree of disarray in many
production chains.
Policy actions should be undertaken in several different directions to help
SMEs attain a better long-term transition to a more open and deregulated
macroeconomic policy regime. These include strengthening their strategic
capabilities, especially in relation to the search for new markets and business
areas; supporting the diffusion of new computer-based managerial know-
how that enable them to participate in real-time production organization
arrangements; facilitating the diffusion of knowledge and understanding of
quality control, product design engineering and just-in-time production
planning and organization; and promoting the establishment of new
knowledge-intensive firms.
SMEs need to enlarge their business perspective both locally and
internationally. That requires them to undertake activities that are not traditional
for small firms, such as acquiring information on new markets, choosing
marketing methods, organizing distribution logistics, identifying representatives
131ECLAC
and distributors overseas, investing in the development of product trademarks
and image, and providing post-sales services. Given the small size of many of
these firms and the complexity of some of these tasks, collective development
is an option that should not be underrated. Public policies should support the
proper development of these critical inputs in conjunction with chambers of
commerce, sectoral business associations and so forth.
With the opening of the economy to foreign competition, “going global”
has ceased to be a matter of internal company decision-making. In the current
context of open competitiveness, SMEs need to develop quality standards,
technical norms and price competitiveness not only to compete in international
markets, but also to face foreign competition in their own domestic market.
Support for competitiveness thus demands the adoption of international
quality standards –namely, ISO 9000 and 14000– and the development of much
higher in-house capabilities in product design engineering and in production
planning and organization.
With regard to exports, new entry should be encouraged by disseminating
information of international trade fairs, trade regulations in would-be
importing countries, competitive conditions that need to be met, and so forth.
Special fiscal support could be given for firms entering export markets for the
first time. For those already accustomed to export activities, support might
come in the form of assistance for opening up new markets or establishing
strategic alliances with large international distributors, for example.
Financing long-term capital investment has always been difficult for
SMEs. There is now consensus that a purely legal approach is insufficient for
developing long-term capital markets. While many countries in the world are
undertaking increasingly complex activities to promote small firms, easing
their access to credit seems to be one of the more difficult tasks. In the 1960s
and 1970s the basic financing mechanism was credit with subsidized interest
rates, granted by public development institutions (development banks).
Private commercial banks scarcely participated on this front, concentrating
instead on discounting commercial short-term debt, mostly related to the
financing of working capital.
As part of recent changes in the macroeconomic policy regime, subsidies
through low interest rates have practically been eliminated. The prevailing
style of operation now involves more complex institutional arrangements,
with State agencies and development banks acting as second-tier credit
wholesalers and with private commercial banks directly linked to the firms
and involved in their risk evaluation. Resorting to market principles in the
management of support policies for SMEs seems to be a step in the right
direction. The resources channelled to such activities are relatively minute so
far, however, given the extent of the reconstruction of production and
technological capabilities that is needed in this area. SMEs constitute a central
pillar of social organization, and their long-term survival cannot be left to the
casual determination of free market forces.
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Three basic principles should govern the functioning of institutional
arrangements in this respect: no redundancy, targeting and additionality (Held,
1999). According to the no redundancy principle, credit lines or rediscounts
provided by development banks should differ from those available in the
market. Targeting means ensuring that the funds go to firms with
characteristics identified as consistent with development policies, such as size,
sector of economic activity, potential for employment generation or export
capabilities. Notice that neutrality is not the issue here. In the transition to the
new age of information technology, for example the whole field of software,
computer-based technologies, logistics and the Internet has become a subject
of great interest for many governments around the world and has thus received
preferential policy support. The policy agenda for promoting SMEs should
include aggressive action on this front. Finally, additionality means verifying
that funds channelled through development banks really represent an increase
in the total funds devoted to small firms, as opposed to resources that those
firms would have secured anyway through credit from commercial banks.
Access to financial support should depend entirely on the private banks’
assessment of the creditworthiness of the individual firms. For this purpose,
banking institutions have to incorporate both a new attitude and new risk-
assessment technologies. They have to redefine their role as part of the
country’s development strategy and not just as profit-making institutions in
the old, conventional style. Obviously, they need to be profitable, but their
role as social institutions should be taken into account.
(b) Policies Related to Innovation and the Generation
and Diffusion of Technology
As demonstrated in previous chapters, the region’s patterns of production
specialization and trade have undergone a major transformation in the course
of the last two decades. This transformation was accompanied by a
simultaneous weakening of the so-called national innovation system, that is,
the set of institutions and interactions associated with the generation,
adaptation and diffusion of technological knowledge and the development
of domestic technological capabilities. The production structure has come to
depend increasingly on access to foreign sources of new technology. Many of
the learning mechanisms developed during the ISI period, as well as numerous
domestic technological capabilities, have been seriously affected by the recent
structural reforms, and action is urgently needed on this front if countries are
to base their future expansion on local sources of growth.
The reconstruction of domestic technological capabilities has to take place
within the context of the new regional patterns of production specialization.
R&D and innovation efforts should therefore aim to introduce more knowledge
content into natural resource–processing activities, increasing their value
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added and domestic engineering content. This is entirely consistent with the
pattern of comparative advantages of the region’s economies. The
development of synergies between local suppliers of capital goods for the
natural resource–based industries and firms providing services such as
transport, energy, telecommunications, refrigeration and storage, packaging
and environmental protection seems to be a priority under present conditions.
Biotechnologies, genetics applied to forestry and fisheries, software and
logistics all belong within this category of knowledge-generation activities
related to the natural resource–based sectors which should be strongly
encouraged in the years ahead.
Most Latin American firms specializing in natural resource–based
industries have fairly recently constructed highly capital intensive, state-of-
the-art plants, but they have specialized in commodities and have invested
next to nothing in technological efforts to increase value added and domestic
engineering content. The region’s research infrastructure is clearly fragile with
regard to supporting natural resource–based industries with a high domestic
knowledge content. Countries such as Sweden and Finland have successfully
developed the knowledge base with which to sustain and enrich the long-
term exploitation of their rich endowments of natural resources. This is what
Latin American countries have yet to accomplish.
Local spending on R&D activities and the diffusion of technology should
be increased significantly to converge with international practices. Firms
should be encouraged to enter the field of knowledge generation and
adaptation not only through conventional fiscal incentives but also via non-
conventional mechanisms such as the establishment of technology parks and
the promotion of alliances and partnerships with universities, foreign firms
and so forth. The region needs to foster the creation of technology-based firms
and the development of activities that are intensive in the use of science and
technology, such as software or biotechnology, as these are crucial for the
incorporation of higher value added to natural resources. The public sector
should take responsibility for the more scientific areas of research –such as
molecular biology, immunology, animal and plant genetics and mineralogy–
leaving to the private sector the development of new commercial technologies.
Firms will scarcely be motivated to use their own resources to generate basic
knowledge useful for these sectors, but they will probably take part in
cooperative, pre-competitive work to capture the externalities of public efforts
on this front. Allowing national universities to profit from patenting activities
might be advisable in this connection.
At the same time, the region needs to modernize the public research
infrastructure required for scientific and technological work in these areas.
This should happen in conjunction with an improvement in the quality of
innovation, stimulating the interaction among firms, suppliers and clients,
universities, public and private research institutes and financial institutions.
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Every country in the region should promote such interactions at the highest
political level, much as the Clinton Administration promoted the diffusion of
Internet and the transition of the United States to a knowledge-based economy.
The successful development of natural resource–based industries depends
on their upstream and downstream integration and the development of
synergies with related services, such as shipping, transport, energy and
telecommunications, which are crucial for the enhancement of international
competitiveness in all of these fields. The country-specific nature of natural
resources imposes the need to develop domestic sources of knowledge and
engineering capabilities, instead of relying exclusively on internationally
generated know-how. The fact that large multinational corporations now
operate in many of these fields raises important questions on how to cover
their idiosyncratic R&D needs and how to address the issue of cooperative
work involving the national innovative system and these global firms. Issues
involving intellectual property rights and externalities must be treated
carefully on a case-by-case basis.
In the process of expanding and improving domestic efforts related to
innovation and knowledge generation, authorities must carefully examine
the roles of public agencies, firms, universities and financial institutions. In
particular, the private sector should be induced to significantly increase its
commitment to knowledge-generation activities. While there are probably
good reasons for firms’ low commitment to R&D activities, it is precisely on
this front that the pattern of public-private interaction needs to be adjusted in
the future in order to establish a new, more knowledge-intensive path of long-
term growth. The State has to adopt a proactive role in this respect, inducing,
coordinating and promoting cooperative programmes in different fields, as
well as financing the more basic scientific component of these activities. Public
research agencies, universities and non-profit organizations must increasingly
target their research efforts on those projects that generate externalities,
allocating public funds according to quality and relevance.
Attaining these objectives demands that efforts be situated within an
overall policy of competitiveness, and not merely isolated exercises as they
have been in the past. Public policy in this field should comprise a reasonable
mix of horizontal signals and selectivity. It is a matter of exploiting synergies
and complementarities in specific fields in which national comparative
advantages are most obvious, such that the issue of selectivity becomes almost
irrelevant. A certain degree of selectivity is necessary, of course, for creating
long-term, dynamic, comparative advantages in sectors that are close to and
that complement the current pattern of production specialization. The trend
towards integrating manufacturing production and post-sales services offers
a broad range of possibilities for enriching the mix of goods offered on world
markets, moving from commodities to specialty products that embody a higher
domestic value added.
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With regard to linking horizontal, industry-specific and regional policies
on innovation and technological diffusion, it seems reasonable to create a
national agency for competitiveness and innovation whose central purpose
would be to implement a national policy in this respect. This agency should
have three main functions: (a) coordinating horizontal, industry-specific and
regional science and technology policies and developing the institutional
framework for cooperation among SMEs, large domestic and foreign firms,
public R&D institutes, universities and financial institutions; (b) relating these
policies and institutions to the country’s present pattern of international
competitiveness, especially in light of the future implications of the Uruguay
Round commitments; and (c) negotiating with large domestic conglomerates
and subsidiaries of multinational firms to establish domestic R&D programmes
capable of enhancing systemic competition. Issues that need to be explored
with large national and foreign firms include, for example, the export of goods
and services with higher domestic value added and the development of
cooperative R&D programmes in conjunction with SMEs and intermediate
part suppliers.
If Latin American countries want to accelerate their rate of productivity
growth and attain a more equitable distribution of the benefits of the transition
to a more open, deregulated macroeconomic policy regime, they must move
towards a pragmatic stage of reforming the reforms. New regulatory and
competition policies, together with new actions related to strengthening
domestic innovation and technological capabilities, are urgently needed if
the benefits of the recent structural reforms are to be sustained and more
equitably distributed in the future.
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